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This thesis examines how political conflict in Yemen has played out within the 
country’s diplomatic corps since 2011. Drawing on nine months of fieldwork, it 
analyses the complex interplay of socio-political, personal, and material forces that 
informed the maintenance and partial reworking of Yemeni foreign policy institutions 
at a time of crisis. It argues that the coexistence of institutional endurance and change 
constitutes a paradox that can only be grasped by conceptualizing the Yemeni foreign 
service as a dynamic, fragmented and internally uneven socio-material institution.  
It finds that institutional boundaries are highly permeable, allowing broader socio-
political changes to impact internal institutional developments. In the Yemeni 
diplomatic service, regime change and war translated into a particular professional 
challenge, marked by shifting and diversified diplomatic practices, attitudes, forms, 
and functions. Notwithstanding such change, strands of continuity prevailed, rooted in 
material institutional structures, as well as staffing policies, professional norms, and 
personal thoughts and emotions. In the process of examining internal change and 
continuity, this thesis sheds light on the controversial yet central notions of diplomatic 
loyalty and professionalism, while further fleshing out the concept of diplomatic 
agency, which is shown to underlie both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary 
processes. 
This study challenges the Western-centric bias in contemporary diplomacy research 
and constitutes an important step toward a radically heterogeneous imagination of 
diplomats and diplomatic practice. Its empirical insights unsettle widespread 
perceptions of global diplomacy as a homogeneous professional field marked by 
bounded state interests, material luxury, and shared professional conduct. This thesis 
also adds to the multidisciplinary field of state theory, using the case of the Yemeni 
foreign service to explain the historical entanglement of diplomacy, international 
recognition, sovereignty, and a government’s successful claim to “statehood”. Treating 
state sovereignty as a political practice embedded in unequal global power relations, 
it illuminates the micro-processes of its diplomatic safeguarding and promotion at a 
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Figure 2: Yemeni Embassies Worldwide 
Yemen has embassies in 49 countries, including Algeria, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, France, Germany, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, 
Mauretania, Morocco, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, 
Sudan, Somalia, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, USA, and South Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yemen, 2020).1 
 
1 Maps showing Yemeni embassy locations marked by the author using Google MyMaps (n.d.) and 
Mapchart.net (n.d.). Retrieved 02 February 2020 from https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/ and 





Faced with the choice of having his assets frozen or securing immunity in return for 
stepping down, Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh chose to resign from his 33-
year-long presidency on 23 November 2011. Sitting in the midst of an ornate room in 
Saudi Arabia, flanked by Yemeni opposition politicians, members of the Saudi royal 
family, and international diplomats, he signed an agreement that was brokered by 
representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the UN (Fahim & Kasinof, 
2011). Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation followed nine months of widespread public 
protests in Yemen and is widely considered a watershed moment in Yemeni state 
history. Opening a unique window of opportunity, it allowed a diverse range of 
stakeholders to rethink Yemen’s political future. In fact, the “GCC deal” signed by 
Saleh foresaw the establishment of a transition government, led by interim-president 
Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the convention of a National Dialogue Conference 
(NDC) tasked to develop more democratic political structures in Yemen (Durac, 
2012).2 Divided into several specialized working groups, the NDC was mandated to 
include all Yemeni “forces and political actors”. Thus, it included a diverse group of 
young protesters and activists, commonly referred to as “the youth”,3 and members of 
the “Southern Movement”, which was established in 2007 and had fought toward 
greater regional autonomy ever since. Added was a group of Zaidi (Shia) revivalists 
known as “the Houthis”, who enacted de-facto control over Yemen’s northern province 
Saada, as well as other political parties, civil society representatives and – in line with 
specific GCC stipulations – women (Lackner, 2012).  
At the core of debates and negotiations that followed Saleh’s resignation stood the 
notion of statehood. What state design could protect and incorporate Yemen’s 
fragmented interests and perspectives? Should a federal system of governance be set 
up? And how could religion be incorporated into formal state structures? Capturing 
 
2 Democratization measures included, among other things, a review of Yemen’s Constitution and 
electoral system (Durac, 2012).  
3 For more information about the concept of “youth”, specifically in the context of the 2011 uprisings, 
read Bonnefoy (2014). 
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these questions, the concept of “civil state” (dawla madaniyya) emerged as a 
particularly relevant concept in 2011, especially among young protesters (Bonnefoy & 
Poirier, 2013).4 Some perceived “the civil” as compatible with Islamic tenets, while 
others viewed it as an inherently secular concept which borrowed much from liberal-
democratic state ideas. As Hill (2010) commented at the time, “the fault lines between 
different meanings [of ‘civil’] indicate ruptures between competing visions of the state” 
(n.p.). Within the framework of the NDC, it was particularly members of the “state-
building” group that specified and negotiated meanings of statehood. Key points 
involved Yemen’s “state identity”, in particular the role of religion in its new 
Constitution, and Yemen’s “state form”, specifically federalist reforms and related 
questions of regional autonomy and intra-state borders.  
Debate about the state also spread to Yemeni diplomatic establishments abroad, 
triggering what one diplomat referred to as “an institutional revolution”. With the 
outbreak of the 2011 uprising, diplomatic state representatives found themselves in a 
sudden and unprecedented moment of uncertainty. Glued to their TV and mobile 
screens, they closely followed events in their home country on mainstream and social 
media. The heightened emotions and politicization that marked street protests in 
Yemen were shared by diplomats abroad, who in some cases had represented Ali 
Abdullah Saleh for decades. Radical socio-political change and conflict in Yemen 
disrupted normalized professional routines, loyalties, and diplomatic self-
understandings in Yemeni embassies around the world. In the process of exchanging 
political opinions, personal sentiments, and work-related concerns, diplomats 
positioned themselves along (conflicting) political, professional, family, and regional 
lines. Through the formation of labour unions, resignations, and public forms of protest, 
diplomats carried the 2011 uprising into Yemen’s foreign policy institutions. Their 
behaviour was met with considerable criticism by colleagues who emphasized 
professional duties of loyalty and political neutrality.  
Diplomats’ divergent reaction to regime change in Yemen raises important analytical 
questions about their role and practice, specifically with regards to the international 
 
4 The concept of “civil state” encompassed “notions of citizenship, social order, gender as well as 
state-society relations” (Heinze, 2014, p.70). 
 5 
representation and (re-)production of “the state”. Likewise, the multitude of diplomatic 
behaviour in 2011 puts the spotlight on the mechanisms and limitations of institutional 
resilience in moments of “revolutionary change”. While it appears that no diplomats 
were fired in 2011, diplomatic posts were assigned to powerful family members of 
former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2013. His son Ahmad Saleh, for instance, 
became ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, while two of his nephews were 
appointed military attachés to Germany and Ethiopia (Gordon, 2013). These staffing 
policies direct attention to the function of Yemen’s diplomatic service, suggesting that 
its liminal institutional space was used as a tool in broader politics of regime change.   
This project aims to explore the socio-material expression of both change and 
continuity within Yemen’s foreign policy institutions in the aftermath of 2011. Building 
on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork, archival studies, and desk-based research, 
it zooms in on the developments that have unfolded inside Yemen’s diplomatic corps 
between 2011 and late 2017. Moments of drastic rupture and conflict crack open the 
otherwise unified and steady façade of the diplomatic service, offering a unique glance 
into its inherent incoherence, fragmentation, and fluidity. While “in prosperous times 
[…], social systems appear stable”, in difficult times “this comfortable illusion 
disintegrates” (Gourevitch, 1986, p.17). More than simply highlighting political 
anomalies, existing historical analysis suggests that insight into the micro-level 
developments of state institutions can illuminate broader issues relating to the future 
trajectories of states (Grindle, 2012). “How public servants are recruited, how their 
careers unfold, and how they think about their jobs are central to the historical 
evolution of countries around the globe and to the conflicts that punctuate and shape 
that evolution” (Grindle, 2012, ix). 
This study sets out to gain an in-depth and situated understanding of diplomats’ 
practices and related meaning-making in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Its insight 
into the Yemeni diplomatic service adds an ethnographically grounded post-colonial 
perspective to the multi-disciplinary literature on diplomats and diplomacy. In 
particular, it advances current scholarly understandings of the socio-material makeup 
of diplomatic institutions in a non-Western setting. This thesis also produces findings 
relevant to contemporary research on “the state” and “state resilience”. The latter 
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became a topic of political concern and academic debate in Yemen with the outbreak 
of war in early 2015, which put a sudden end to the country’s political transition.  
Whilst NDC debates kept progressing slowly, sealed behind the closed doors of a five-
star Sanaani hotel, alternative state visions found a quicker – albeit more forceful – 
expression outside Yemen’s capital. Notably, the Houthi movement began expanding 
its territorial control in the north through military might. Their violent advancement soon 
caused a de facto shift in power that superseded negotiations at the NDC. Following 
a series of territorial power grabs, Houthis took over Yemen’s capital on 21 September 
2014 and moved further south. A few months later, Hadi’s transition cabinet resigned 
in protest of the Houthis’ ongoing expansion, and on 4 February 2015 Houthis replaced 
the parliament with a 501-member governing body, while also establishing a 
presidential council. Subsequently, most members of the Yemeni cabinet fled to Aden 
and moved on to Riyadh, where they set-up improvised governmental offices that were 
promoted as Yemen’s “legitimate government” (al-hakuma al-sharaiyyah).  
Soon after, on 25 March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition initiated a military intervention with 
the official goal of restoring Hadi’s rule over Yemen. What started with air strikes and 
a naval blockade quickly culminated in a violent war, involving a large number of 
foreign ground troops as well as local military factions and armed militia groups. 
Ongoing conflict and the incessant Saudi-run naval blockade aggravated a quickly 
forming humanitarian crisis in Yemen, marked by severe malnutrition, disease, and 
the death of thousands of innocent civilians (Bonnefoy, 2018). Horror and destruction 
inside Yemen have been accompanied by the ongoing negotiation of competing state 
claims, orchestrated by both the “legitimate government” in Riyadh and the “Houthi 
government” in Sanaa. In light of Yemen’s ongoing war, disintegration, and contested 
sovereignty, commentators jacked up previous characterizations of the country’s 
“weakness” and “fragility” to announce ultimate “state failure” (see Clausen, 2019). 
Notwithstanding its de facto collapse and surrounding negative commentary, “the 
Yemeni state” as an idea and legal status lived on. As international law scholar 
Crawford (2007) remarked, “the State continues to exist, with its rights and obligations, 
despite revolutionary changes in government or despite a period in which there is no, 
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or no effective, government” (p.34).) Legally speaking, states “once created […], even 
failed States, rarely disappear” (Novogrodsky, 2018, p.42).  
While state resilience is widely acknowledged among social scientists, the processes 
underlying such durability remain ill-understood. 5  In recent years, an increasing 
number of scholars in political geography and international relations have offered a 
potential avenue of exploring the matter further by emphasizing the involvement of 
diplomats in the maintenance of state permanence and solidity (Jones & Clark, 2015). 
Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann (2015) view diplomats as crucial to the reproduction 
of the state “as the naturalized political arena for the generation of meaning and 
belonging” (p.7). Yet, much of the existing research fails to explain how statehood is 
diplomatically maintained in moments of upheaval and conflict. By zooming into an 
allegedly “failing” state institution and conducting an ethnographic study of diplomats’ 
embodied socio-material practices, this project offers a new perspective to current 
debates on “the state”. Its findings foreground the experience of diplomats as “failing 
state”-actors, shedding light on the socio-material mechanisms underlying state 
resilience at a time of rupture.  
I The situated study of Yemen’s diplomatic service 
Addressing the partial and situated nature of current conceptualisations of both state 
resilience and diplomatic institutions, this study examines the micro-level 
developments of the Yemeni diplomatic service in the aftermath of 2011. Specifically, 
it aims to understand how the Yemeni diplomatic service has reflected recent socio-
political conflict in Yemen. Insight into the socio-material expression of both change 
and continuity within Yemen’s foreign policy institutions constitutes a useful empirical 
starting point for the further study of state resilience, while also contributing to the 
understanding of diplomats and diplomatic services, specifically in a non-Western 
context.  
 
5 Existing research mostly focuses on explanatory factors that fall outside the failing state. 
Novogrodsky (2018), for instance, mentions the general bias among state actors to “save” failing state 
entities to thereby maintain the international status-quo.  
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This project views social and political structures as re-produced through practice, 
which renders them temporal and contingent by default (Bueger & Gadinger, 2018). 
Accordingly, its exploration of change and continuity is inspired by practice theory, 
which was initially developed “to gain a better understanding of the dynamic interplay 
between order and change” (Bueger & Gadinger, 2018, p. 100). Acknowledging that 
social practices are shaped by a range of contextual factors, often inherited from the 
past, this project adopts a historical approach in its analysis of 2011 events. As Rouse 
(2007) put it, the “emphasis upon the dynamics of social structures and their 
governance or constraint of individual actions gives a strongly historical dimension to 
any practice-theoretical approach” (p.646). Practices in relation to the state are not 
developed on a blank surface but draw on a historical legacy, notably involving a set 
of institutions and conventions. These historical trajectories provide “the resources 
with which actors pursue strategies for the future” (Painter & Jeffrey, 2009, p.26), while 
also limiting the range of options (perceived to be) available. Reviewing the 
emergence of Yemen’s diplomatic service over time allows this project to trace its 
historical legacies into the present, outlining the resources and limitations that shaped 
diplomatic practices in the aftermath of 2011. The meaning of contemporary diplomatic 
practice, its vocabularies and material form, can only be grasped against the backdrop 
of wider historical-institutional developments. “To gain any true understanding of what 
something means, it is necessary to unravel how it came into existence in the first 
place” (Danesi, 2002, p.viii). 
Since social interaction is situated not only in time but also in space (Giddens, 1984), 
the final part of this study zooms out of Yemen to regionally contextualize and qualify 
its case study. Extending its analytical gaze to Egypt and Tunisia – arguably the two 
most prominent and promising cases of regime change in 2011 – it highlights 
similarities and differences that help assess the uniqueness of the Yemeni experience. 
While this study does not claim to be comparative per se, its outline of Egyptian and 
Tunisian developments provides empirical snapshots which can be productively 
juxtaposed with the Yemeni case study.  
This project’s analysis of socio-material change and continuity within the Yemeni 
diplomatic service is guided by the following three research questions: 
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1) What are the historical narratives that frame the emergence of the Yemeni 
diplomatic service? 
2) What was diplomats’ experience of the crisis and how did it impact diplomatic 
practice? 
3) How can we trace the implications of the Yemeni crisis through focus on 
institutional forms and functions? 
In answering these questions this project explores how the in-depth and ethnographic 
study of the Yemeni diplomatic service helps theorize the relationship between the 
state and diplomacy. In particular, it seeks to uncover diplomats’ role in the 
maintenance of state sovereignty. Neither sovereignty nor the concept of state are 
considered empirical facts in this study, but instead are treated as ideas and practices 
– with real material effects. This approach builds on a trend in state theory that is 
widely traced back to Abrams (1988), who was among the first to suggest studying 
“the idea of the state” (p.75), rather than “the state as a material object”. As a socio-
political concept, he argued, “the state” is closely intertwined with social and material 
power relations, acting as a “triumph of concealment” that disguises the disunity of 
political authority and clouds “relations of subjection” (Abrams, 1988, p.77). People’s 
belief in the state’s existence, no matter how misguided, can have “a significant 
political reality” (Abrams, 1988, p.68).  
Abrams’ constructivist argument was taken up and developed further by Mitchell 
(1991), who proposed to examine the state “not as an actual structure, but as the 
powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist” 
(p.94). A number of scholars (Jeffrey, 2006, 2013; McConnell, Moreau, & Dittmer, 
2012; Painter, 2006; Marston, 2004; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Navaro-Yashin, 2002; 
Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Trouillot, 2001; Ó Tuathail & Dalby, 1998; Gupta, 1995; 
Corrigan & Sayer, 1985) followed and built upon the work of Abrams and Mitchell, 
examining the socio-material construction of the state. Moving within the broader 
framework of postcolonial theory, as well as structuralist and poststructuralist thought 
(Bratsis, 2006), they frequently applied concepts such as practice, performance, 
improvisation, or discourse. Building on their work, this thesis sheds light on the set of 
micro-level diplomatic practices that help produce macro-level effects of sovereign 
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statehood. Following Schatzki (2005), it argues that the state and state institutions can 
be comprehended by identifying the actions that compose it. 
II Conceptualizing the study of diplomats and diplomatic practice 
Arguing that knowledge about diplomats and the diplomatic service is essentially 
interdisciplinary, this study draws on research produced within the fields of 
international relations, political geography, political sciences, sociology, and 
organization studies. In doing so, it follows an inductive, integrative, and question-
driven approach; concrete empirical objects, structures, and processes are analysed 
in terms of concepts and theoretical tools chosen for their relevance, regardless of 
their disciplinary origins (Sil, 2000). This approach prioritises historically emergent 
questions as “the driving force of social research rather than a priori commitments to 
disciplinary traditions or methodological perspectives” (Sil, 2000, p.13). Specific 
theoretical frameworks and concepts are selectively applied to help explain and 
interpret this study’s empirical findings. 
Focusing on the Yemeni diplomatic service, this project places the diplomat and 
diplomatic practice at its core. As such, it contributes to the “practice turn” in qualitative 
research, shifting focus from the “big things”, such as discourse and linguistic 
representation, to the “little things” of affect, objects, and daily practice (Mul̈ler, 2013). 
Keen to move beyond the representational surface of social events, an increasing 
number of scholars have begun to study and theorize minute practices. Referred to as 
“a diffuse movement” (Shove et al, 2012), the “practice”-theme has grown 
considerably in the early 21st century, embracing, among other disciplines, 
organization studies (Nicolini et al, 2003; Gherardi 2006; Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks 
& Yanow, 2009; Nicolini, 2012), media studies (Couldry, 2010), and political sciences 
(Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Freeman, Griggs & Boaz, 2011). As of late, an increasing 
number of political geographers (Jones & Clark, 2015, 2019; McConnell, Moreau, & 
Dittmer, 2012) and international relations scholars (e.g. Neumann, 2002; Pouliot, 
2010; Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014; Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2015; Bueger & 
Gadinger, 2018; Bode, 2018) have turned to the concept of practice as well, studying 
events, processes, and entities at the world stage as “bundles of individual and 
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collective practices woven together” (Cornut, 2018, p.713). They viewed war, peace, 
diplomacy, states, and other “big picture”-components of international affairs to be 
organized by specific practices (Jones & Clark 2015; Shove et al, 2012).  
Practices offer a suitable focal point in the socially grounded analysis of international 
affairs, one that transcends narrow dualisms such as agency and structure, material 
and social, as well as local and global scales. While the benefits of studying human 
practice are widely agreed upon, controversy prevails regarding the exact definition of 
practice and the feasibility of practice-centred research. “Social practice theory is not 
a unified theory, but rather a collection of authors and approaches interested in 
studying or theorizing practice, each of whom has his or her own distinctive 
vocabulary” (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks & Yanow, 2009, p.1312). In an attempt to 
bring order to such fragmentation (Rouse, 2007; Ringmar, 2014), several scholars set 
out to review and synthesize commonalities of existing practice accounts (e.g. 
Reckwitz, 2002; Schazki et al, 2001). According to Reckwitz (2002), for example, the 
concept contains three major elements: 1) bodily and mental activities, 2) “things” and 
their use, and 3) background knowledge “in the form of understanding, know-how, 
states of emotion and motivational knowledge” (p.249).6  
Definitional approaches such as Reckwitz’ (2002) remain necessarily vague, leaving 
several questions unaddressed. The relationship between practice and the dualistic 
notions of change and continuity, for example, continues to spark scholarly debate. 
“While practice theorists generally share a conception of social or cultural structures 
as existing only through their continuing reproduction in practices, they differ 
extensively over the degree of stability that practices can sustain” (Rouse, 2007, p. 
646). On the one hand, practices have been portrayed as spontaneous, dynamic, 
continuously changing (Bueger, 2014), and responsive to shifting contexts (Jones & 
Clark, 2015). On the other hand, practices have been viewed as “stable, regulated 
patterns, routines, and reproduction” (Bueger, 2014, p.391). 7  In fact, some 
researchers emphasize the role of practice in path-dependencies. Among other things, 
 
6 Notwithstanding minor deviations, additions, and abstractions, Reckwitz’ theorization of practice has 
been acknowledged in later works on practice (e.g. Shove et al, 2012; Bueger, 2014). 
7 According to Shove et al (2012), “stability is the emergent and always provisional outcome of 
successively faithful reproductions of practice’’ (cited in Jones and Clark, 2015, p.3). 
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they suggest that previously acquired schemes of action are applied through practices 
to new situations (e.g. Pouliot, 2010). In other words, every revision of social action is 
thought to take place on the basis of prior dispositions (Pouliot, 2010). Fixation on 
such social reproduction “can explain why practice theory is sometimes felt to 
overemphasize continuity and structure over change and agency” (Cornut, 2018, 
p.721). Bueger and Gadinger (2018) group scholars’ varying emphasis of change and 
continuity into critical and pragmatic trends. Critical approaches draw heavily on 
Bourdieuan concepts in emphasising repetition and the reproduction of social systems 
(e.g. Pouliot, 2010), whereas pragmatic perspectives focus on fluctuation and 
contingency and are frequently influenced by pragmatic sociologists like Boltanski 
(e.g. Bode, 2018). In analysing simultaneous processes of continuity and change 
within the Yemeni diplomatic service, this project draws inspiration from both theoretic 
orientations.  
A further point of debate regards what Reckwitz (2002) calls “background knowledge”. 
According to Pouliot (2018), “an essential dimension of practice is the result of 
inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear self-evident or 
commonsensical” (Pouliot, 2010, p.12). This implies that practices are acquired and 
enacted unthinkingly. Practice theorists go to great lengths explaining why practices, 
such as playing the piano or skateboarding, can only be learned by “practicing”. Once 
acquired, they argue, the enactment of practices is neither based on “conscious 
deliberation” nor on “thoughtful reflection” – it is just done (Pouliot, 2010). Notably, the 
concept of background knowledge figures prominently in Bourdieu-inspired studies of 
social reproduction, while being less relevant to studies of controversy and change 
(Bode, 2018).  
As shown in the remaining part of this study, the theorization of practice as a skill, or 
a craft, acquired over time is at odds with the empirical data gathered in this study. 
Due to a large number of political appointments and institutional rotations, Yemeni 
diplomatic practices are frequently enacted by “newcomers”. Similarly, the notion of 
practical knowledge is difficult to reconcile with this study’s focus on crisis, during 
which practices tend to be more “thought-through” and reflexive (Bueger, 2014). 
Instead of emphasizing background knowledge, this project therefore follows the 
examples of Bode (2018), who studied reflective practices of a strategic or tactical 
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nature at the UN Security Council. “Portraying practices as reflective rather than as 
only based on tacit knowledge highlights how actors may creatively adapt their 
practices to social situations” (Bode, 2018, p. 293). According to Bode (2018), 
competent performance rests not so much on tacit knowledge but on the personality 
of actors, which she conceptualized as a plural socialisation experience. Bode’s focus 
on actors corresponds with Cornut’s (2018) argument that “practice theory is a theory 
of agency” (p.714). All practice, while conditioned by material and social history, 
contains a degree of improvisation that requires “agential creativity” (Cornut, 2018). 
No situation equals another, and agents continuously develop new scripts at work 
(Wagenaar, 2004).8 This study is particularly interested in the behavioural choices and 
justifications that inform diplomats’ diverse practices at a time of rupture and 
controversy. These are theorized with the help of Hirschman’s (1970) well-known 
theoretical trio of exit, voice, and loyalty, which allows for the study of actors’ 
subjectivity and internal institutional heterogeneity. 
In examining the agency and reflectivity that is entangled in diplomatic practice, this 
project benefits from its focus on crisis. It is in these moments that established 
practices are challenged, changed, and/or in need of new justification (Bueger, 2014). 
As Cornut (2015) put it, “when facing exceptional circumstances, even seasoned 
diplomats may act like beginners” (p.728). Increased doubt and uncertainty lead 
practitioners to reflect on the “common sensical” and (re-)think their practices at work 
(Bueger, 2014). According to political scientists Laws and Rein (2003), accepted 
stories are challenged in moments of doubt, when “events upset conventional 
accounts and an indeterminate situation arises that requires interpretation” (p.175). A 
similar argument was made by Boltanski and Thev́enot (1999), who found that in 
“critical moments” actors “who are doing things together – let us say in politics, work, 
unionism – and who have to co-ordinate their actions, realize that something is going 
wrong; that they cannot get along anymore; that something has to change” (p.359). 
The subsequent quest for new arrangements is marked by controversy and power 
struggles, centred around competing narratives of justification. According to Boltanski 
 
8Among other things, state bureaucrats and administrators are required to respond to “the human 
dimensions of situations” which calls for “sensitive observation and judgment, which are not reducible 
to programmed formats” (Lipsky, 2010, p.15). 
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and Thev́enot (1999), the re-development of temporary and fragile agreements 
depends on the assertion of a new narrative that secures sufficient legitimacy. The 
conceptualization of practice as “a process of social ordering occurring between 
justification and critique” (Gadinger, 2016, p. 188) foregrounds normativity and is 
echoed in other scholarly work on international practice. For instance, Jones and Clark 
(2015) find that diplomatic practice “gives rise to the ordering of the state at home and 
at – a – distance” (p.3). Conversely, they link the contestation of state legitimacy and 
authority to the “disordering” of routine diplomatic practices.  
Contrary to abstract practice-based accounts that foreground the philosophical 
theorization of implicit knowledge, this study puts forth a more pragmatic and 
ethnographically inspired approach that centres around agential creativity. Borrowing 
from the often-cited work of Schatzki (1996, 2001), it understands practice as the 
“doings and sayings” of people. This broad definition purposefully circumvents the 
theoretical complexity of Schatzki (1996), which has been proven difficult to apply in 
empirical studies (Bueger & Gadinger, 2018). Throughout this project, the “practice”-
term is used to capture a range of “doings and sayings” of diplomats, variably referring 
to activities, performances, narratives, behaviours, and behavioural strategies, to 
name just some examples. As understood in this study, “practices range from 
ephemeral doings to stable long-term patterns of activity” (Rouse, 2007, p.639). 
Describing singular and/or collective action (Rouse, 2007, p. 647), they contain a 
number of inherent opposites, being both un/intentional, in/sincere, un/emotional, and 
non/routinized.  
This project hopes to contribute to existing studies of diplomatic practice by shifting 
focus onto internal practices of organisation, notably appointments and promotions, 
as well as crisis-specific practices of protest (and monitoring), revolving around 
questions of loyalty and voice.9 Among other things, these include individual cases of 
disobedience, sit-ins, the establishment of a diplomatic labour union, ambassadorial 
 
9Diplomatic practices commonly studied by scholars include, among others, speech writing, 
conference negotiations, information gathering, visa delivery, multilateral debate, cultural exchange, 
treaty signing, twitter messaging, negotiating treaties, sitting on the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council, waging wars, conducting bilateral relations, sending reports, engaging with civil society, 
inviting state representatives for state visits, following speaking points, hosting seminars, workshops, 
and talks, and having informal meetings to learn about the positions of other diplomats (Pouliot & 
Cornut, 2015; Cornut, 2018; Jones & Clark, 2015).  
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resignations, and diplomats’ public criticism of their government. Furthermore, this 
study’s analysis makes reference to material practices, such as the hosting of dinner 
parties, and practices of protocol, such as the issuing of visas. In analysing these 
diplomatic practices, this project emphasizes practitioners’ intrinsic drive and 
context. 10  As such, it looks at diplomats’ individual attributes, for example their 
emotions, personality, ambitions, opinions, and values, as well as their social, political, 
economic, and institutional environments.  
By combining personal with broader contextual variables, this study goes beyond the 
perennial dualism which lies between “the purposive and meaningful activity through 
which agents construct their world on the one hand, and the impersonal compulsion 
and limits the gravity of social structures impose upon them on the other” (Bourdieu, 
Waquant & Farage, 1994, p.3). Rather than merely combining “structuralist” and 
“constructivist” approaches, this study aims to demonstrate their simultaneous 
necessity and inseparability. As Bourdieu (1991) aptly put it, the true principle of action 
resides not in either institutions or agents, but in their interaction, meaning the 
encounter between “history objectified in things” and “history incarnate in bodies” 
(p.38). According to Bourdieu, Waquant, and Farage (1994), “it is out of this perpetual 
and multi-levelled dialectic of field and habitus, position and disposition, social 
structures and mental structures that practices emerge and (re)make the world which 
makes them” (p.4).  
Bridging the conceptual divide between agency and structure means combining “the 
social” with “the material”. By adopting a relational ontology that highlights the close 
interconnection between material and social resources, this study adds to a new 
strand of research in political geography, which explores the world as a 
conglomeration of “socio-material practices that are diffuse, tangled and contingent” 
(Anderson & McFarlane, 2011 cited in Jeffrey, 2017, p.2). The analysis of diplomats’ 
agency and its interaction with material environments acknowledges the important role 
of objects. Following Bueger (2014), this study finds that certain ways of handling 
 
10 This approach follows Bode (2015), who argued that “as conceptual sites, practices are equally 




things may be inscribed into an artefact, which can ‘‘authorize, allow, afford, 
encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on” 
(Latour, 2005, p.72). While studying the impact of objects and materiality on political 
developments, this study does not treat material features as “agents”. Like Krause 
(2011), it finds that “it is one thing to acknowledge that non-human bodies contribute 
to human agency and another thing to attribute agency to them” (p.309). Clearly, 
diplomatic agency is materially mediated; a broad range of material resources and 
configurations, expressed through professional codes and symbolic systems, impact 
and constrain diplomatic behaviour. Yet, objects and material structures do not 
constitute a deterministic force that could define, let alone predict, human behaviour. 
On the contrary, existing institutions can be remodelled through changed collective 
practices and their large-scale structuring effects. As Giddens (1984) put it, “the 
reversible time of institutions is both the condition and the outcome of the practices 
organized in the continuity of daily life” (p. 36).  
While this study aims to integrate “the social” and “the material”, it does not entirely 
elide the distinction between these two conceptual categories. Separate references to 
material and social aspects are linked to Chatterjee’s (1993) differentiation between 
the material domain of the outside – variably referring to the world, statecraft, and 
technology – and the inner domain of spirit, national culture, and identity (Chatterjee, 
1989). Drawing on Chatterjee, this project occasionally refers to the “material 
structure” of Yemen’s diplomatic corps, which includes architecture, technology, 
Constitutions, organisational charts, laws, formal titles, and material objects, such as 
passports, diplomatic salaries, formal dress codes, flags, and letterheads. The realm 
of “spiritual agency” comprises less tangible social and power relations, personal 
biographies, and individual beliefs, values, aspirations, and emotions.  
This study’s comprehensive conceptual approach is combined with rich data collected 
during nine months of multi-site ethnographic fieldwork in 2016-17 and extensive 
desk-based and archival research. Treating the global network of Yemeni diplomats 
as a single field site, fieldwork was driven by an opportunistic focus on trust-based 
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access. Inspired by existing global ethnographies11 and a recent trend of people- and 
practice-centred studies on diplomacy (Jones & Clark, 2013; McConnell, Moreau, & 
Dittmer, 2012; Kuus, 2013; Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014), research was conducted 
across Europe, America, and the Middle East, involving diplomats from Yemen and 
other countries. While repeated narrative interviews constituted this project’s primary 
research method, the researcher also engaged in sporadic participant observation 
within the “microgeographies” of ethnographic encounters (Elwood & Martin, 2004, 
p.653). 
Practice theorists have long argued that the critical deconstruction of global 
developments requires empirical research (Cornut, 2018, Bueger & Gadinger, 2018). 
To better understand international practices, Neumann (2002) famously called on 
scholars to abandon their “arm-chair analysis”, which he criticized lacked 
contextualizing data from the field, “data that may illuminate how foreign policy and 
global politics are experienced as lived practices” (p.628). Focusing exclusively on 
aggregate macro-level patterns risks producing an image of global politics “in which 
practitioners hardly recognize themselves” (Cornut, 2018). While most theorists in the 
field of international relations view diplomacy as “strategic action, instrumental 
rationality and cost-benefit calculations” (Pouliot, 2010, p.12), this scholarly 
understanding is at odds with that of practitioners. 
III Outline of this thesis 
At its core, this research argues that Yemen’s diplomatic corps has witnessed the 
coexistence of institutional endurance and change since 2011 – a paradox that can 
only be grasped by conceptualizing the Yemeni foreign service as a dynamic, 
fragmented, and internally uneven socio-material institution. Diplomats interpreted the 
Yemeni crisis as a unique professional challenge that had to be “navigated” by means 
of different behavioural strategies. Their newly emerging practices constituted a key 
driver of change, having “structural effects” (Mitchell, 1991) and impacting the 
perceived institutional function of the Yemeni diplomatic service. However, shifts in 
 
11 Global ethnographic studies have been conducted on foreign correspondents (Hannerz, 2003), 
ballet professionals (Wulff, 1998), the transnational organization of Apple (Garsten, 1994), and the 
“professional elite” of wealth managers (Harrington, 2017). 
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diplomats’ subjectivity, their practice, and institutional form and functions never 
replaced strands of continuity. Notably, the visible “material form” of Yemen’s 
diplomatic service was preserved, contributing to an outward image of stability. 
Likewise, a number of diplomats chose to actively maintain the status-quo, silently 
following established routines. To capture the complex interaction of institutional 
change and endurance, this study conceptualizes the Yemeni diplomatic service as a 
heterogeneous and fluid socio-material organization. Its internal diversity and flexible 
interaction with shifting external factors and individual demands is demonstrated by 
tracing its historical genealogy and by studying the micro-level developments that 
have unfolded since 2011. 
This study’s argument is presented in eight chapters. Its research design and data 
collection methods are discussed in chapter two, which introduces the Yemeni 
diplomatic service as a global, relatively exclusive, and fluid professional network. It 
also foregrounds the importance of trust and explains the usefulness of international 
snowball sampling. It is argued that access to diplomats and attainment of in-depth 
information about diplomatic practice was dependent on the quality of personal 
relationships. Rather than determining research sites a priori, the researcher followed 
diplomats’ referrals whenever and wherever possible, tracing, tapping into, and 
benefiting from already existing relationships of trust.  
As is typical for ethnographic projects, multiple qualitative research methods were 
deployed, including (repeated) narrative interviews, sporadic participant observation, 
and archival research. This multi-site and multi-method approach offers a valuable 
contribution to the methodological literature on global ethnographies and elite 
research, while also informing actor- and practice based research in diplomacy 
studies. To illustrate the complex and multi-layered power relations that shaped the 
researcher’s fieldwork experience, issues of reflexivity, positionality, and ethics are 
discussed. 
This project’s third and fourth chapter outline the historical development of the Yemeni 
state and the Yemeni diplomatic service respectively. Chapter three introduces the 
Yemeni state as an important reference in this study. Instead of offering a static 
“snapshot definition”, it suggests that the meaning of Yemeni statehood resides in the 
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fluid relation between institutions and agents over time. More specifically, it 
conceptualizes state development as a translocal practice of learning that involves 
people, materials, and shifting environments. This approach is particularly useful in 
studying the multiplicity of state-building in Yemen, which never followed a 
superimposed and externally enforced blueprint. In examining the formation and 
expression of state ideas, this chapter does not aim at covering the full intellectual 
history of Yemeni “statehood” but proceeds in a genealogical manner that emphasizes 
outwardly striking ruptures in Yemeni politics.  
Chapter three offers important background information which helps to explain the 
development of the Yemeni diplomatic service, outlined in chapter four. Crucially, 
chapter four adds historical depth to this study’s argument, demonstrating that the 
plasticity and internal unevenness of Yemeni foreign policy institutions have long 
comprised simultaneous change and continuity. Its analysis emphasizes information 
about diplomats’ educational backgrounds, careers, and physical appearance. This 
sheds light on the translocal practices and socialization processes that shaped the 
institutional development of the Yemeni diplomatic service. Focus on diplomats’ 
personal biographies also highlights the embodied nature of diplomatic practice and 
pinpoints their embeddedness in wider global power structures. By tracing historical 
legacies into the present, chapter four helps assess the significance and meaning of 
post-2011 developments.  
Chapters five to seven examine to what extent and how Yemen’s diplomatic state 
institutions have reflected regime change and war in the aftermath of 2011. Chapter 
five focuses on diplomatic practices and diplomats’ experience of the 2011 uprising. 
It argues that Yemeni diplomats interpreted protests as a particular professional 
challenge and examines the various viewpoints and behavioural strategies they 
developed in response. Drawing on the concept of “social navigation” (Vigh, 2006) and 
Hirschman’s (1970) trio of exit, voice, and loyalty, chapter five captures diplomats’ 
oscillation between silent obedience and expressions of protest. Behavioural 
strategies and concomitant power struggles were informed by material as well as 
psychological and emotional factors. They centred around the concept of “diplomatic 
professionalism”, which emerged as an important reference and practice of 
justification in 2011. Similarly, the notion of “diplomatic loyalty” emerged as a central 
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factor in the ongoing controversy that surrounded diverse diplomatic behaviour. While 
the findings of this chapter suggest that institutional boundaries are highly permeable, 
allowing broader socio-political changes to impact internal institutional developments, 
principles of diplomatic loyalty, staffing policies, and varying personal motivations 
helped maintain strands of continuity.  
Following chronologically, chapter six focuses on the outbreak of civil war in early 
2015 and subsequent developments unfolding within the Yemeni diplomatic service. 
The interrelated themes of professionalism, voice, and loyalty continue to inform its 
analysis of diplomatic agency and practice in the context of violent conflict. In exploring 
the micro-level dynamics of Yemen’s (dis)ordered state representation during civil war, 
this chapter emphasizes diplomatic practices related to voice and loyalty, specifically 
diplomats’ contested freedom of expression and appointments. Focusing on the 
important role of social media, it argues that the exiled Yemeni government managed 
the existent array of diplomatic voices more rigidly during the civil war than it did in 
2011. At the same time, shifting appointment practices pushed the reward-function of 
diplomatic posts to new heights, triggering a “crisis of professionalism” among career-
diplomats that altered the perceived institutional function of the Yemeni foreign 
service. The chapter concludes by examining how micro-level developments inside 
the diplomatic service reflect back on macro-level perceptions and understandings of 
Yemeni statehood. Specifically, it suggests that practices structured around diplomatic 
loyalty, no matter their effectiveness, were essential to governmental claims of 
legitimacy and sovereignty.  
Chapter seven shifts focus onto the (changing) materiality of the Yemeni diplomatic 
service. Following a relational ontology, Bourdieu’s concept of capital is applied to 
capture the interaction of material and non-material factors. Importantly, this chapter 
outlines the limitation of state-provided economic capital within the Yemeni diplomatic 
service, painting a picture that challenges widespread stereotypes of diplomatic 
luxury. It also indicates that diplomatic practice is shaped by a fluid constellation of 
scarce resources that are unevenly distributed within the Yemeni diplomatic service. 
This insight provokes a set of reflections that is termed “poor state diplomacy”. At its 
core, the concept of “poor state diplomacy” addresses the difficult reconciliation of 
resource scarcity with materially embedded diplomatic functions. Grounded in 
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empirical data from the “geopolitical margin”, it serves as a critical intervention in the 
Euro-centric field of diplomacy studies and its imaginations of global diplomatic 
uniformity. In particular, the concept challenges the idea of homogeneity that 
frequently underlies conceptions of diplomatic practice between and within national 
diplomatic services. The final part of chapter seven examines the material and 
symbolic co-constitution of the Yemeni diplomatic apparatus by focusing on the 
changing functions of the passport. It demonstrates that in 2016-17 the ability to 
provide internationally recognized passports emerged as an essential tool in the 
legitimation of competing claims to territorial control and state power.  
Chapter eight contextualizes the Yemeni experience geographically by exploring 
developments inside the Egyptian and Tunisian diplomatic service at a time of sudden 
socio-political change. Its findings reveal similarities and differences that help assess 
the uniqueness of the Yemeni experience. While this chapter is not comparative per 
se, its outline of Egyptian and Tunisian developments provides empirical snapshots 
which can be productively juxtaposed with the Yemeni case study. To better draw out 
comparative insights, chapter eight maintains the conceptual categories already 
applied in the analysis of the Yemeni diplomatic service. Using Hirschman’s (1970) 
trio of exit, voice, and loyalty, it focuses on diplomats’ viewpoints and various 
behavioural strategies after 2011. The analysis of Tunisian and Egyptian diplomatic 
practices foregrounds and further illuminates the concept of diplomatic agency. Similar 
to developments in Yemen, a number of diplomatic actors in Egypt and Tunisia saw 
the uprising as an “opening” and engaged in unprecedented political activism in 
support of both change and continuity. While some aimed to reform diplomatic 
practice, others actively tried to maintain the status quo. A look at Tunisia and Egypt 
also lends support to the argument that diplomatic institutions are fragmented, 
ambiguous, highly responsive to environmental change and marked by unique 
institutional histories.  
This project’s findings are of both academic and political value. Academically, this 
study advances the people- and practice-centred research on diplomacy within the 
field of IR and political geography. To date, ethnographic studies on diplomats have 
mostly looked at diplomats in Brussels (Jones & Clark, 2015; Kuus, 2014), European 
foreign ministries (Neumann, 2007, 2015), and international organizations, such as 
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NATO (Pouliot, 2010; Dittmer, 2017) and the UN (Jones & Clark, 2019). While much 
has been written about diplomacy in the Middle East, and some scholars have 
assigned a distinctive diplomatic culture to it (Brown, 2003), no research on the region 
has focused on diplomats themselves and diplomatic state institutions.  
This study of Yemeni diplomats and diplomatic practice produces country-specific 
findings that challenge the Western bias in current diplomacy research. In particular, 
it problematizes Euro-centric imaginations of global diplomatic uniformity, which 
assume universally shared professional codes, norms, structures and experiences.12 
This study’s historical analysis also complicates narratives of diplomacy’s European 
origins and linear diffusion,13 pointing to the legacies of exclusion and oppression that  
have marked the early diplomatic history of South Yemen.  
Besides contributing to diplomacy studies, this project’s analysis of a non-Western 
case study adds to the diverse field of practice research. First, it combines postcolonial 
and practice theory, highlighting their ontological and epistemological similarities. Both 
postcolonial and practice-based approaches tend to view social order as multiplicity. 
Rather than speaking of universal wholes or truths, they examine multiple and 
overlapping orders and realities (Schatzki, 2002; Bueger & Gadinger, 2018) and 
foreground individual subjectivity, meaning, and power relations in their 
methodological designs. Notwithstanding these overlaps, postcolonial and practice 
theory have rarely been merged in the empirical research of international relations and 
diplomacy. Second, this project moves away from the focus on background 
knowledge, instead examining reflexive diplomatic practices and diplomatic agency in 
moments of rupture. Notwithstanding the interest that many practice theorists have 
expressed in “the innovativeness of reflexive agents” (Bueger & Gadinger, 2018, p.29) 
and questions of “competence” (Sending, Pouliot & Neumann, 2015, p. 18), many 
have “bypassed whether and how it matters which individuals, in the true sense of the 
word, perform practices” (Bode, 2018, p.299).  
 
12 Melissen (2016), for instance, speaks of a “global diplomatic system” (p.xxi), marked by “shared 
values and diplomatic norms” (p.xiv). Likewise, Cohen (2016) suggests that “diplomatic relationships” 
are “grounded in a commonly accepted system of procedure, protocol and law; a lingua franca; and 
permanent diplomatic missions” (p.13). 
13 According to Cohen (2016), modern diplomacy “surfaced in Renaissance Italy” and spread “over 
the entire world after the Second World War” (p.13). 
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By exploring the relationship between diplomatic practice and the state, specifically 
state sovereignty, this study also contributes to the multi-disciplinary field of state 
theory. First, it sheds light on the micro-level mechanisms underlying the diplomatic 
maintenance of state sovereignty in moments of crisis. It suggests that the continued 
performance of diplomatic loyalty and the maintenance of institutional “outer form”, no 
matter their effectiveness, are essential to claims of legitimacy and sovereignty – two 
concepts that emerged as crucial to regime survival in the Yemeni case study. A 
second contribution to state theory regards the role of state institutions in 
“revolutionary moments”. By portraying foreign policy apparatuses as microcosms of 
broader political and social trends, this project emphasizes bureaucracy’s fluidity and 
calls into question depictions of the diplomatic service as a counter-revolutionary force 
(Sharp, 2009; Ross, 2007; Frey & Frey, 2004). In fact, it indicates that resistance and 
contestation are as common within state institutions as they are outside of them.  
The relevance of this project stretches beyond academia, offering a rare glance 
“behind the scenes” of Yemeni diplomacy. By adopting an actor- and practice-based 
approach, this thesis produces a level of nuance that is crucial for informed, sensible, 
and effective foreign policy-making pertaining to the Middle East. In particular, its 
research findings contribute to the understanding of (non-Western) diplomats’ diverse 
subjectivities and practices. Such insights are of broader social and political relevance 
given that diplomats and their behaviour influence the policies and self-understanding 
of governments, while probably also impacting the public’s understanding of foreign 
policy (Stanzel, 2018). 
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2 Following Diplomats Through a Translocal Field  
 
 
The first Yemeni embassy I visited could only be accessed through a side-entrance in 
London’s South Kensington neighbourhood. Its main door was closed and inscriptions 
on the doorbells were difficult to decipher. Upon entering, I found myself in a stuffy 
and small room, with a seating area to the right and a glass window, protected by a 
steel grid, to the left, showing a chamber with a desk, presumably the reception. The 
burgundy colour of time-worn chairs, fashionable maybe in the 1970s, matched that 
of the torn carpet. An oversized and faded banner in the right corner advertised Yemen 
as a tourist destination. On the wall just opposite the entrance hang a large gold-
framed portrait of Yemen’s president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi.   
 
       
 
Figure 3: Yemeni Embassy in London 
The embassy’s “lobby” (left), its main door (centre), and doorbells with a sign asking visitors to enter 
the building through the side entrance around the corner (right).14 
 
Initially I found myself alone in the room, as the reception was unattended. After 
waiting for a while, I knocked at the window and shouted a loud “hello?” A woman 
 
14 Source for photo in the centre: “Embassy of Yemen in London”. [Digital Image]. (2013). Retrieved 8 
May 2018 from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Embassy_of_Yemen_in_London_1.jpg. 
Source for photos on the left and right: private. 
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promptly appeared, and I asked to see the ambassador. I remember I used the 
expression “his excellency the ambassador”, which felt strangely old-fashioned and 
out of place spoken in the humble ambience of a basement room. I was led through a 
dimly lit hallway, filled with what appeared to be dusty thrown-out furniture, and up a 
staircase. The thick red carpet swallowed the sounds of my steps, emphasizing the 
absolute silence surrounding me. The large Victorian town house seemed empty, even 
abandoned. “Stuffy, dark, and quiet – a shadow of the glory it once was”, I later wrote 
in my fieldnotes.  
This first encounter with Yemeni diplomats radically challenged my preconceived 
images of diplomatic work settings. Influenced by mainstream cultural and media 
representations, I had pictured diplomacy as a glamourous world of galas and 
receptions, villas and suits, Champagne and flashy cars. Its distinctive aura of historic 
nobility and aristocratic etiquette made it look oddly detached from broader historical 
changes in political organisation. In short, I had viewed diplomacy as a “bubble” of 
material affluence, power, and conservative tradition.  
In the process of meeting and talking to diplomats, I revisited many of these 
preconceptions. Fieldwork proved a learning experience in more ways than I imagined 
and was marked by self-reflexive openness, the frequent re-assessment of 
understanding, and flexible changes in my research design. As I traversed through 
diplomatic spaces, tracing the networks of Yemeni diplomats across countries and 
continents, I experienced the Yemeni diplomatic service as a highly heterogeneous 
field, marked by internal contradiction and variety. Meeting “rich” and “poor” diplomats, 
in five-star lobbies and shabby Nero cafés, expressing both criticism and support of 
the exiled Yemeni government, I gained insight into their lives, their different socio-
material backgrounds and dispositions, struggles in their personal lives, and feuds at 
work. 
In exploring how the Yemeni diplomatic service reflected socio-political crisis, I 
adopted a relational ontology that included both institutionalized and material aspects, 
such as stamps, payments, and official documents, while also taking into 
consideration personal relations, biographies, and emotions. Given my concern with 
attaining a holistic, yet in-depth and situated understanding of diplomats’ meaning-
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making processes, socio-material relations, and practice, I adopted a qualitative 
research methodology including multiple research instruments (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003).  
In the remainder of this chapter, the specific methods deployed during fieldwork, and 
broader methodological concerns will be discussed. The first section theorizes the 
concept of trust and explores how I gained initial access to the Yemeni diplomatic 
network. It also examines the trust-building methods that facilitated my access to 
personal in-depth information during interviews. Next, the method of international 
snowball sampling and the translocal character of this project’s research design are 
discussed with reference to Marcus’ (1995) concept of multi-site ethnography. In a 
third step, this chapter outlines the specific methods used to collect data, including 
semi-structured narrative interviews, multi-site participant observation, as well as 
archival and online research. It then analyses questions of power and my own 
positionality, which impacted the production of knowledge. In doing so, it pays 
particular attention to the concept of “elite research” and the role of gender and 
“diplomatic culture” in building rapport. This chapter ends by discussing questions of 
ethics, which are of particular concern given the context of war in which this research 
took place.  
I Trust and the challenge of gaining access 
When I planned this research, friends and colleagues voiced concern that diplomats 
might refuse to meet me, “brush me off”, or “be diplomatic” by feeding me official, 
vague, and unhelpful phrases. Likewise, academic sources warned “that many 
organizational elites spend a good part of the day acting as spokespeople for their 
organizations, so the interview becomes an extension of their daily routine” (Delaney, 
2007, p.213). While beginning fieldwork with considerable scepticism, I took comfort 
in the reassurance by established diplomacy researchers like Merje Kuus, Alun Jones, 
and Julian Clark, who found that diplomats were approachable and supportive. Jones 
and Clark (2015), for instance, observed that many “European diplomats […] are 
prepared to talk, listen, reflect and argue for long periods with researchers” (p.4). 
However, the risk of encountering the “spokesperson problem” remained, acting as an 
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acute reminder that the development of trust and the building of rapport was crucial to 
my research. 
The first obstacle I encountered at the onset of fieldwork revolved around access. 
Gaining first access to diplomats was complicated by the “institutional exclusivity” of 
formal diplomatic institutions. Diplomats could “resist the scrutiny of research” 
(Lancaster, 2017, p.95) by relying on, or reinforcing bureaucratic barriers. Their 
contact details were not publicly accessible, emails to embassies’ generic “info@”-
accounts rarely yielded results, and meetings personally requested on-site were 
skilfully stalled by secretaries. Even when access to diplomatic institutions and 
diplomats was granted, interviewees’ responses could remain vague and unhelpful. 
As Ostrander (1995) famously put it, “gaining access is not the same as establishing 
the trust required for getting useful data” (p. 135).  
In the course of this research project, barriers to accessing information laid in 
professional secrecy and normative discretion, which sporadically surfaced in 
interviews. One respondent evaded a question he deemed to be sensitive, explaining, 
with half-abashed laughter and lowered glance, “it is a little bit a secret for Yemenis, 
you know, for us diplomats only”.15 Another diplomat was seemingly nervous, and 
initially quite guarded, wondering throughout the interview whether he was 
transgressing his “obligation of discretion”.16  
To gain access, both to diplomats and useful information, I devised research strategies 
that centred on the notion of trust. Set in 2016/2017, fieldwork took place under unique 
conditions, in which trust was particularly contested within the Yemeni diplomatic 
corps. Any behaviour deemed “critical” could end a diplomat’s post abroad and impend 
their return back home. This looming threat, among other elements, had an impact on 
diplomats’ willingness to participate in my research, specifically since it touched upon 
a sensitive topic at the time. As one Yemeni diplomat explained by reference to his 
colleagues, “for those diplomats who are outside [i.e. abroad], they are afraid, they 
cannot talk, they cannot say anything because they know if they say anything, […] 
 
15 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
16 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 5 September 2017. 
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they will just get kicked out”.17  
The “crisis moment” within which this research took place not only hindered, but also, 
paradoxically, facilitated this study’s data collection process. The disruption of 
professional routines, norms, and codes seemed to open up room for actors’ 
independent decision-making and improvisation, while also creating grievances and 
feelings of frustration that probably motivated diplomats to talk to me. Offering an 
opportunity for respondents’ own reflections and complaints, it can be assumed that 
interviews were experienced as cathartic by some diplomats, who went “off script” 
more readily at a time of “institutional rupture”. In many cases, diplomats criticised 
unfair practices within the Yemeni diplomatic service and discussed the personal 
hardship they suffered due to unpaid salaries for example.   
Trust-building efforts sat at the heart of this project’s overall methodological design. It 
is established that trust is “important or even vital in cooperative efforts in all aspects 
of life” and central to any social research involving humans (McKnight and Chervany, 
2001, p.28). Although trust is understood differently across disciplines, Bigley and 
Pearce (1998) observe that it is “almost always […] associated with the idea of actor 
vulnerability” (p. 407). Trust is widely described as someone’s willingness to accept 
vulnerability on the confident expectation that the intentions or behaviours of others 
are positive (Mayer et al, 1995; Rousseau et al, 1998; McEvily et al, 2003). 18 
Importantly, the trust between two people is influenced by their broader social 
environment and the trust-confirming information that is passed on by third parties 
(Williams, 2005). Applied to this research project, the social diffusion of trust was 
relevant in two ways: 1) the possibility of interviewees trusting me “by proxy”, 
extending their trust in mediating agents to myself; and 2) the possibility of 
interviewees following laws of “conformism”, deeming it “safe” to trust me because 
others have done so as well. In the latter case, trust-related behaviour is induced by 
imitation, following the simple logic “since they do I do; since they trust I trust” (Falcone 
& Castelfranchi, 2001, p.69).19  
 
17 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
18 For more information on the contested range of existing definitions of trust read Kramer (1999). 
19 For further information on trust transferability see Williams (2005). 
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Contrary to research that emphasizes trust as a means to gain “privileged insider 
status” (Tope, Chamberlain, & Crowley, 2005, p. 489), I followed Bucerius (2013), who 
productively combined the notion of trust with her status as an outsider, claiming that 
her “outsider status encouraged the young men to trust me with inside information that 
they would not otherwise have shared with ‘real insiders’” (p. 715). In fact, this project 
suggests that “being an outsider trusted with inside knowledge […] can be a great 
research asset” (Bucerius, 2013, p. 715). 
In gaining initial access to diplomats, I relied on network-based resources, or “social 
capital” (Bourdieu, 1986), which I gained through past research and professional 
experience in Yemen. In 2012, I conducted fieldwork on political Salafism in Sanaa 
and in 2014/15, I worked with a small newspaper there. In the process, I made friends 
and established contacts that proved useful for this project. Europe-based researchers 
on Yemen as well as Yemeni academics, political activists, and politicians could refer 
me to diplomats and helped me arrange my first interviews. Furthermore, I found out 
that a number of former, mostly British, diplomats worked in senior positions at the 
University of Cambridge and that a number of Yemeni diplomats used to attend the 
yearly Gulf Meeting Conference there. Students involved in the organisation of the 
conference and former diplomats working at the university introduced me to Yemeni 
diplomatic actors. Overall, I relied heavily on three interwoven milieus in gaining initial 
access to the Yemeni diplomatic service: diplomatic, political, and academic social 
circles.  
Throughout my research, processes of trust diffusion, through shared friends or 
contacts, emerged as most relevant, although personal characteristics, individual 
predispositions, shared experiences and interests with respondents also impacted the 
establishment of trust. Where I tapped into close personal relationships, being 
recommended by a trusted friend or relative, respondents were more willing to open 
up. In these instances, I was occasionally greeted with a “his friend is my friend” 
comment and was told that the respondent intended to speak freely, following the 
















Since I did not spend an extended period of time within a geographically bounded, 
small-scale community, the development of trust required the building of rapport and 
immersion into a fluid and global network of mobile professionals. Acknowledging the 
importance of shared third parties in the building of trust, this research of Yemeni 
diplomats was structured around the method of snowball sampling. This method is 
generally considered useful where target populations are hard to reach and “some 
degree of trust is required to initiate contact” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001, n.p.). In 
spontaneously following diplomats’ referrals whenever and wherever possible, I 
traced, tapped into, and benefitted from already existing relationships of trust. 
Throughout this process, fieldwork quickly became multi-sited.   
II International snowballing through a global professional network 
In studying the Yemeni diplomatic service, I flew across 11 capitals in Europe, 
America, and the Middle East over a period of nine months, meeting diplomats in 
embassies, hotel lobbies and bars, exclusive clubs, restaurants and ordinary cafés, 
universities, offices and private homes. My stay in each capital was usually limited to 
a couple of days, which allowed for the possibility of follow-up interviews, the meeting 
of recommended new contacts, and in some cases the attendance of diplomatic 
events. Several cities were visited repeatedly, usually to meet interviewees a second 
 














  Academy 
Figure 4: Accessing Yemeni Diplomats 
Access to Yemeni diplomats was gained through contacts in the 
diplomatic, political, and academic field. 
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time, or to follow up on new leads and referrals. In some cases, I literally “followed” 
diplomats, who were either travelling or posted from one country to another.  
This approach resembled the “multi-sited ethnography” coined by Marcus (1995), who 
recommended its conduct whenever the “object of study cannot be accounted for […] 
by remaining focused on a single site” (p.96). Many scholars who work “under 
circumstances of globalization” (Weißköppel, 2005, p.45) and/or on “transnational 
phenomena” (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p.215) have adopted a multi-site style of 
ethnography. Viewing the global “as local in all its points” (Candea, 2009, p.29), they 
“follow the people” (Marcus, 1995, p.106), or variably life stories, objects, and 
metaphors, in order to detect relationships, processes, networks, and fields. As 
suggested in this study, multi-site research gains in importance in a context of violent 
conflict when access to a country is risky, if not impossible. Gathering “offline data” 
then becomes dependent on creatively tracing already existing global networks, such 
as the diplomatic one, or a war-induced and globally dispersed diaspora. 
In devising the design of this project’s multi-site study of Yemeni diplomats, I had 
initially planned to focus on three to five embassies. This approach was based on 
limited fieldwork funds and a pragmatic emphasis of network “hubs”, which I assumed 
differed in importance and magnitude. The focus on particularly relevant embassies 
seemed to constitute a justifiable way of narrowing down the geographical scope and 
numerical size of my target group. It also complied with existing practice in global 
ethnographies: Hannerz (2003), for instance, visited Johannisburg, Tokyo, and 
Jerusalem in his study of foreign correspondents, while Wulff (1998) included 
Stockholm, New York, London, and Tokyo in her study of ballet professionals.    
A few weeks into my fieldwork, it became clear that my locality-focused multi-site 
approach was not compatible with the fluid and highly personalized characteristics of 
the Yemeni diplomatic field. While in theory the research of diplomatic networks could 
start with any embassy and diplomat, I found that in practice access was dispersed 





Figure 5: Mapping Translocal Fieldwork 
Following diplomats and diplomatic networks led me to London, Paris, Den Hague, Berlin, Prague, 
Vienna, Rome, Brussels, Cairo, Tunis, and Washington D.C..20  
 
In some instances, ambassadors refused to see me, leaving me communicating with 
their respective secretaries. In other instances, it appeared that ambassadors 
“advised” other embassy employees against participation in this research project. 
Moreover, diplomats rarely suggested meeting colleagues who worked in the same 
embassy. Instead, I was referred to colleagues, relatives, or friends in faraway places. 
In many cases, notions of trust, friendship, and “usefulness” seemed to matter more 
than geographic closeness. I experienced that “what determines the texture of ties or 
trust is not spatial proximity, but the nature of contact, intermediation, and 
communicative complexity involving groups of actors and entities” (Amin & Roberts, 
2008, p.366).21  
As these examples illustrate, network nodes and hubs can “close down” to the 
researcher, a fact that underlines the importance of flexibility and mobility during 
fieldwork. In the research of exclusive and relatively “closed” networks, with irregularly 
 
20 Google MyMaps (n.d.). Map showing interview locations marked by the author. Retrieved 15 April 
2019 from https://www.google.co.uk/maps/d/u/0/. 
21 In some cases, diplomats’ wish for privacy, anonymity, and safety might have motivated “remote 
referrals”. Suggesting meeting spots outside their respective embassy, it is possible that some 
respondents found recommendations to faraway contacts “safer” as it prevented the researcher’s 
presence from interfering in the social relations of their daily work, or from stirring unwelcomed 
rumours.  
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distributed points of access, I realized that the persistent focus on a limited number of 
pre-selected research locales could virtually be counterproductive. Thus, I began to 
follow diplomats’ translocal referrals, flexibly choosing capitals in the course of 
fieldwork, and continuously adapting to unique, and newly discovered, network 
features and dynamics. The methodological approach that emerged through initial 
fieldwork experience was thus inherently translocal. In Berlin, I was instructed to get 
in touch with a friend in Paris, in Cambridge I was told to meet a cousin in Brussels, 
while in London I was offered contacts in Saudi Arabia. While these exact locations 
and referrals have been made up to maintain “internal confidentiality” (Tolich, 2004), 
they truthfully reflect the kind of referrals I witnessed during fieldwork. Diplomats’ 
translocal introductions allowed me to tab into and benefit from pre-existing 
relationships of trust. Yet, they complicated the logistics of my research and posed a 
challenge to its original design. I learned first-hand that “carefully planned proposals 
may dramatically change as fieldwork begins” (Billo & Hiemstra, 2013, p.313) and 
came to agree with Hays-Mitchell (2001) that “regrouping, reflecting, accepting 
mistakes, and modifying plans are four cornerstones of fieldwork” (p.317). 
Ultimately, I treated the global network of Yemeni diplomats as a “single 
geographically discontinuous site” (Hage, 2005, p.463), whose access points were 
rooted in localities across the globe. Rather than determining research locales a priori, 
methodological choices were largely driven by an opportunistic focus on trust-based 
access. Encountering few financial and time constraints, I followed most of diplomats’ 
referrals, in the process tracing the various networks of trust embedded within the 
Yemeni diplomatic service. This approach complies with the observation that “site 
selections are to an extent made gradually and cumulatively […] and to some extent 
by chance” (Hannerz, 2003, p.207).  
The frequency of trips was dependent on interview opportunities, which were usually 
arranged via email or WhatsApp. While I flew from one capital to another, I also spent 
weeks in between at my university office, waiting for emails, doing online research, 
organizing trips, and staying in touch with diplomats. As Hannerz (2003) observed, 
 “multi-site ethnography […] may fit particularly well into that more drawn-out, 
off-and-on kind of scheduling, as the latter does not only allow us to think during 
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times in between about the materials we have, but also about where to go next” 
(p.213).  
In some ways, the fast-paced “in-through-and-out” nature of this translocal research 
resembles Knoblauch’s “focused ethnography”, which “is characterized by relatively 
short-term field visits” (n.p.) that require “an intimate knowledge of the fields to be 
studied” (n.p.). By spreading across various “diplomatic spaces”, I gained insight into 
diplomats’ socio-professional geographies, and their respective sense- and place-
making activities.  
II.1. Semi-structured interviews and sporadic participant observation 
This project’s multi-site ethnographic work is structured around (repeated) in-depth 
interviews and sporadic participant observation. It treats ethnography as a “sensibility 
[…] to glean the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and 
political reality” (Schatz, 2009, p.5). This ethnographic approach foregrounds 
interviews as “an opportunity for creating and capturing insights of a depth and level 
of focus rarely achieved through surveys, observational studies or the majority of 
casual conversations” (Hockey & Forsey, 2012, p.69). Especially in professional and 
more difficult to access contexts, interviews have been described as the most 
appropriate form of participatory and ethnographic research (Hockey & Forsey, 2012). 
As Pouliot’s (2010) practice-based research of NATO showed, qualitative interviews 
are generative of subjective meanings and “provide researchers with an efficient 
means to penetrate more or less alien lifeworlds” (p.68). Similar to Sorrell and 
Redmond’s (1995) phenomenological approach, this project did not use interviews 
“to explain, predict or generate theory, but to understand shared meanings by drawing 
from the respondent a vivid picture of the lived experience, complete with the 
richness of detail and context that shape the experience" (p. 1120). Semi-structured 
narrative interviews served the practical purpose of learning more about the intrinsic 
and contextual factors impacting diplomatic practice.  
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Interviews were conducted in English,22 took place in locations suggested by the 
interviewee, and were structured into three main parts: the first part involved small 
talk, with questions and anecdotes shared by both the interviewees and me. It served 
as an introduction, during which both interview parties developed an intuitive “sense 
of each other”, built rapport and trust, and exchanged information about the research 
project. The second part of the interview involved open-ended questions about 
diplomats, their background, education, their decision to join the diplomatic service, 
and their diplomatic careers. This “narrative opening” aimed at putting diplomats at 
ease, while also transitioning the conversation into a narrative interview format and 
gathering information about diplomats’ distinct experience and personality. Hoping 
that diplomats would “loosen up” in the process of talking, I asked questions about 
their regional affiliation, their parents’ profession, their education, as well as their 
career choices, dreams, and ambitions. Inspired by Dezalay and Garth’s (2002) 
“relational biographies”, I inquired into “who these individuals are and where they come 
from in order to see the relationship between what they say and their own strategic 
positions” (p. 9). Focus on diplomats’ personality and biographies allowed for the 
development of an actor- and agency-centred understanding of diplomatic practice. 
Specifically, it offered insight into the various intrinsic drivers underlying reflexive 
diplomatic practice and facilitated the analysis of diplomats’ creative agency. At the 
same time, diplomats’ “biographical accounts of […] choices and career strategies” 
(Dezalay & Garth, 2002, p.9) helped to better understand the socio-material make-up 
of diplomatic institutions and organizational structures.  
The third part of interviews covered diplomats’ experience of the 2011 uprising, the 
subsequent political transition, and the outbreak of civil war. Its design drew inspiration 
from Bueger (2013), who argued that  
“the strategy of crisis and controversies […] implies first identifying these critical 
moments and then studying how actors deal with these situations, how they 
justify what needs to be done, and how they proceed to act and adjust practices 
or invent new ones” (p.397).  
 
22 Although most interviewees spoke English, some Yemeni diplomats, especially recent political 
appointees, were alleged to only speak Arabic. Unsure of my Arabic skills, diplomats seemed to 
select English-speaking colleagues in making their referrals at the end of interviews. 
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Diplomats were asked to narrate what happened in the diplomatic service between 
2011 and 2017 and were questioned about how they felt and what they thought about 
developments at the time. Whenever I deemed diplomats’ accounts to be too brief, I 
asked specifically whether they faced any challenges at work following the 2011 
uprising. The last question did not only aim at comprehending change, but also the 
backdrop of routines and norms against which events were judged to be “challenging”.  
While the first two parts of interviews remained similar throughout fieldwork, the third 
part varied slightly over time and from person to person. In fact, “in-depth” 
conversations (Soss, 2006) served the in-built flexibility of this research project; in 
many cases I disclosed and followed unforeseen connections and subject areas. For 
instance, I asked individuals with unique experience and anecdotes, or exceptional 
historical knowledge, to expand on parts of their narrative. Similarly, once I discovered 
new information, for example on corruption or the formation of Yemen’s first diplomatic 
labour union, I asked specific questions about these developments and practices in 
subsequent interviews. As is common for narrative interviews,  
“decisions about relevant and irrelevant content [were...] made during the 
course of the interview, both by the informant and in collaboration with the 
researcher […]. No information [was…] a priori ruled out, for any event or 
interpretation [could…] contribute to the meaning of a story” (Ayres, 2012, 
p.545).  
In all cases, the line of questioning focused on “what happened”, inquiring what 
diplomats did and why, how they felt, and what they thought.23 While this approach 
tied diplomatic practice to “events”, questions also addressed diplomats’ day-to-day 
tasks, for instance by asking what an average work week looked like. The resulting 
information on mundane diplomatic tasks informed but was not prioritized in this 
project’s analysis. Instead of emphasizing the expression and micro-elements of 
unceasing day-to-day practices, this study was interested in exploring diplomats’ 
choice to continue tasks as usual, or not, and aimed to understand why some practices 
emerged as particularly contentious. By emphasizing diplomats’ points of view, this 
 
23 Following the example of Jones and Clark (2015), interviews were designed to not only address the 
how and when but also the why of diplomatic practice. 
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study managed to explore the meaning of being a diplomat and the significance of 
diplomats’ “doings and sayings” (Neumann, 2002, 2007).  
Where it was possible and relevant, I carried-out follow-up interviews with 
respondents. Diplomats who appeared cautious and shy in the first meeting often 
opened up in the course of (repeated) conversations. Given the length of interviews, 
which typically lasted between one and two hours, a number of diplomats seemed to 
develop trust or sympathy in the course of a single encounter, beginning to display a 
more relaxed demeanour and sharing insider and personal information halfway 
through an interview.  
The nature and dynamics of each interview were highly relational and context 
dependent. While some diplomats deemed my opening questions unimportant, 
offering nothing more than a brief, two-minute summary of their CV, others did not 
mind walking me through their life history for hours, sharing anecdotes, thoughts, and 
memories. In many cases, the free-flowing and personal dynamics of conversations 
created moments of “connectedness” that were shielded from societal markers of 
power, such as titles, formal codes of conduct, and roles. In these instances, the 
researcher managed to meet “the person” behind “the spokesperson”, 24  which 
positively impacted on the quality of information shared, the likelihood of being 
introduced to further respondents, and the chance of being offered a follow-up 
interview.  
Overall, I visited eleven capitals during nine months of fieldwork (see Figure 5), 
interviewing 48 current and former diplomats; 33 interviews were conducted with 24 
Yemeni diplomats, nine interviews were conducted with eight Egyptian diplomats, and 
11 interviews were conducted with eight Tunisian diplomats. Overall, 10 diplomats 
were met repeatedly, in some cases up to four times. In addition, I stayed in touch with 
diplomats via Email and WhatsApp, posing follow-up questions and asking for 
clarification and comments throughout this research project. 
 
24 The “spokesperson problem” has been described by Watson (2011), who argues that “people in 
organizations […] making verbal statements (written or oral) rarely do so without some consideration 
of their personal or group interests or preferences” (p.210). 
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While this project placed trust-based conversations and interactions with diplomats at 
the core of its inductive and bottom-up data collection process, it also paid close 
attention to the “microgeographies” (Elwood & Martin, 2004, p.653) of interview 
settings, including the interviewees’ interaction with physical attributes, other people, 
and the interviewer. Meeting diplomats in places of their own choosing improved the 
researcher’s understanding of their spatial positioning and the multitude of localities in 
which the Yemeni diplomatic network is enacted and materializes. As Elwood and 
Martin (2004) put it,  
“not only is it useful to observe the microgeographies of a single interview as 
an opportunity to learn more about a particular participant or place, but analysis 
of the microgeographies of a number of interviews can also offer important 
opportunities to learn about the social geographies of a community” (p.653).  
The exploration of ethnographic locales offered insight into the (material) spatiality of 
the Yemeni diplomatic service. For example, I bumped into the Saudi ambassador at 
the end of a multi-hour interview in the bar of a high-end Ritz Carlton hotel, which 
suggests that the hotel might be a diplomatic “hang out spot”. Likewise, it was only by 
visiting an embassy that I discovered its central heating system was broken for several 
weeks on end. Similarly, a toothbrush in an embassy bathroom, the emptiness of an 
embassy building, and a glance at standard embassy decoration shed light on the 
material set up of Yemen’s diplomatic service. At times I was left with the vague 
impression that the few Yemeni objects and people in each embassy could not fill and 
did not quite fit antique architectural structures of grandeur.  
Participant observation was particularly rich outside the interview setting. In one 
capital, I was invited to join a gala concert organized by and for the local diplomatic 
community. I also attended meetings of the APPG Yemen in Westminster, which were 
frequented by Yemeni diplomats who actively participated in discussion. Likewise, I 
met diplomats at workshops and conferences, which confirms the aforementioned 
overlap between academia and diplomacy. These moments provided a “first-hand 
encounters with the actors in their own settings, in the midst of doing whatever it is 
that they do every day, with whatever is required to do it” (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks 
& Yanow, 2009, p.1315).   
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II.2. Acquiring archival and online data 
To historically embed the Yemeni case study, fieldwork included six weeks of archival 
research conducted in the National Archives in London (NA) and the “Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes” (PAAA) in Berlin. Yemeni archives could not be 
consulted, as fieldwork took place in the midst of Yemen’s internationalized civil war, 
making travel to Sanaa impossible.  
Given the British colonial past in South Yemen, the diplomatic material produced by 
colonial officers constitutes a rich resource, containing detailed information about the 
Yemeni social and political system during and after colonization. Likewise, documents 
produced by the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG’s) embassy in Taiz and later 
Sanaa offered invaluable insights. The Federal Republic was among the first 
“Western” countries to be diplomatically represented inside Yemen and was the only 
one, alongside Italy, to have diplomats in Yemen throughout the civil war period in the 
1960s. While the Federal Republic supported a range of development projects in 
Yemen, it had few tangible interests in the country, aside from preventing Yemen’s 
recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The reports of FRG diplomats are 
rich in observations of the minutiae of daily politics: government initiatives, behind the 
scenes manoeuvring, and evaluations of the developing state bureaucracy (Rogers, 
2018).  
In reading and interpreting archival information I was critically aware of the unequal 
power relations and the context of coloniality within which diplomatic papers were 
produced. I found that many British and German documents contained a tone of 
superiority, which went hand in hand with the exoticization of Yemeni culture, society, 
and politics. For example, a German diplomat praised the “oriental generosity” and 
“Arab brotherliness” he witnessed in Yemen (PAAA B12 1067, 22 April 1956). 
Likewise, a German ambassador who travelled the country in the 1950s seemed 
fascinated by the “pictorially wild warriors in their colourful and varying garbs” (PAAA 
B11 347, 22 August 1953). To add Yemeni voices to such outside perspectives, I 
made an effort to include Yemeni memoirs, interviews, and official documents in my 
historical chapters. Among other things, this involved the use of an improvised 
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“Facebook archive” which contains historical pictures of state events, figures, and 
institutions uploaded by Yemenis. 
Archival material was complemented by online research, which involved the browsing 
of foreign ministries’ websites, relevant Yemeni newspaper articles, and research 
reports. It also included ministries’ and embassies’ official social media accounts. 
Concerns regarding constructed “online personas” (Branthwaite & Patterson, 2011), 
inconsistent expressions of attitudes (Gladwell, 2010), and lacking subtlety on social 
media were all taken into account during the collection and analysis of online data.  
To sum up, I conducted semi-structured narrative interviews and engaged in sporadic 
participant observation within the diverse microgeographies of interview settings. 
During fieldwork, I also spent six weeks reading countless British, German, but also 
Yemeni diplomatic papers stored in the National Archives in London and the 
“Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes” in Berlin. Last but not least, I conducted 
substantive online research, reviewing relevant news sources, embassy and foreign 
ministry websites, as well as diplomats’ social media accounts. I thereby gained 
access to Yemeni sources that was difficult to secure offline given the context of war.  
III Positionality in the research of diplomats: a reflection of elites and gender 
This project considers all knowledge to be situated (England, 1994). It therefore deems 
it crucial to identify subjective and normative choices involved in fieldwork (Knafo, 
2016). This call for reflexivity notably involves the discussion of positionality, i.e. the 
process of taking oneself, as a researcher, into account (Knafo, 2016). Although 
reflexivity and discussions of positionality have become a “received wisdom” in 
qualitative research (Kobayashi, 2003, p.346), they have been criticized for being 
practically unfeasible (Knafo, 2016) and potentially out-worn (Kobayashi 2003). In 
particular, critics have argued that absolute knowledge and understanding of one’s 
own positionality is unattainable. After all, “there is no clear landscape of social 
positions to be charted by an all-seeing analyst” (Rose, 1997, p.316). While reflexivity 
might never be fully achieved, it has been a guiding aspiration in the conduct of this 
project, which acknowledges the relational and political nature of knowledge 
production.   
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Following the epistemic approach of feminist and critical geographers, as well as post-
colonial theorists (Falconer Al-Hindi & Kawabata, 2002; Moss, 2002; Bondi, 2003; 
Mukherjee, 2017), I reflected on power relations and my own positionality during 
fieldwork. This involved recording analytical thoughts regarding my learning process, 
for example by writing down changing first impressions and assumptions. I recognized 
that ethnographic encounters were infused by multiple relations of power (Naples, 
2011) and that I constantly “self-situated” myself as a result (Haraway, 1988; Neuman 
& Neuman, 2015). The contingency of power and relational positionalities involved in 
this study is outlined in the following sections. The first part critically reflects on “elite 
research”, arguing that the power relations involved in this project cannot be narrowed 
to a rigid bottom-up, or top-down affair. The second part describes “diplomatic culture” 
and gender as specific challenges to the building of rapport.  
III.1. Understanding Yemeni diplomatic practice: a case of elite research? 
In preparation of my fieldwork, I reviewed existing literature on “elite research” (e.g. 
Harvey, 2010; Delaney, 2007; Lilleker, 2003; Ostrander, 1993; Odendahl & Shaw, 
2002; Thomas, 1993). As mentioned above, I perceived the Yemeni diplomatic service 
as an exclusive elite network, marked by material luxury and power. Yet, in the course 
of my investigation, I encountered a degree of heterogeneity that made me question 
the usefulness of the “elite” label in qualitative research. 
Existing definitions of elite actors tend to be rather broad, describing “the elite” as “a 
relatively small group within the societal hierarchy that claims and/or is accorded 
power, prestige, or command over others” (Abbink & Salverda, 2012, p.1). Elite status 
thereby becomes applicable to a great variety of actors, ranging from tribal elders and 
small-town mayors to CEOs of multi-national corporations. In light of such variety, a 
number of scholars concluded that “elite” was a highly contextual and relative concept 
(Harvey, 2010). Nevertheless, the idea prevailed that elite research methods 
constitute a collective that is somehow different from other qualitative research tools 
(Delaney, 2007). As Desmond (2004) explained,  
“with elite interviewees the relationship is inevitably asymmetrical regardless of 
the research strategies deployed. The researcher is dependent on the 
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cooperation of a relatively small number of people with specialized knowledge” 
(p.265).  
To successfully study up, vertical effects of power must be skilfully negotiated (Rice, 
2010). Initially developed by Nader (1972), the notion of “studying up” encourages 
research of “the colonizer rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than 
the culture of the powerless – in order to understand social processes that produce 
both” (p.289). 
The Yemeni diplomatic corps is itself heterogeneous and seemed to differ from other 
foreign services. This problematizes the use of distinct “elite research methods”, 
developed around the dualism of bounded “elite” and “non-elite” categories. In some 
instances, my whiteness, German nationality, and “elite university”-background placed 
me on par with, if not in a comparatively more privileged position than Yemeni 
diplomats. This was especially true in the case of mid-ranking diplomatic actors from 
modest family backgrounds, who struggled financially and, in many ways, suffered 
from the war in Yemen. In light of such complexity, the de-contextualized and 
generalized use of the “elite” label and common methodological denominators in “elite 
research”, is problematic, if not misleading. 
Instead, a more particularistic, relational, and personal approach is put forth in this 
study. Placing the individual respondent at its heart, this strategy accounts for the 
unique combination of each person’s character traits, personal history, interests, social 
networks, and professional rank, to name just a few examples. Intrinsic factors, such 
as interviewees’ personal inclination, motivation, thoughts, feelings, sympathies, and 
curiosity are of central importance in navigating power relations and developing 
successful access strategies. Of course, it can be argued that a highly successful and 
busy “elite” actor might be less motivated to spend his or her precious free time on an 
interview. However, as suggested in this study, time is only one of many factors 
determining respondents’ motivation to meet and open up to the researcher. Others 
include, for example, social relations with the person “introducing” the researcher, 
interest in his or her project, or sympathies triggered by a shared university 
background.  
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Questioning the usefulness of the “elite label” does not mean that power asymmetries 
did not exist and posed a challenge in the context of this study. In many instances, 
diplomats’ superior position was expressed and fortified through institutional barriers, 
as mentioned above. At times, perceived asymmetries were amplified by the 
exclusivity of research locales. Not being used to glittering lobbies of 5-star hotels, 
these luxurious environments had an intimating effect on me. While I did not try to 
show it, “elite material spaces” might have impacted my behaviour as a researcher. 
Likewise, in one interview, an affluent retired ambassador literally dictated his answers 
to my questions, always checking that I copied his responses correctly. In this case, I 
felt that relations were indeed hierarchical, resembling traditional professor-student 
dynamics. While experiences like these confirm the commonly presumed power 
asymmetries involved in “elite research”, they cannot be generalized and applied to all 
Yemeni diplomats, let alone “elite actors”. Less affluent, mid-ranked, and younger 
respondents often behaved in less status-conscious ways, which led to more 
egalitarian interview dynamics and positionalities.  
In addition to individual factors such as age or diplomatic rank, the existence of shared 
contacts frequently impacted power relations, often acting as an “equalizing force”. 
Diplomats who were asked by close acquaintances to meet me, seemed to extend 
their friendship and concomitant trust to our first encounter. Additionally, shared 
educational backgrounds helped flatten out hierarchies. Some diplomats emphasized 
their own experience of doing a PhD, for instance, and expressed their sympathy for 
academic research and my project. Especially those who showed appreciation for 
academia ascribed prestige to the University of Cambridge, which I was affiliated with. 
The positionalities of the researcher and interviewees could switch and change 
multiple times in the course of a single interview. While the initial small talk was 
commonly based on shared interests and academic backgrounds, interviewees could 
emphasize their high diplomatic rank and professional expertise in later conversation, 
or make remarks that created gendered power asymmetries – a point that will be 
further discussed in the following section.    
The situational character of power relations became particularly visible in diplomats’ 
discussion of their temporary war-related struggles. It was in these fleeting moments 
that I found myself in a relatively more privileged position. Diplomats’ financial 
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struggles, their separation from family members in Yemen, and the difficulties they 
faced in providing for their family challenged prevalent assumptions of fixed, “elite”-
based hierarchies. Instead, they highlighted broader global power structures, in which 
international economic hegemonies and colonial histories determined the relative 
privilege of certain nationalities. Yemeni diplomats’ hope for asylum in the UK or 
Germany, for instance, accentuated the benefits attached to my own nationality as a 
German, leaving me with the vague feeling of being “lucky”, comparatively “better off”, 
and possibly even in a perceived position of power. Several Yemeni diplomats 
assumed that I would commence a career in diplomacy following my PhD, possibly 
perceiving me as a “useful” (future) contact. In another example, my nationality and its 
placement in broader global power relations subtly emerged in conversation with a 
Tunisian diplomat, who expressed his gratitude for the economic support Tunisia had 
received by the German government after 2011. Knowing I was from Germany, he 
complimented the German government, economy, and people on multiple occasions, 
which made me feel uncomfortable. Not only did I disagree with many of his 
generalizations, I also felt I was given “power by proxy” creating interview dynamics I 
deemed unjustified. My relations with Yemeni and other Middle Eastern diplomats cut 
across broad geopolitical north-south divides crudely associated with unequal 
privileges, such as material wealth, human security, or global mobility, to name just a 
few examples. As shown above, these global inequalities could momentarily resurface 
in interview settings, placing me in a position of relative power. 
My research experience suggests that power relations cannot simply be viewed as a 
rigid bottom-up, or top-down affair. Over-emphasis of material and societal markers of 
participants’ alleged “elite status” clouds the complexity and fluidity of relations 
involved in the conduct of qualitative research. Following Mountz (2002), this study 
argues that researcher and participants are defined in relation to each other, as well 
as in relation to wider political, institutional, and spatial dynamics. This necessitates 
“restless contemplation of reflexivity and of the ways in which people are inside and 




III.2. Gender, the building of rapport, and ‘diplomatic culture’ 
I was nervous when entering my very first meeting with a high-ranking diplomat. 
Intimidated by the respondent’s title, I formally introduced myself by reciting a 
memorized text and rushed through a printed list of prepared questions. I sensed that 
my counterpart was tense and guarded and that the meeting stayed overly “official”, 
which made it difficult to solve the “spokesperson problem” described above. I 
therefore decided to emphasize the building of rapport and adopted a more personal 
and relaxed approach in conducting later interviews. In doing so, I navigated 
challenges related to ‘diplomatic culture’ and gender.  
In the beginning of fieldwork, I was unsure how to treat and address diplomats who 
seemed to have a distinct “professional culture”. In formulating my emails to former 
prime ministers, ambassadors, and diplomats of different ranks, I relied heavily on 
Google, specifically Robert Hickey’s “guide to names, titles, and forms of address” 
(see Figure 6 below). Although I travelled across multiple countries, I felt I entered a 
single new terrain and was disoriented at the beginning of fieldwork. In that respect 
my experience resembled that of other ethnographers who explored “cultures” within 
their immediate living and/or work environments (Nathan, 2006).  
While I tried to learn “the rules of the game,” I was left with the impression that Yemeni 
diplomats as well did not know, or care, about diplomatic etiquette. In my first email to 
a former Yemeni ambassador, who held a doctorate degree, I decided to address him 
as “Dr”. In his response, the interviewee signed his email with “Dr. Ambassador” 
followed by his first name – a choice that seemed unorthodox to me. Since diplomatic 
titles and demeanours were rather formal, I felt that they created a distance that 
complicated the building of rapport and the conduct of interviews. I therefore decided 
to circumvent them by displaying a more “natural” and “informal” demeanour. I hoped 
to thereby meet interviewees on an inter-personal, human-to-human level, and to 
create an environment in which they felt comfortable opening up. In subsequent 
meetings, I thus approached ambassadors and other respondents with a huge smile, 





Figure 6: Website “Honor and Respect” 
A website offering advice on how to address retired and current diplomats of different ranks.25 
 
In my attempt to build rapport and trust, I usually began my interviews with small talk, 
speaking about the office space, my journey, the weather, or other readily available 
topics. I then introduced myself and my research, usually mentioning the fact that I 
had previously lived in or visited Yemen (Tunisia or Egypt), which often triggered 
smiles, questions, and led to further small talk. My goal was to create moments of 
“connectedness”, a momentary space that was shielded, as much as possible, from 
forced formalities, such as titles, stiff codes of conduct, and professional roles. 
Throughout the interview, I stayed aware of my own body language, trying to display 
 
25 [untitled screenshot of Robert Hickey’s website “Honor and Respect” taken by the author in 
November 2017]. Retrieved November 2018 from 
http://www.formsofaddress.info/FOA_ambassador_f.html. 
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a relaxed, open, and confident posture. In general, I confirmed interviewees’ opinions 
and statements verbally or through body language, such as heavy nodding. I wanted 
diplomats to feel heard and understood and I wanted to give the impression that I was 
someone “to be talked to”. I also tried to answer questions about myself very truthfully 
to appear authentic and trustworthy. 
My pursuit to establish personal and “intimate” interview settings was at times 
facilitated, and at other times complicated by my gender. Most of the interviewees I 
met were male, the implications of which I had not fully thought through prior to 
fieldwork. Occasionally, I assume being a woman was associated with being kind, 
emotional and understanding, which made me less of a threat. This facilitated access 
and might have encouraged male respondents to disclose personal information, an 
interpretation I share with other female researchers who conducted ethnographic work 
in male dominated settings (e.g. Gurney, 1985; Williams & Heikes, 1993; Easterday 
et al, 1977). Furthermore, I have also reason to believe that my femaleness and 
outward appearance, in combination with the charm I consciously tried to apply, 
motivated diplomats to meet me a second time and to willingly share personal 
anecdotes in an effort to both help and impress me. While this proved useful, it 
appeared that diplomats occasionally exaggerated their own role and power – a 
possibility I considered in evaluating and interpreting my data.   
In some instances, I felt I was sexualized by respondents, who seemed to perceive 
me first and foremost as a woman, not a professional researcher. Throughout 
fieldwork, I encountered moments of “sexual hustling”, involving “behaviour such as 
sexual flirtations, sexually suggestive remarks, and overt sexual propositioning” 
(Gurney, 1985, p.75). I felt uncomfortable walking into an embassy office and being 
greeted with “wow, this is really not what I expected. I expected someone old and grey, 
but you are really beautiful. Really beautiful”. Likewise, I got annoyed when a retired 
ambassador, sitting next to me in a hotel lobby, “casually” placed his hand on my leg. 
To cultivate goodwill, I swallowed my anger and tried to navigate my way out of 
sexualized moments of discomfort. I laughed comments off as jokes, switched 
subjects, moved my leg in trying to reach my phone, and emphasized my role as a 
researcher, for example by asking a diplomacy-related question in a serious tone. I 
later found out, that other female researchers responded similarly to moments of 
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“sexual hustling” (Gurney, 1985). For example, Pante (2014) wrote that she and her 
female research colleague “inadvertently prioritized our status as researchers. We 
went along with the [sexist] jokes, laughed, and built rapport with important 
personalities in the community” (p.78). 
Throughout fieldwork, I constantly straddled the very fine line between “being 
charming and personal enough” for respondents to like and trust me, without letting 
charm and “intimacy” take over the professional intention of my meetings and 
messages. As other researchers have pointed out, the building of rapport and the 
avoidance of sexist hustling can pose a dilemma: “Being close to respondents may 
give access to their candid thoughts and personal narratives which are important 
sources of data but our closeness made me vulnerable to sexual advances” (Pante, 
2014, p.78).  
Following my first experience of “sexual hustling”, I began worrying about giving off 
the wrong impression by being too open, too friendly, or by meeting diplomats “at the 
wrong time and place”. For example, I was concerned that after-work meetings in hotel 
bars, might be misinterpreted, and tried to arrange lunch meetings instead. If daytime 
interviews were not possible, I reinforced and clarified boundaries by adopting a more 
“distant” tone and behaviour and by emphasising my professional interest in 
“interviews” rather than “meetings”. While I wanted to lift boundaries enough to gain 
access to personal information and “insider knowledge”, I did not want to eliminate 
boundaries altogether.  
The outcome of such “boundary work” was highly relational and contextual. In some 
cases, interviewees seemed unwilling to let go of their “officiality” and I could not get 
through existing “barriers of professionalism”. In most cases, however, I think I 
managed to meet “the person” behind “the spokesperson”. Where rapport could 
successfully be established, it positively impacted the quality of information shared 
with me, the likelihood of being introduced to further respondents, and the chance of 
follow-up interviews. The degree of openness displayed by research participants and 
the occurrence of “sexual hustling” was not solely dependent on my own research 
strategies but again relational. For example, one former ambassador explained, his 
connection to powerful individuals and personal wealth made him feel “protected” and 
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willing to be very frank. He did not care whether or not I recorded our conversation 
and freely shared very personal anecdotes and insights.  
IV Ethical research in the field of diplomacy 
Throughout this project I strove to conduct ethical, transparent, and respectful 
research. In order to gain informed consent, I described my research aims and scope 
to respondents and discussed their rights and potential questions at the beginning 
and/or end of each interview. I also clarified and upheld my role as a researcher and 
treated participant data confidentially. Importantly, I made every effort to ensure 
participants’ anonymity. At times, this required the omittance of information or the 
explicit permission from diplomats to use data that might allow the informed reader to 
guess their identity. At a time of conflict and heightened suspicion, when diplomats’ 
expressions in public could lead to their removal from office, ensuring anonymity was 
crucial.  
A further ethical concern revolved around the use of Internet data, specifically the 
blurred and contentious lines dividing public from private domains. In line with “best 
practice” (Townsend & Wallace, 2016), I considered diplomats’ Twitter accounts to be 
public, while treating their Facebook sites as private sources (British Psychological 
Society, 2013). While no “closed” Facebook groups were accessed, some information 
could only be obtained through “Facebook friendships”. I typically sent friend requests 
after my first interviews, which means that diplomats knew about my research role and 
could choose to ignore my online invitations. All information obtained through social 
media sites was anonymized. Where anonymization was difficult, information was only 
included if explicit permission was given by respondents via email or WhatsApp. 
Yemen’s internationalized conflict also raises ethical points regarding this project’s 
inclusiveness and balance. At the time this research was conducted, two self-
proclaimed governments fought for recognition and territorial control in Yemen. As 
such, two foreign ministries existed: the foreign ministry of the exiled government in 
Riyadh, led by president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and the foreign ministry in 
Sanaa, which was run by members of the Houthi movement. Importantly, Yemeni 
embassies were paid by, and officially affiliated with, the Hadi government. Given the 
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researcher’s lacking access to Sanaa, self-declared “Houthi voices” have remained 
absent from this project, which must be kept in mind when reading its research 
findings.  
Questions of inclusiveness also concern the voice of Yemenis in general, irrespective 
of their political affiliations. Pointing to academia’s entanglement in the maintenance 
of unequal power relations, postcolonial theorists have long warned against “pro-
Western” bias and lacking epistemic openness (Elie, 2012, p.1217). In calling for the 
“democratization” of global knowledge production, they advocate the inclusion of 
unmediated “non-Western” views (Sharp, 2008; Spivak, 1994). Bonnefoy (2019) 
emphasizes that the context of war further excluded Yemeni voices from the 
international social science community, which amplifies the responsibility of foreign 
social scientists to involve them in the production of knowledge. Critically aware of the 
power-knowledge nexus, which has been famously theorized with reference to the 
Middle East by Edward Said (1978), this project placed great emphasis on including a 
plurality of Yemeni primary sources, both written and oral. Its empirical analysis 
contains a large number of quotes, which allows Yemeni diplomats to speak and offers 
rich and unmediated insight into the complex and multi-layered world of Yemeni 
diplomacy.  
One final ethical remark regards this project’s negative environmental impact. I felt 
guilty for the number of airmiles and the irresponsibly high carbon footprint of my 
research design. While I tried to rely on eco-friendly transportation within Europe, 
especially trains, these were often more expensive. Given my limited fieldwork funds, 
I was required to make trade-offs between my carbon footprint, on the one hand, and 
the perceived quality of my research, on the other. So far, environmental costs in 
academic conduct are mostly raised by universities with regard to commutes. In a rare 
intervention, Phillips and Johns (2012) published an introductory textbook chapter on 
fieldwork, advising students on how to assess their carbon footprint. Going beyond the 
issue of flying, they ask “where is the nearest place to study the phenomenon that you 
are interested in?” (p.19). Given the seemingly rising number of global ethnographies 
(e.g. Falzon, 2009), environmental costs are a point of great relevance that has, as of 
yet, received limited attention.  
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3 The Pedagogy of State-Building: Learning the Yemeni State  
 
 
Since the Yemeni state constitutes a frequent reference in this study’s analysis of 
diplomats and diplomatic practice, its historical emergence is outlined in the following. 
Instead of offering a static “snapshot definition”, this chapter suggests that the 
meaning of Yemeni statehood can only be grasped against the backdrop of historical-
institutional developments. “Since no social realities are natural, they are the results 
of political and social processes that are rooted in history” (Pouliot, 2010, p.63). 
Understanding Yemeni statehood thus resides in the fluid encounter between 
institutions and agents over time, between “history objectified in things” and “history 
incarnate in bodies” (Bourdieu, 1981, p.313). 
In historically defining “the Yemeni state” this chapter adopts a pedagogical lens: it 
conceptualizes state-development as a translocal practice of learning that involves 
people, materials, and shifting environments. This approach captures the multiplicity 
of state-building in Yemen, which never followed a superimposed and externally 
enforced blueprint. Instead, ideas regarding the Yemeni state and their 
implementation have been driven by personhood, shifting relational alignments of 
Yemeni (and other) individuals, and international and domestic material environments. 
This perspective acknowledges the importance of individual backgrounds, interests, 
values, and aspirations, emphasising “the unceasing work of human creators” as well 
as “the unstable and hybrid character of their creation” (Asad, 1993, p.2). The state is 
continuously (re-)learned by people, “often for very different reasons, from coping 
mechanisms and personal advancement to policy-making and questions of 
contestation and justice” (McFarlane, 2011, p.8).26  
Learning is very broadly understood here as a name for specific socio-material 
practices through which knowledge about the state is created, contested and 
 
26 While McFarlane (2011) discusses the learning of cities, his work is also useful in outlining Yemeni 
state-learning.  
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changed. 27  In exploring the historical process of learning the Yemeni state, the 
remaining part of this chapter focuses on the complex translation of globally circulating 
“state models”, their partial application by Yemeni state actors, and the creation of new 
and hybrid forms of Yemeni statehood. To better conceptualize “state models”, it 
deploys Hansen and Stepputat’s (2001) linguistic of “languages of stateness”. Each of 
these languages describes a certain “register of governance and authority” (p.6), 
capturing specific ways of viewing, experiencing, and expressing the state. From this 
perspective, every state emerges as 
“a historically specific configuration of a range of languages of stateness, some 
practical, others symbolic and performative, that have been disseminated, 
translated, interpreted, and combined in widely different ways and sequences 
across the globe” (p.6/7)  
The practice of (re-)learning languages of stateness involves their translation, which 
according to McFarlane (2011) centres around particularistic and comparative 
processes of distributing and mediating knowledge. By conceptualizing how 
knowledge is facilitated, distorted, contested, or radically re-packaged over time and 
space (McFarlane, 2011), the practice of translation resembles “hybridity approaches” 
prevalent in the field of postcolonial state theory (Chatterjee, 1993; Asad, 1993, 
Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Sharp, 2008). It emphasizes the materiality, relations, 
and spaces through which ideas disperse in a non-linear fashion. The study of 
translation thereby challenges existing diffusion models, which link travelling 
knowledge to an authoritative knowledge-transmitting centre, usually “the West”.  
By portraying Yemeni state building as a practice of learning and translation, this study 
emphasizes human agency. As will be shown in the following analysis, high-ranking 
Yemeni politicians appear to have learned the state in part by translating knowledge 
through mediated and dispersed models. They selectively drew on and combined 
state attributes already available. While such intermediation implies the existence of a 
“source”, the following analysis does not try to trace alleged “roots” of variously 
implemented state ideas and images in Yemen. Instead, it limits itself to outlining 
 
27 This definition borrows heavily from McFarlane (2011), who understands learning as “processes, 
practices and interactions through which knowledge [about the state] is created, contested and 
transformed, and for how perception emerges and changes” (p.3). 
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existing narratives of ideational origins and “state models”. As argued in this chapter, 
the Yemeni state has emerged as a unique and ever-forming hybrid. Such hybridity is 
not seen as the failed attempt of mimicking others, but as the result of translating 
(globally dominant) “languages of stateness”.  
Notably, this chapter recognizes that human agency is materially mediated. Given the 
historical dependence of Yemeni state makers on external aid and loans, it is not far-
fetched to assume that state institutions were at times designed so as to match the 
preferences of major donors. In these instances, the advantage of adopting globally 
dominant languages of stateness lied in the securement of ongoing external support. 
Speaking the same language than powerful and potentially threatening states also 
carried more indirect advantages, such as facilitated diplomatic communication. For 
instance, the Yemeni Imam Yahya Hamid al-Deen decided to refer to himself as “king” 
in the early 20th-century, a time when European dominance was spreading in the 
Middle East. He presumably deemed it beneficial to choose a form of self-
representation that was readily understood by European and other Middle Eastern 
representatives. At the time, Egypt, Iraq, and other states in the region became 
headed by “kings”, a change in title that can, at least in part, be understood as the 
emulation of European monarchies. Aware of these power-knowledge dynamics, the 
following analysis of Yemeni state configurations is informed by postcolonial theory. 
Unequal global power relations shape the learning and translation of “languages of 
stateness”. As Hansen and Stepputat (2001) point out, not all “languages of stateness” 
are equally influential. Their varying global authority is tied to material and political 
constellations, in which “Western registers” rank particularly highly (Hansen and 
Stepputat, 2001, p.6). As mentioned above, it appears that state-makers in Yemen, 
and elsewhere in the Middle East, increasingly viewed the European nation-state as 
a proto-type of successful political organization, which they aimed at emulating – at 
least in part.  
While “influential” state languages were applied relatively literally within the “material 
realm” of Yemen’s institutional structure, they were translated more freely within the 
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domain of social relations, views, and practice.28 Early “ministries”, for example, did 
not initially operate from within public buildings, but gradually developed around key 
figures, tasks, and social relations. While ministry buildings and complex 
organizational structures were added over time, often mirroring existing ministerial 
models elsewhere, underlying social norms and practices continued emphasizing the 
importance of network-based resources and personalized “neo-patrimonial” decision-
making. 
By studying the actors and practices involved in Yemen’s state building, the following 
analysis responds to a recent strand in IR literature that emphasizes processes of 
international socialization. Zarakol (2010), for instance, depicts the international 
system as a stigmatizing arena, in which feelings of inferiority explain collective elite 
efforts to adapt to “Western” norms. She observes that state leaders frequently 
internalize “the idea of linear progress and the idea that European material 
advancement was somehow connected to European culture and lifestyle” (p.55). Their 
consequent effort “to catch up” is specified in Mitchell’s (1988) analysis of nineteenth-
century Egypt, where processes of (self-) colonization occurred “through the 
internalization of scientific genres of knowledge, modern methods of administration 
and surveillance, and styles of cultural self-objectification through European registers” 
(Hansen and Stepputat, 2011, p.13).  
The remainder of this chapter outlines the historical development of Yemeni state 
ideas and their institutional manifestation. Its analysis combines secondary sources 
with original documents, such as the Yemeni Constitution, and archival material from 
the British National Archives (NA) and the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (PAAA). Although the German Federal Republic has been a significant 
source of development assistance for the North Yemeni state, and the only Western 
country with uninterrupted diplomatic representation there, Rogers (2018) finds that 
the West German papers have been under-utilised in the study of the Yemen Arab 
Republic. The use of commentary and analysis by West German diplomats does not 
compensate for lacking access to Yemeni archives. Yet, it enriches this historical 
 
28 With reference to Chatterjee (1993), this study draws a conceptual distinction between outwardly 
visible material form and less tangible social practices, ideational developments, and personal 
biographies. 
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outline with unique empirical details that offer insight into diplomatic interpretations of 
Yemeni state-learning.  
Given this study’s interest in the Yemeni diplomatic service, the following historical 
outline pays particular attention to central government institutions, first and foremost 
state ministries but also legislative bodies. This means leaving out other aspects 
involved in the learning of the Yemeni state, such as military institutions, the 
geographic reach and effectiveness of the judiciary, and government-tribe relations, 
for example. In examining the formation and expression of state ideas, this chapter 
does not aim at covering the full intellectual history of Yemeni “statehood” but 
proceeds in a genealogical manner that emphasizes outwardly striking ruptures in 
Yemeni politics. Examining how seeming political turning points have impacted state-
related meanings and practices, it finds that the fluid expression of state ideas has 
been accompanied by surprising endurance. As such, the history of the Yemeni state 
emerges not so much as a series of drastic ruptures, but as a story of simultaneous 
change and continuity. Drawing inspiration from Bourdieu, it is argued that besides 
outwardly striking and widely studied events, such as rebellions, conspiracies, and 
insurrections; “what is [also] staggering and amazing is the opposite: the fact that order 
is so frequently observed” (Bourdieu cited in Riley, 2015, p.265). While history is often 
thought of as a series of change and rupture, this chapter indicates that it is equally 
marked by continuity, with a variety of state practices and institutions finding ways to 
endure. From this perspective, ‘‘Each ‘new’ combination of [state] elements and 
practices is in some sense an emergent outcome of those that went before” (Shove et 
al, 2012, p.125). The following sketch of developing state ministries in Yemen is 
divided into three main parts, first discussing historical events in Northern Yemen, then 
Southern Yemen, and lastly the unified Republic of Yemen.  
I Learning the Yemeni state in the north 
Recent writing on Yemen’s history traces the early beginning of “statehood” back to 
the kingdoms of Saba and Himyar, “two major states” (Dresch, 2000, p.5) that ruled 
over much of South Arabia in pre-Islamic times. An alternative, and more common 
historical narrative treats the ninth century as a starting point of “the state” in Yemen, 
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pointing to the emergence of an “Imamic state administration” (Vom Bruck, 2005, p.3) 
that lasted for roughly ten centuries. Until 1962, a succession of Zaydi Imams, “drawn 
from the descendants of the Prophet” (Dresch, 2000, p.11), ruled over Yemen’s 
northern territories (Madelung, 1992; Vom Bruck, 2005).29 It was not until the mid-19th 
century, following the British takeover of Aden’s port in 1839 and the Ottoman 
occupation of Yemen’s northern highlands in 1872, that Yemenis were said to have 
experienced a shift in predominant notions of authority, order, and space (Messick, 
1993).30 In the north, reforms such as the codification of sharia and the introduction of 
Lancaster method schools31 have been portrayed as “Western” influences, that were 
mediated “through Ottoman-introduced institutions or filtered northward along the 
trade routes from colonial Aden” (Messick, 1993, p.9).32  
Following the departure of Turkish forces from northern Yemen in 1918, the acting 
Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid al-Din (1904-1948) gained back full political control. 
In an effort to maintain sovereignty and power, he was said to have chosen a “path of 
isolation” (Bonnefoy, 2018, p.7). Yet, it is a misconception to think that the Imam’s 
governance or the lacking interest of imperial powers resulted in the complete isolation 
of Yemen (Bonnefoy, 2018).  
Following independence, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din continued many of the reform 
processes once started by the Ottoman occupiers. In fact, the Yemeni state was said 
to have in many ways been learned from the Ottomans, at least into the 1920s: 
Ottoman reforms shaped the top levels of regional administration and the Imam 
adopted the model of a professional military (jaysh al-nidhami) from the Ottomans, to 
name just some examples (Rogers, 2018). Later, the Imam allegedly modelled Yemen 
 
29 “The religious and political legitimacy of the imamate was grounded in Zaydism, a branch of Shia 
Islam specific to Yemen” (Bonnefoy, 2018, p.2). 
30 “Save for the Ottoman Empire’s twice-held grip on the country in the sixteenth and then the 
nineteenth century, primarily remote in nature and in many ways less devasating than occupation by 
Western European powers, the north never experienced the traumas of colonisation” (Bonnefoy, 
2018, p.20). 
31 The schools were adapted from instructional methods developed by Joseph Lancaster in the 19th-
century. Offering a precise guide for schools’ physical layout and instruction, the Lancaster design 
was described as “widely influential” (Messick, 1993, p. 102). “Model schools were established in 
France, Germany, the United States, and a number of colonial settings” (Messick, 1993, p. 102) 
32 Until 1961, when the port of Hodeida was expanded, eighty percent of North Yemen’s trade passed 
through Aden Port. While petroleum was the most important traded good, other items included food, 
tobacco, raw materials, as well as some machinery and manufactured goods (Halliday, 1974). 
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more explicitly after European nation-states. In doing so, he was never coerced by 
“Western” colonialists, but supposedly driven by a more subtle strife for imitation. As 
Dresch (2000) observed, the “Yemeni state” became increasingly understood “in its 
relation with the world beyond”, which made “emulation, both within and between 
states […] a prime concern” (p.267). The Ottoman-introduced printing press in Yemen, 
and the increasing consumption of foreign newspapers, literature, and later also radio 
and television, impacted Yemenis’ self-awareness and the number of circulating 
“languages of stateness”. These trends were exacerbated by the Middle East’s 
reorganization into multiple nation-states following the end of World War I. By imposing 
their own “language of stateness”, European colonizers restructured “the Orient” 
according to “European taxonomies”, thereby reinforcing their recently gained control 
of the region (Sharp, 2008, p.18). Presumably hoping to facilitate his communication 
with European rulers, the Yemeni Imam translated his title into “king” in 1926. At the 
same time, he insisted on continuously representing himself “first and foremost as the 
amir al-mu’minin (leader of the faithful)” (Vom Bruck, 2005, p.48). This example points 
to the comparative, dispersed, and multiple nature of translating “languages of 
stateness” and to the unique hybrids born in the process. 
With regards to domestic government institutions, a first “mimicking step” was taken 
by the Imam in 1931, when a Cabinet with appointed ministers was put in place, 
including ministers for war, foreign affairs, justice, finance, agriculture, 
communications, and education (Peterson, 1982).33 Notably, the initial delegation of 
ministerial functions was not accompanied by the construction of imposing public 
buildings. As Peterson (1982) observed, “these ministries never involved more 
bureaucracy than the ‘minister’ and a clerk or two, with the premises of the ‘ministry’ 
simply being the incumbent’s home” (p.52). Thus, no distinction was made between a 
visible exterior of institutions and a less visible “inner structure” (Mitchell, 1991, p.59).34 
 
33 In 1937, the Ottoman advisor Qadi Raghib Bey suggested the establishment of an additional health 
ministry to manage the country’s three clinics and the procurement of medical supplies (Peterson, 
1982). 
34 In the writings of Ibn Khaldoun and other Arab historians, official activities are never indicated by 
reference to or in terms of an imposing building. Urban life was understood by function not by 
buildings (Mitchell, 1991). 
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It was only during the reign of Yahya’s son Imam Ahmad (1948-1962) that the material 
outer form of the Yemeni state was further developed. Imam Ahmad’s state-building 
efforts allegedly drew on external funds and involved the translation of various 
“languages of stateness” that were mediated by European as well as Egyptian 
consultants. As early as 1959, Egyptian experts advised the Imam on agricultural 
issues, the development of the Yemeni police and security apparatus, as well as the 
health and education sector, to name just a few examples (PAAA, B12 1059a, 29 June 
1959).  
While the outer form of state institutions changed and developed, political decision-
making remained personalized. Hence, the effectiveness of early ministries continued 
to depend on the motivation and pro-activeness of their respective ministers 
(Peterson, 1982). Further undermining the power of ministries was the fact that many 
of the ministerial and assisting civil servant roles were nominal in nature (PAAA, B12 
1058a, 8 September 1955): they were handed out and existed on paper but did not 
reflect any actual ministerial portfolio or function. Real political authority remained 
within the hands of Imam Yahya and later Imam Ahmad (PAAA, B12 1058a, 8 
September 1955), who jealously protected all decision-making power and allegedly 
insisted on micro-managing each ministry. “There is no official who carries even the 
slightest personal responsibility, let alone would dare to claim any,” a Yemen-based 
diplomat reported in the early 1960s (PAAA, B12 1058, 21 November 1960). It was 
the Imam, not newly developed institutions, that embodied the Yemeni state. Thus, 
new “languages of stateness” were not suddenly spoken, i.e. adopted in full, but 
translated to suit the interests of the (leading) Yemeni state actors. “When a project is 
translated from one site to another, from one agent to another, versions of power are 
produced. As with translations of a text, one does not simply get a reproduction of 
identity” (Asad, 1993, p.13).  
While Burrowes (1991) described the late Yemeni Imamate as a “traditional theocratic 
state” (p.486), his description misses the increasing blend of “state languages” that 
marked Yemen’s development in the first half of the 20th-century. While traditional 
state registers remained dominant, they began merging with an increasing number of 
alternative state ideas. As shown below, certain parts of that mix had “greater power 
to influence the direction of change [than others]” (Sharp, 2008, p.3). In Yemen, it was 
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especially “Western languages of state” that began to gain traction after the “1962 
Revolution”, which replaced the Imamate with a “nation-state republic” (Messick, 1993, 
p.8).  
I.1. The 1962 revolution and the rise of the Yemen Arab Republic 
On the night of 26 September 1962, a group of lieutenants and officers shelled the 
Imam’s palace in Sanaa, while also capturing military headquarters, the radio station, 
and other strategic facilities (Peterson, 1982). In the absence of an immediate royalist 
response, the “Yemen Arab Republic” (YAR) was declared by the next morning. Imam 
Mohammad al-Badr, who had succeeded his father only one week earlier, fled to Saudi 
Arabia, where he aimed at reversing Yemen’s new political power constellation. In the 
years that followed, a civil war erupted between royalist and republican forces, who 
advocated two different “languages of stateness”. The conflict involved a broad range 
of external actors, including the region’s two power houses at the time: Saudi Arabia, 
who supported the Imam and his exiled government in Jeddah,35 and Egypt, who 
supported the republican government in Sanaa. While Egyptian state actors allegedly 
aimed at shaping Northern Yemen in the image of “Arab socialism”, Saudi Arabian 
politicians were described as eager to protect royalist “state registers” in the region.  
Both Yemeni royalists and republicans were dependent on the material support of their 
respective regional patron.36 Saudi Arabian rulers, for instance, provided the Imam 
with sufficient funds to continue mobilizing Yemenis in northern and eastern regions 
(PAAA B36 46,1963), while Egyptians sent up to 70,000 soldiers to support the 
republican government.  
 
35 The royalists established formal governmental structures in Jeddah, containing a “royal council”, 
which was headed by Imam al-Badr as president, and a “transitional cabinet” containing a prime 
minister, as well as ministers of interior, transport, foreign affairs, defence, information, justice, 
education, finance, social affairs, the royal palace, health, and economics. It is unclear whether the 
“exiled royal government” existed only on paper or took on real governmental functions (PAAA, B36 
299, 30 April 1967). Presumably, it helped the Imam’s effort to maintain, or gain, international 
recognition, which was essential to securing material support from external powers. 
36 The Imam was not only supported by Saudi Arabia, but also by British agents Israelis, and a few 
Frenchmen. “Sent by MI6 and the CIA, these foreign combatants were determined not to see a 
regime inspired by Arab nationalist ideology take hold” (Bonnefoy, 2018, p.25).  
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While literature on the history of Yemen identifies the 1970s as the true period of state-
building,37 this chapter agrees with the more recent analysis by Rogers (2018), who 
finds that the basic institutional groundwork of the young Yemeni republic was already 
developed in the 1960s. Geographically removed from the frontlines of war, important 
institutional changes had been unfolding in Yemen’s urban centres since 1962.38 
Already existing ministries were reformed and expanded at the time, including the 
ministries of justice, education, health, agriculture, public works, foreign affairs, 
communications, and industry. Other institutions were created from scratch, such as 
the ministries of interior, economy, and local administration (Peterson, 1982). New 
public buildings were set-up for ministries, with Burrowes (1991) observing that 
following regime-change, “a full panoply of ministries and other state agencies [was 
erected] almost overnight” (p.486).  
Between 1962 and 1967, the process of state building in Yemen was heavily 
influenced by Egyptian civilian advisors, who had accompanied Egyptian troops to 
Yemen (Rogers, 2018). 39  Approximately 350 civilian advisors, managers, and 
teachers worked to improve existing administrative institutions, while also creating a 
range of new ministries, offices, schools, hospitals, as well as a central bank (Rogers, 
2018). Yemeni decision-makers were highly sensitive to Egyptian threats to cut off the 
supply of paper riyals, which were printed in Egypt, suspend funding, or to freeze 
Yemen’s currency reserves, which had been transferred to Cairo (Al-Aini, 2004). As 
Rogers (2018) put it, Yemeni officials in the 1960s were “performing stateness for 
external donors” (p.174).  
To operate these new organizations, thousands of Yemeni civil servants were 
recruited and trained (Rogers, 2018).40 In July 1963, the Yemeni government created 
 
37 See Peterson (1982 and 1984) and Burrowes (1987 and 2010). 
38 Yemen’s urban centres included Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeidah. 
39 Egyptian advisors impacted the drafting of the YAR’s Constitution (Rogers, 2018) and influenced 
day-to-day politics. “Present and influential in all government bodies and public institutions” (cited in 
Rogers, 2018, p.178), the most important Egyptian advisors sat in the office of the ministers 
themselves (Rogers, 2018). It was only in 1964, that Yemeni politicians began to increasingly oppose 
the extent of Egyptian interference. For instance, Yemen’s newly established national security council 
was dissolved that year due to opposition to its inclusion of three Egyptian members (PAAA B36 115, 
18 February 1964).  
40 In the mid-1960s ministries in Yemen included the ministry of foreign affairs, education, health, 
tribal affairs, interior, justice, agriculture, finance, labour, information, and the economy (Rogers, 
2018). 
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an institute of public administration, offering crash courses on administration and a 
range of other subjects relevant to governance. As the “Yemen News” reported at the 
time, the institute served “as a means of increasing the officials’ efficiency…” (cited in 
PAAA B36 45, 1963). Teachers at the institute were mostly Egyptian, including Abdul 
Hafiz Abu Schuhud, who had previously served as Egyptian ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia (PAAA B36 45, 27 July 1963).41  
As these examples indicate, ongoing learning processes were closely tied to shifting 
power relations and involved the translation of new “languages of stateness”, 
mediated by Egyptian and European “advisors”. While these developments all point to 
change, they have been accompanied by important strands of continuity. Existing 
institutions and institutional practices were built on and further developed rather than 
abolished and fully replaced by new ones. As was the case during the Imamate, reform 
was more visible in outward institutional structures than in the realm of social relations 
and practice, leading scholars such as Peterson (1982) to conclude that “while the 
institutions have changed [following the 1962 revolution], Yemen still relies on the role 
and force of dominant personalities at the expense of more enduring and legitimate 
structural institutions” (p.11-12). German diplomatic sources added that by 1974 the 
Yemeni state administration remained strained by “nominal civil servants” (PAAA B36 
108796, 11 April 1975). Likewise, a UNDP assessment conducted in 1971 pointed to 
the “duplication of functions” and the “overlapping and conflicts of jurisdiction” both 
between and within ministries. The report criticized that administration was “personal 
and individual rather than institutional” (cited in Rogers, 2018, p.175).  
The above-mentioned administrative changes were embedded in broader 
transformations of ordering systems regarding both time and space. For instance, in 
February 1963, a new time system was introduced, formally integrating the Yemen 
Arab Republic in global UTC time. Prior to 1963, Northern Yemen had operated on 
the basis of a solar time system, where the day began with sunrise, at 0:00 o’clock, 
and ended with sunset, at 12:00 o’clock. This measurement was made possible by 
Yemen’s geographical proximity to the equator, which ensured that the sun rose and 
 
41 Years later, teachers were also recruited from other countries, including Germany (PAAA B36 
108796, 23 December 1974). In addition, high-ranking Yemeni officials were sent abroad to study 
administrative practices there (PAAA B36 32768, 1968). 
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set at approximately the same time throughout the year (PAAA B36 45, 2 February 
1963). In addition, territorial space was fundamentally restructured in the early 1960s. 
A system of governorates, including administrative units of municipalities, was 
introduced (PAAA B36 45,19 June 1963; Rogers, 2018) and the ministry for communal 
and village affairs began allocating street names within major Yemeni cities (PAAA 
B36 45, 27 July 1963).42 In fact, territory has long constituted a key concern in the 
learning of the Yemeni state, leading to the geographical expansion of state services, 
for instance, and infrastructure projects, such as the construction of roads linking the 
cities of Taiz, Hodeidah, and Sanaa. While the communication of state ideas and the 
forging of state-related affiliations may be described as fragmented, they were crucial 
to ongoing efforts at territorially consolidating “the Yemeni state”.  
Following post-war reconciliation in 1970 and the partial integration of royalists in the 
republican government, the continuous learning of the state was complicated by 
considerable “in-house” fighting and the constant re-shuffling of the cabinet in the 
1970s. While state institutions remained dependent on dominant personalities, no 
consensus could be reached regarding the allocation of high-ranking positions. This 
led to constant and unproductive struggle between competing factions and individuals. 
Between 1962 and 1978 four presidents succeeded each other, often through violence 
(Bonnefoy, 2018).  
The in-fighting of competing political factions decreased somewhat with Ali Abdullah 
Saleh’s rise to power in July 1978. His ability to remain president for 33 years has 
been linked to the growing influence of loyal military and security forces43 and his 
successful co-option of diverging political forces and tribal elders (Burrows, 1991; 
PAAA B36 137628, 15 August 1980). The political system he built was described by 
German diplomats as “not dictatorial” but a “moderate one-man-rule”, in which “the 
president bases his power on the benevolence of the tribes and a powerful security 
apparatus” (PAAA B36 137776, 8 February 1984, PAAA B36 137777, 1 February 
 
42 Names were to serve the memory of alleged martyrs, including Yemenis who had died in the 1962 
revolution but also those who gave their lives in previous wars, going all the way back to fighting the 
Ethiopian occupation in the 6th century AD (PAAA B36 45, 27 July 1963). 
43 The armed forces were reformed, enlarged, and re-equipped in 1979 and again in 1986 and 1988 
(Burrowes, 1991). 
 63 
1985). Notably, Saleh applied an increasing number of democratic state registers,44 
establishing a one-party-system built around the “General People’s Congress” 
(GPC),45 for instance, and orchestrating elections in 1988 to “democratically confirm” 
his presidential power (PAAA B36 154168, 6 July 1988). The translation and 
performance of democratic stateness has, again, been particularly visible in the 
outward material form of central government institutions. In contrast, Burrowes (1991) 
observed that “the politics of the YAR continued to revolve largely around notables, 
traditional as well as modern, and, of course, President Salih and his close associates” 
(p.495). A German diplomat at the time agreed, writing, “Saleh tries to build a 
centralized nation-state with increasing democratic elements – this should not distract 
from the fact that staying in power was a key priority. Legitimizing this power came 
second” (PAAA B36 154168, 1988). By 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh had built a system 
that was based on military and security forces who were personally loyal and often 
related to him. In what was widely described as a (neo-)patrimonial system, he granted 
a certain level of autonomy to tribal leaders and other powerful stakeholders, in 
exchange for their support of his presidency.  
II Learning the Yemeni state in the south 
Historically, the Zaydi Imamate “was either absent or fragile and disputed” in the south-
east of Yemen, where a large part of the population has been Sunni (Bonnefoy, 2018, 
p.2). A notable rupture along northern and southern lines occurred in the early 18th 
century, when the sultan of the southern region of Lahj, who served as a local 
administrator of the Imam, revolted and broke away from the Imamate, with various 
other tribal leaders following suit. Until the British occupation of Aden in 1839, southern 
Yemen was comprised of a range of independent sultanates, amirates, and 
shaykhdoms, which were typically structured around a central leading figure and tribal 
law (Halliday, 1974). This section traces the learning of a single southern state to the 
 
44 First parliamentary election occurred in 1971, but the parliament only existed until 1974, when the 
military took over in 1974 (PAAA B36 154168, March 1988). It was only in July 1988 that elections 
were allowed again. 
45 The GPC party constituted a central platform for patrimonial exchanges and negotiations. 
“Ministers, businessmen, national and local leaders, all having a vested interest in the system, were in 
the GPC, which rarely pretended to have an ideology” (Brehony, 2011, p.183). 
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gradual introduction of central government institutions in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. The early translation of languages of stateness served the interests of British 
colonizers and has always been partial in reach, co-existing and at times blending with 
alternative state registers.  
In 1937 British occupiers solidified their presence by declaring Aden a “crown colony”, 
whose “hinterland” was divided into two administrative units a few years later in 1940: 
The Western Protectorate and the Eastern Protectorate. Both protectorates were 
initially managed through a system of “indirect rule” (Halliday, 1990, p.108), which 
means that British officials concluded a series of “advisory treaties” with tribal leaders, 
promising money and arms in return for their obedience. According to Halliday (1974), 
the main purpose of Aden’s hinterland was to serve as a buffer zone protecting the 
urban Crown Colony.  
British colonizers interfered more forcefully inside Yemen’s southern port city, where 
they placed great emphasis on introducing new languages of stateness. For the most 
part, this involved translating British state registers so as to match colonial interests 
and local specificities. In 1947, a Legislative Council was established, whose functions 
and procedures were roughly modelled after the British Parliament (Sheth, 1980). 
Likewise, in February 1961, the leaders of newly established executive departments 
were upgraded to “ministers” (PAAA B12 1137, 8 September 1962). Importantly, these 
changes were of a cosmetic nature, pertaining more to outward form than “inner 
essence”. First ministerial positions and institutions were mostly “nominal” in nature, 
lacking power and democratic legitimacy. According to Halliday (1974) and others, “no 
real attempt was made to democratize the government of Aden” (p.170). 46  The 
Legislative Council operated under direct control of the British Governor in Aden, the 
chief executive. Half of its eighteen members were ex officio while the other half was 
being nominated (Sheth, 1980). Its democratic deficit was reflected spatially as well. 
Detached from Aden’s broader popular base, the Council was based in a converted 
Methodist chapel atop a hill in the Crater district in Aden – “an ugly and alien symbol 
brooding uneasily over the predominantly Moslem town underneath” (Halliday, 1974, 
 
46 Colonial orders provided for a centralized, personalized form of government under the direct control 
of London (Sheth, 1980). 
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p.186). While the number of electable council members gradually increased, voting 
rights remained restricted, only allowing British subjects or people born in Aden to 
participate in elections (Halliday, 1974).  
As these examples indicate, unequal global power relations allowed colonial officials 
to selectively pick and mimic political structures “from home”. The Council’s 
appearance and official functions might have resembled British Parliament, yet, its 
social composition, practice, and power remained under the authoritarian control of 
the British, specifically the Governor. While scholars such as Liebesny (1955) 
positively commented at the time that “British advice and British participation in 
legislative drafting no doubt have introduced a certain amount of Western thought and 
Western method” (p.396), the translation and implementation of allegedly “Western” 
languages of stateness was incomplete and contradictory at best.47 
Over time, Yemenis began to increasingly learn and shape the southern Yemeni state 
by pushing for the training and employment of locals, initially within the lower echelons 
of the Adeni civil service. A variety of vocational training schools were set up training, 
for instance, women to work as nurses and teachers. In addition, a small number of 
Yemenis were selected by British officials to receive training overseas or to participate 
in internal government training schemes (Little, 1968).48 Several of newly trained 
professionals became ministers or senior officials after independence in 1967, a 
development that links expertise to state-related continuity. Fadhl Ahmad Sallami, for 
instance, was educated at Aden College and served in an administrative capacity in 
various government departments during British rule. Following independence, he 
became head of the presidential office and later held the positions of head of the 
general intelligence, permanent secretary for the ministry of foreign affairs (1969), and 
ambassador to the UK (1970) (NA /8/1705).49 
Slowly shifting power dynamics were also reflected institutionally. With the beginning 
of 1959, political and administrative structures in South Yemen were gradually re-
organized into a single federal government representing Aden and most of its 
 
47 “Direct British rule has given the Colony a Western-type administration” (Liebesny, 1955, p. 396). 
48 For more information read Little (1968). 
49 High-ranking political figures, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister studied at the 
Aden College (Halliday, 1974). 
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hinterland. While these developments point to the emergence of functioning federal 
government, Yemen’s state development was yet again marked by a gap between 
outward material form and actual political power. While the British undertook a range 
of (cosmetic) administrative changes,50 they simultaneously set up a treaty ensuring 
their ongoing sovereignty in Aden (Pieragostini, 1991), which in essence remained a 
“crown colony” (Brehony, 2011, p.10). In addition, the Federation had to assign 
responsibility for external affairs to the British government, and agreed to refrain from 
entering into any treaty, agreement, correspondence or other relation with any foreign 
government or international organisation without knowledge and consent of the British 
(Little, 1968). 51  Financially as well, the Federation remained dependent on their 
colonial masters. While attempts have been made since 1956 “to fill the vacancies for 
administrative, professional, and technical officers” with Yemeni recruits, the payment 
of the Federation’s approximately 6,000 civil servants and a similar number of locally 
recruited military was entirely reliant on the British government (Governor Luce cited 
in Sheth, 1980; Halliday, 1974).  
II.1. Southern independence and emergence of the PDRY 
Existing dependencies in South Yemen were transformed considerably in 1967, when 
British colonial control was put to an end and members of the National Liberation Front 
of Occupied South Yemen (NLF) announced the People’s Republic of South Yemen 
(PRSY). Subsequent state-building efforts involved the translation of new state 
languages, notably socialist registers, which were combined with already existing 
“languages of stateness”. In fact, several state registers learned from the British were 
deemed useful and survived the political rupture of independence. Such continuity 
supports arguments made by postcolonial theorists who recognize that “colonial 
effects” remain tangible even after acts of decolonization (Sharp, 2008, p.5). 
Notwithstanding the departure of (British) senior staff in 1967, a sufficient number of 
state employees remained in South Yemen to manage colonial administrative 
 
50 Aden’s Executive Council, for instance, was renamed “Council of Ministers”, and the title of the 
British Governor was changed to “High Commissioner”. In addition, the number of governmental ex 
officio members was reduced to one and the position of “Chief Minister” was created (Pieragostini, 
1991). 
51 The Federation was also bound to accept British advice on any matter connected with the “good 
governance” of their territories (Little, 1968). 
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remnants. In fact, given the administration’s ongoing functionality, the new Yemeni 
government decided to extend the Adeni administrative system to the whole country. 
Within a few years, it thereby established its presence, and a certain degree of control, 
in nearly all parts of South Yemen – a fact that set it apart from the YAR government 
at the time (Brehony, 2011).52  
Besides maintaining existing institutional structures, South Yemen’s new leaders in 
many ways continued speaking the “language of stateness” they had learned from the 
British. Prime Minister Ali Nasir Muhammad, for instance, insisted in the 1970s that 
existing civil service disciplines were to be maintained: “meetings were expected to 
start on time, minutes kept, and decisions recorded and followed up” (Brehony, 2011, 
p.59).53 NLF leaders were also said to have internalized more abstract norms and 
concepts such as “modernity” and “progress” (Messick, 1993). Among other things, 
this was expressed in measures taken against tribal forms of political authority less 
than two weeks after independence. In a landmark decision on 17 December 1967, all 
tribal leaders were declared to lose land and title (Müller, 2015). At the same time, the 
PSRY was divided into six provinces, each being subdivided into numbered regions 
and districts. 54  The boundaries of new provinces intentionally ignored those of 
previous sultanates and tribes, which were perceived as “backward” (Brehony, 2011, 
p.69). The close relationship between political power and spatial organization 
indicates that learning the PRSY involved a considerable territorial element; 
consolidating “the state” was as much a geographical as it was a socio-political project.  
Rather than producing absolute outcomes, efforts to remove wide-spread tribal 
structures and related registers of political authority frequently resulted in 
fragmentation, combining changes in outer form with continuity in traditional modes of 
personalized power. As Brehony (2011) described it: 
 
52 South Yemeni leaders also benefitted from a functioning army, for instance, as well as a 
rudimentary education sector already in place (Brehony, 2011). In its early years, the education 
system was “largely dependent on importing foreign teachers, mostly from friendly Palestinian 
organizations and Sudan” (Lackner, 2017, p.688). 
53 In the late 1970s, the civil service could attract a number of South Yemenis who used to live in exile 
or had graduated from soviet and foreign universities (Brehony, 2011).    
54 Müller (2015) points out the similarity to East German reforms, where existing states were no longer 
referred to by their names but were labelled with numbers.  
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“The old tribal chiefs had gone, but were in effect replaced by NF officials from 
the tribe: the party secretary was the new shaykh; he was the source of 
influence and jobs. In return, he expected the loyalty of his beneficiaries” (p.70).  
Besides strands of continuity, radically “new languages of stateness” were introduced 
with the establishment of the PRSY, notably including socialist state registers. PSRY 
officials turned toward governments commonly labelled anti-imperialist and socialist, 
asking for assistance and guidance in their state-building effort. A day after 
independence was declared, East Berlin agreed to offer training to South Yemeni 
political cadres in the east German Democratic Republic (GDR). Soon afterwards, 
Otto Winzer, GDR minister of foreign affairs, reacted to the PRSY’s demand for 
“advisors on state and administrative affairs”, promising to promptly send a group of 
consultants (Müller, 2015, p.262).55 The PRSY’s socialist orientation was pursued 
more forcefully following a regime change in 1970, when left-wing politicians gained 
the upper hand within the NLF and began learning and applying languages of 
stateness that were labelled “democratic” by East German advisors, while appearing 
outrageously “socialist” to others (Müller, 2015). In November 1970, a Constitution 
was issued in Aden, replacing the “People’s Republic of South Yemen” (PRSY) with 
“People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen” (PDRY). The Constitution branded South 
Yemen more clearly as a “revolutionary socialist state”. Reflecting the PDRY’s political 
leaning, its capital was described by Bonnefoy (2018) as “a meeting place for Arab, 
European, African and Asian leftist militants alike, as well as for Soviet, East German, 
Bulgarian and Ethiopian training officers and agents” (p. 28).56 
Written with the help of Egyptian and East German advisors (Brehony, 2011), the 
South Yemeni Constitution was claimed to have followed the blueprint of East 
Germany’s Constitution in its structure, language, and content (Müller, 2015). Next to 
granting citizens a wide range of rights and entitlements, such as free access to 
education and healthcare, the PDRY’s Constitution emphasized the importance of its 
 
55 The GDR thereby established what Müller (2015) labelled “political engagement through ‘advisory 
groups’” (p.262). “It was assumed that after [...] independence the PRSY would mostly need political-
ideological help and advice on fundamental questions about the economy and the state apparatus” 




single party, declaring that the National Front leads, “the political activities of the 
masses and the mass organizations [based on Scientific Socialism], to further the 
society’s non-capitalist path” (PDRY Constitution 1970 cited in Müller, 2015, p. 257). 
In line with new constitutional requirements, the organizational structure of both the 
state and the party was changed. Besides promoting the notion of a shared 
presidency,57  the Constitution stipulated the establishment of a proper legislative 
body, the Supreme People’s Council. Continuing a history of discrepancy between 
material outer form and political power dynamics, the Supreme Council was described 
as little more than “a façade of democracy” (Brehony, 2011, p.55). Similar to practices 
once applied by British colonizers, democratic state languages were deployed to 
legitimize an otherwise centralized and hierarchical regime.58 While the 101 members 
of the Supreme People’s Council were supposed to be elected by local councils and 
trade unions, in reality, a large number was appointed by, and from among the ranks 
of, the General Command of the National Front (NF) - as the NLF was then called. 
Their main purpose was to obediently approve political decisions made by party 
leaders in top government positions (Müller, 2015). From the onset of the 
PSRY/PDRY, personalized structures of power and patrimonial bureaucratic practices 
co-existed with colonial-British and socialist “languages of stateness”. 
At party level, socialist state registers were translated more literally in 1972, when the 
party was modelled explicitly as a “Soviet-style vanguard party” (Müller, 2015, p.265):  
The party’s General Command was replaced by a “Central Committee” and its 
Executive Committee by a “Politburo” (Müller, 2015). The Politburo effectively 
emerged as the main centre of power during the 1970s, gradually overtaking the 
Presidency Council in importance. In 1973, the British embassy noted that, with one 
exception, “all members of the Politburo now hold key positions, and of the total 18 
 
57 The “Presidency Council” contained five and later three members. Following constitutional 
amendments in 1978, it was re-named “Presidium” (Brehony, 2011). 
58 The government’s lacking political debate and autocratic tendencies were reflected at a broader 
societal level, where freedom of expression became severely constrained, the media was tightly 
controlled, and fear of the newly created state security spread (Brehony, 2011). In 1975, a law was 
passed banning contact with foreigners, mostly directed at Western diplomats in Aden (Brehony, 
2011). 
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ministers the six who are neither members of the Politburo or Central Committee are 
all in the most insignificant posts” (Brehony, 2011, p.58).  
A final series of institutional reforms took place in 1978, when the NF became part of 
a newly established Yemen Socialist Party (YSP). According to West German 
analysis, the amended Constitution, specifically the structure and content of its 
articles, continued reflecting the influence of East European advisors (PAAA B36 
137633, 27 May 1979). West German diplomats claimed that the Soviet Union and 
East Germany had “experts and advisors in all ministries, public offices, and 
administrations” by 1978 (PAAA B36 119926, 20 August 1978; PAAA B36 137633, 1 
March 1979).59 Learning processes also involved training abroad, with a number of 
high-ranking party functionaries being educated in Moscow and East Berlin. As 
Bonnefoy (2018) described it, “South Yemeni students went abroad to train in ‘people’s 
democracies,’ faced the harsh Moscow winter, gave their children names like 
Guevara, Lenin, Thwra (revolution) or Dawla (state), and occasionally married in their 
host country before returning to lead the civil or military administrations at home” 
(p.28). 
The increasing adoption of “socialist state registers” was in part motivated by 
ideological conviction, but also linked to broader material power configurations, 
specifically South Yemen’s need for development aid (Weeden, 2008). “Effectively, 
the state had no source of income other than fisheries and limited agriculture, as well 
as whatever aid it could obtain from its very few friends” (Lackner, 2017, p.688).60 
These friends included communist governments, whose decision-makers provided 
money, goods (especially weapons), and expertise. China built a road connecting the 
PDRY’s eastern and western peripheries (PAAA B36 137634, 25 November 1979), 
East Germany gave millions in “solidarity support” (PAAA B36 119926, 18 June 1977), 
and the Soviet Union emerged as the PDRY’s most important donor. In 1981, German 
 
59 Weeden (2008) agrees that “the South’s government structure was organized on the basis of the 
Soviet model, with the familiar party central committee and the smaller, more powerful politburo ruling 
within it” (p.58). Likewise, Müller (2015) finds that in its heyday, the PDRY housed more than 2,000 
East German experts and advisors, who sold their concept of socialist state- and nation-building.  
60 The PDRY government also received support from the UN and other international organizations as 
well as a range of individual countries (PAAA B36 137894, 12 November 1986) 
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diplomatic sources described the uneasy relation between applied state languages 
and material support as follows: 
“Ali Nasser [head of state] has dutifully continued the uncritical political support 
for Soviet policies and has stressed that relations with the Soviet Union are the 
cornerstone of PDRY’s foreign policy. Ali Nasser realizes that the Soviet bloc 
is the PDRY’s only certain source of support and assistance, but he probably 
also realizes that the Russians are not popular in his country and their interest 
is not an altruistic one” (PAAA B36 137676, May/June 1981). 
In a cold war context, in which socialist and capitalist languages of stateness 
competed for prominence, the (outward) learning of socialist registers was rewarded 
materially. Yet, as suggested in this chapter, socialist languages of stateness were not 
“just” copied, but translated, leading to fragmented outcomes that were deeply 
embedded in interpersonal, domestic, and international power relations. The PDRY 
Constitution, for instance, named Islam as a state religion, with leading politicians 
displaying their religious affiliation and practice in public (PAAA B36 137633,15 March 
1981).  
The late 1970s and 1980s were marked more by political division and power struggles 
than state-building and institutional state reform. According to Bonnefoy (2018), “the 
socialist project did not erase either the disjunction between Aden and the PDRY 
hinterland or the strength of local identities that structured political competition”. Five 
PSRY/PDRY presidents succeeded one another “in a climate of merciless personal 
rivalries, coups d’état, purges and assassinations” (p.28). A putsch attempt in January 
1986 led to a two-week outburst of violence that left thousands dead (Bonnefoy, 2018). 
Realizing that conflict between political factions stood in the way of effective 
governance, PDRY officials concluded that regime survival would either require major 
reforms or a long-aspired union with the YAR (Brehony, 2011). Like the PDRY, the 
YAR faced a range of domestic challenges at the time and viewed unification as an 
impactful gesture of change (Brehony, 2011).61 Rather than viewing unification as the 
compromise it was, both governments hoped to expand their respective political 
 
61 While Saleh had successfully consolidated his power and developed a patronage system that 
incorporated powerful tribal leaders, he wanted to divert attention away from rarely improving 
government services and the economic impact of declining remittances (Brehony, 2011). 
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system and to use the strength of a united Yemen to resolve their problems. In May 
1990, a unified “Republic of Yemen” was announced, with Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali 
Salem al-Beidh as its president and vice president respectively (Dunbar, 1992). 
III The Republic of Yemen: unifying the learning of Yemeni statehood? 
In ruling and administering a “joint Yemen”, northern and southern party leaders 
agreed that, until formal elections were to take place in 1993, the distribution of senior 
government positions should follow a strict 50-50 split – notwithstanding the 80-20 
population disparity (Hudson, 1995). Hence, the unified Cabinet held an equal amount 
of southern and northern ministers, who were each assigned a “regional counterpart” 
as deputy (Dunbar, 1992). Since politicians on both sides wanted to see as many of 
their civil servants as possible included in unified state institutions, merged ministries 
ended up being unproportionally large. The provisional joint Cabinet, for instance, 
consisted of 39 members, including ministers of both South and North Yemen 
(Burrowes, 1992). 
Agreements regarding the distribution of posts were embedded in a wider discourse 
of democracy deployed by political leaders on both sides. Their supposed democratic 
commitment was later described as a cover for ongoing partisan power struggles and 
diverging self-interests (Schwedler, 2002; Brehony, 2011). As mentioned above, 
government officials on both sides viewed unification as an opportunity to expand their 
own political power at the expense of their respective counterpart. PDRY leaders were 
hoping to use the freedom of press and freedom of expression to convince northerners 
of the advantages of their political system. According to Brehony (2011), “they felt that 
their superior organization, system ideas, and perhaps their record of giving rights to 
women, would attract the support of northerners” (p.183). YAR president Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, in turn, was banking on Yemen’s demography and the resilience of the political 
system he had set up in the north. Given that the population of the YAR was about 
15.8 million, compared to approximately 2.9 million in the PDRY (Brehony, 2011), the 
option of democratic elections presumably appealed to him. By translating democratic 
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“languages of stateness” to mask and legitimize their own interests, both sides 
continued a history of instrumental democratization (Jeffrey, 2007).62 
Notwithstanding its functionalist nature, the democratic registers led to real institutional 
and societal change in the unified Republic of Yemen. Its 1990 draft Constitution was 
described as “probably the most democratic in the Arab world” (Brehony, 2011, p.183), 
defining the newly established “House of Representatives” as the republic’s primary 
legislative authority, to be elected “in a secret, free and equal vote directly by the 
people”. In addition, the Constitution prescribed that a five-member “Presidential 
Council” was to be set up and that a “Council of Ministers” should act as the “highest 
executive and administrative authority of the state” (Constitution of the Republic of 
Yemen, 1990). The Constitution also granted unprecedented civic freedoms to 
Yemenis, which led to the rise of around 40 new political parties, 20 newspapers, and 
numerous research institutes, women’s and human rights groups (Brehony, 2011; 
Schwedler, 2002). Claiming inspiration from Baathism, Zaydism, Nasserism, and other 
political and/or religious references (Bonnefoy, 2018), political newcomers participated 
in Yemen’s 1993 parliamentary elections, described as “the first to be held under 
universal suffrage in the Arabian Peninsula” (Schwedler, 2002). 
Behind the curtain of fairly shared democratic governance, political leaders and civil 
servants continued competing for political power along regional fault lines. Ministries 
remained divided into two camps, with many employees speaking different “languages 
of stateness”, for instance on matters such as education or the economy (Brehony, 
2011). In addition, political power did not follow organisational hierarchies. Southern 
ministers, for example, complained that important ministerial decisions were frequently 
made by northern deputy-ministers, who, despite their lower position, held greater 
influence in Sanaa (Hudson, 1995; Brehony, 2011).63 At lower ranks, political power 
occasionally amounted to a numbers game, with southern civil servants pointing out 
that their northern colleagues were simply too numerous to be stopped (Hudson, 
1995). These imbalances were exaggerated by the fact that at regional bureaucratic 
 
62 Looking at Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq, Jeffrey (2007) examines the legitimizing role of 
democratization discourse in the politics of international interventions. 
63 Haytham Qasim Tahir, Southern minister of defence, for instance, complained that the northern 
chief of staff tended to ignore his orders (Brehony, 2011). 
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echelons “more northern officials had moved into government positions in the south 
than vice versa” (Brehony, 2011, p.187).  
Regional tensions deteriorated when southern leaders realized they had miscalculated 
their chances of success. While the PDRY had considerable state capacity, a civil 
service that was better organized than its YAR equivalent, and effective armed forces, 
it had been weakened by 1986 events, leaving the YAR in a comparatively stronger 
political and economic position at the time of unification (Brehony, 2011). Following 
the state merger, Saleh’s patronage system proved to be not only resilient but was 
further strengthened by the privatization of southern land and industries (Bonnefoy, 
2018). Taken together, these developments generated a strong sense of injustice and 
distrust among southerners, leading to a southern attempt of secession, which in tun 
triggered a two-month civil war in 1994.64 The war was won by northern forces and 
bolstered Saleh’s supremacy within the new Republic. In the south of Yemen, notions 
of insult and exploitation spread, not least because of crimes committed by northern 
combatants following their victory. Aden’s public infrastructure was plundered and the 
files of its former PDRY ministries destroyed. Importantly, the feeling of having been 
“absorbed” or even “occupied” by the north has fuelled the emergence of southern 
opposition movements ever since unification (Weeden, 2008; Brehony, 2011; Day, 
2012).65  
With Ali Abdullah Saleh establishing himself as the republic’s definite leader, his 
outward commitment to a language of plural democracy declined. 66  He emptied 
electoral procedures of their fair and competitive elements (Weeden, 2008) and 
developed a hybrid language that contemporary scholarship has struggled to define. 
Some researchers described it as a “quasi-autocracy” (Weeden, 2008, pp.219-220), 
while others called it “semiauthoritarian” (Phillips, 2008, p.3). Following Phillips (2008), 
this study uses the term “neo-patrimonialism” to rhetorically capture Saleh’s self-
 
64 The increase in political tension between the north and the south was also impacted by a worsening 
economic situation, especially for southerners, and a series of assassinations of southern politicians 
in the north (Brehony, 2011). 
65 Following the 1994 war, only eight of twenty-seven ministers were from the south. With few 
exceptions, all southern ministers were GPC members (Day, 2012) 
66 “Since 1993, a succession of parliamentary, presidential and local government elections has not 
delivered the peaceful rotation of power that is the hallmark of established democracies” (Whitaker, 
2009, n.p.).  
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serving translation of various state languages. It understands neopatrimonialism as 
the penetration of informal patrimonial loyalties into formal political institutions. Thus, 
in a neo-patrimonial system, “political parties, civil society organizations, and 
parliaments—institutions associated with a modern state—are used in conjunction 
with traditional informal organizations by the leaders to expand their patron–client 
networks” (Phillips, 2008, p.4). Rather than managing the payment of salaries or 
economic rewards directly, for example, Ali Abdullah Saleh went through the Ministry 
of Finance (Phillips, 2008). As a former member of parliament explained, “when Saleh 
wanted to get something done, for example when he had problems with tribesmen and 
wanted to pacify them, he would just send a little note to the Minister of Finance signed 
by him saying ‘give this sheikh one million riyals.’ The sheikh would receive it, and 
problems were solved” (cited in Phillips, 2008, p.74). Non-merit appointments or co-
option through financial means were the order of the day, mostly benefitting individuals 
who had proven their loyalty to the regime (Phillips, 2008). While at top-level, material 
rewards were mostly motivated by political calculations, at the lower echelons of 
Yemen’s state bureaucracy the sustenance of unofficial financial hand-outs was based 
on economic grievances. Given their low salaries, Yemeni civil servants were often 
reliant on loyalty-based financial bonuses (Phillips, 2008). As illustrated in this chapter, 
“neo-patrimonialism” has not been invented by Saleh but describes a combination of 
state registers that has long shaped the learning of the Yemeni state. While it does 
not account for the Yemeni hybrid in its entirety (and eternity), it usefully summarizes 
a set of views and practices which have characterized state ministries since the 
Imamate.   
IV Conclusion: the dispersed and multiple learning of Yemeni Statehood 
As this chapter has demonstrated, McFarlane’s conceptualization of learning 
constitutes a useful framework for understanding the crisis-ridden emergence of a 
geopolitical actor known as “Yemen”. McFarlane’s emphasis of translation – in 
combination with Hansen and Stepputat’s “language of stateness” – conceptually 
captures the fluid multiplicity that has long characterized the development of Yemeni 
statehood. Learning is a complex, contingent, and never-ending process that is highly 
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responsive to shifting personal, material, and environmental factors. Its emphasis 
facilitates this study’s analysis of socio-material developments and human agency, 
both within the domain of diplomacy and “the state”. Specifically, it introduced 
concepts and ideas relevant to the remaining part of this thesis, including the internal 
fragmentation and contradictions of state institutions, differences between visible 
organizational structures and less visible power dynamics, as well as concepts used 
to describe common bureaucratic practice, such as neo-patrimonialism. The historical 
outline of the Yemeni state showed that the fragmentation and fluidity of the Yemeni 
diplomatic service is no singular occurrence but reflects a broader set of state ideas 
and practice. 
In examining the formation and expression of state ideas, this chapter did not aim at 
covering the full intellectual history and “origins” of Yemeni “statehood” but proceeded 
in a genealogical manner that emphasized outwardly striking ruptures in Yemeni 
politics and circulating narratives of alleged external influences. Contemporary writing 
about the non-European state has been pre-occupied with the notion of “origins” (e.g. 
Grice, 2015; Zarakol, 2010; Chakrabarty, 1992; Owen, 1992). This chapter hopes to 
add a critical voice to these discussions by examining how different ideas of “state 
origins” are being presented in academic and non-academic discourse in the Yemen 
example. It points to scholarship emphasizing the impact of Ottoman, British, 
Egyptian, and generally “Western”, “European”, or “socialist” state registers. 
Emphasising the partial, multiple, comparative, and dispersed nature of translated 
“languages of stateness”, this chapter outlined shifting and historically unique 
institutional hybrids. In doing so, it provided important background information which 
helps understand the contingent (re-)construction of Yemeni statehood – a recurring 
theme in this thesis – and the historical development of the Yemeni diplomatic service, 






4 Development of the Yemeni Diplomatic Service: Tracing the 
History of a Profession 
 
 
Having outlined the historical learning of the Yemeni state, this chapter zooms in on 
the development of a single state institution: the Yemeni foreign ministry and its 
network of embassies. Tracing the historical legacies of Yemen’s diplomatic service 
into the present facilitates assessing the significance and meaning of contemporary 
events. Crucially, this chapter adds historical depth to this study’s argument that the 
Yemeni diplomatic service has to be conceptualized as a dynamic and fragmented 
socio-material institution in order to comprehend the paradoxical co-existence of 
institutional endurance and fluidity. It shows that the socio-material divisions, 
contradictions, and plasticity of the Yemeni diplomatic service have emerged over time 
and that not all political ruptures have been translated into radical institutional reform. 
This indicates that the development of Yemen’s foreign policy institutions has long 
been marked by both change and continuity.  
This chapter’s historical approach also introduces ideas, practices, and concepts that 
are central to this study’s later analysis. For example, the allocation of diplomatic posts 
to “reward” and/or “exile” individuals after 2011 was no new practice at the time but 
constituted a custom as old as the Yemeni diplomatic service itself. Likewise, the 
relationship between state sovereignty, international recognition, and the foreign 
service figures prominently in the institutional history of Yemen’s diplomatic corps. To 
better understand contemporary diplomatic practices, this chapter explores the 
historical formation of “diplomatic professionalism” in Yemen, outlining the emergence 
of diplomacy as a specialised field of governance and its later institutionalization – a 
process that involved acts of legal codification, the addition of formal organizational 
structures, and the material reflection of ideational developments in choices pertaining 
to building design and functionality.     
Conceptually, the following inquiry must be read as a continuation of the previous 
chapter, which studied the learning of the Yemeni state through a post-colonial lens. 
In a slight deviation, the following analysis emphasizes personal biographies over the 
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translation of “languages of stateness”. Information regarding diplomats’ educational 
backgrounds, careers, and physical appearance (e.g. clothing and beards) sheds light 
on the socialization processes that shaped the institutional development of the Yemeni 
diplomatic service. It also highlights the translocal and embodied nature of learning 
and diplomatic practice and pinpoints their embeddedness in wider global power 
structures.  
This chapter is divided into three parts: The historical development of the Yemeni 
diplomatic service is first traced in the north, then in the south, and lastly in the unified 
Republic of Yemen. Since no written work has specifically dealt with the history of the 
Yemeni diplomatic service, the following analysis draws heavily on interviews with 
Yemeni diplomats and archival material from the British National Archives (NA) and 
the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany (PAAA).67  
I Learning the diplomatic service in the Imamate and YAR 
Describing Yemeni foreign affairs in the early 20th century, Peterson (1982) points out 
that relations with “the world outside” were kept at a minimum during the sovereign 
reign of Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid al-Din (1918-1948). “No foreign missions 
were allowed to take up residence in Yemen and Yahya maintained no emissaries 
abroad” (Peterson, 1982, p.60). Taking foreign affairs into his own hands, the Imam 
delegated tasks to personal envoys, who were dispatched on an ad-hoc basis.68 Rare 
diplomatic missions to Europe and other places were mostly carried out by the Imam’s 
sons (Peterson, 1982). In a few instances, Imam Yahya also relied on diplomatic 
services provided by well-known and trusted foreign individuals who resided abroad. 
Up until the mid-1940s, for instance, he had a Beirut dignitary, Muhammad Jameel 
Bayhom, handle his affairs in Lebanon (Al-Aini, 2004). In the early 1940s, foreign 
(re)presentation inside of Yemen was limited to a British native clerk, who resided in 
the city of Hodeidah, and “the semi-political functions of Italian and British medical 
missions in Sana’a” (Peterson, 1982, p.60).  
 
67 The archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany is called “Politisches Archiv 
the Auswärtigen Amts” (PAAA) in German. 
68 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 August 2017. 
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It was only toward the end of Imam Yahya’s rule that foreign policy gained in 
importance and became institutionalized. In 1928, the Imam signed a treaty of 
friendship and trade with the Soviet Union (al-Eiman Newspaper, 1929), 69  while 
ratifying a first treaty of cooperation with Baghdad in the 1930s. He also maintained 
close relations with Italy, which enacted colonial rule over Ethiopia at the time and 
were a major power in the Red Sea area (Bonnefoy, 2018). The Imam’s increasing 
engagement with foreign actors triggered a gradual process of institutionalization, 
which Peterson (1982) described as follows: 
“Foreign affairs was a relatively simple matter, consisting in the main of a 
secretary to answer messages from foreign governments. As the number of 
governments involved increased and grew more varied (and less Arab), Imam 
Yahya was forced to rely on his former Ottoman diplomat, Raghib Bey, to 
handle the correspondence and increasing number of treaty negotiations” 
(p.55). 
Qadhi Muhammad Raghib Bey was a Turkish Cypriot, who came to Yemen during its 
brief Ottoman occupation (1849-1919), when he served as the Ottoman governor of 
Hodeidah. Following Yemen’s independence, he moved to Turkey, but was unable to 
find suitable employment there, thus returning to the southern Peninsula in 1924. Hired 
as an advisor by the Yemeni Imam, he began specializing in foreign affairs (Peterson, 
1982).  
Coloured by colonial condescendence, British observers at the time wrote that the 
Imam and his most trusted right-hand al-Qadi Abdullah al-Amri had somewhat of an 
“inferiority complex in matters which concern[ed] the great world” (cited in Peterson, 
1982, p.46). Allegedly, none of them had seen the shores of the Red Sea, let alone 
travelled outside of Yemen. They were thus believed to have welcomed the 
international experience and language skills brought to the table by Raghib Bey, who 
handled treaty negotiations with various European powers and joined Yemeni 
delegations abroad (Peterson, 1982). As Peterson (1982) put it, Raghib Bey “was used 
as a channel of communication to the non-Arab world, due to his diplomatic experience 
in Ottoman service” (p.52). His career suggests that expertise and professional skills 
 
نامیإلا 69 ةدیرج   
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informed strands of continuity in the formation of foreign affairs as a specialised field 
of governance.  
Notably, the position of Raghib Bey triggered tensions between institutionalized and 
personal power, which have marked Yemeni foreign policy institutions ever since. 
Notwithstanding his titular command over the Imamate’s external relations, Raghib 
Bey faced a number of unwanted intrusions into his “niche of expertise” (Peterson, 
1982). For example, the Imam continued delegating certain diplomatic matters to his 
sons, regardless of their diplomatic experience and knowledge, which was taken as a 
personal affront by Raghib Bey.  
It was not until 1931, with the Imam’s establishment of a first Cabinet, that Raghib Bey 
was officially named “foreign minister”, a title he carried until 1948, when he was retired 
by the Imam’s son Ahmad, who had taken over (Peterson, 1982). According to 
Peterson’s (1982) analysis, Yemen’s first “ministry” of foreign affairs can be pictured 
as the foreign minister himself and a small number of aides. In the context of this study, 
first reports of a foreign ministry building could only be traced to 1949. It occupied a 
few rooms above the “post and telegraph office” in Taiz (PAAA B12 1058, 12 July 
1961).70 The institution was described as small and provisional by both Yemeni and 
foreign observers. A senior Yemeni diplomat remembered that Yemenis at the time 
refused using the word “ministry” (wizara) and spoke of an “office” (maktab) instead.71 
The German ambassador to Egypt, who visited Yemen in 1953, emphasized the 
ministry’s simplicity, writing: 
“The staff of the foreign ministry consists of […] the acting foreign minister 
himself, Qadi Mohamed Abdullah al-Omari [al-Amri], the Lebanese […] 
secretary Sami Izzedin, who also serves as interpreter and head of protocol, a 
Palestinian steno typist, and a Yemeni writer. The ministry has four rooms, one 
of which serves as a reception room. Only this room is equipped with furniture, 
a desk and some chairs” (PAAA B11 347, 19 December 1953).72 
 
70 A year earlier, Imam Ahmad had declared the city of Taiz as Yemen’s second capital (Peterson, 
1982). 
71 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017.  
72 Another German diplomat reported in 1961 that the ministry had six rooms (PAAA B12 1058, 12 
July 1961). 
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A few years later, in 1961, his colleague continued describing the foreign ministry as 
“improvised” and “primitive” (PAAA B12 1058, 8 May 1961; PAAA B12 1058, 12 July 
1961): 
“Its organization can in no way be compared with what we would [usually] 
expect from such a government agency. There are very few officials who are 
all immensely underpaid and therefore show little eagerness to work and are 
indecisive. As a source of information, they are worth nothing. Whenever the 
minister of state Abdurahman Abdusamad Abu Talib, the director of the foreign 
ministry, is absent, all wheels stand still” (PAAA B12 1058, 12 July 1961). 
Nonetheless, the ministry carried some weight in Yemeni politics,73 being of personal 
interest to the Crown Prince Mohammad al-Badr, who continuously aimed at 
improving its organizational efficiency. An Asian and African department, as well as a 
department for Western countries were established in 1961 (PAAA B12 1058, 12 July 
1961). The first department was headed by Abu Talib, whereas the second was led 
by Abdulwahid al-Kharbash. Kharbash was one of the few Yemenis at the time who 
had received a university education abroad, speaking Italian, English and some 
French (PAAA B12 1058, 12 July 1961). He earned his PhD in political sciences in 
Rome, followed by a 12-month internship at the Italian foreign ministry. Allegedly, he 
was asked by the Crown Prince to use his experience to help “modernize” (PAAA B12 
1058, 12 July 1961) and develop the foreign ministry’s administration. German 
diplomats at the time described Kharbash’s presence in the ministry as notable: “since 
the beginning of his function, we receive written responses to the notes we sent to the 
foreign ministry, which earlier only happened in rare exceptional cases” (PAAA B12 
1058, 12 July 1961). 
 
73 According to a German diplomat in 1962, ministerial positions existed, but – with the exception of 
the foreign ministry – were not accompanied by an actual ministry and lacked any practical functions 




Figure 7: Former Foreign Ministry Building in Taiz 
The photo was found on a Facebook page called “photos of old Yemen” that was referred to by 
Yemeni diplomats as an “archive”. The photo’s description referred to the ministry as Yemen’s former 
“office of foreign affairs”.74  
 
Besides institutionalizing foreign affairs in Yemen, Imam Yahya and his son Ahmad 
began setting up permanent diplomatic missions abroad. The foundation of the Arab 
League in March 1945, with Yemen as a member state, “resulted in the first Yemeni 
diplomats being posted abroad on a permanent basis” (Peterson, 1982, p.55).75 
Notwithstanding the delegation of foreign policy functions, the Imam was said to have 
maintained strict control over diplomatic representatives in Egypt. According to one 
 
74 [Untitled illustration of the former Yemeni Foreign Ministry in Taiz]. Retrieved 6 February 2019 from 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=oa.350057438429477&type=1 
75 Throughout the second half of the 1940s, Yemen became increasingly involved in international 
affairs. For instance, in 1948, an Arab League delegation was sent to Sanaa (Al-Aini, 2004). 
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Yemeni diplomat, “Yemen's delegate to the Arab League under the Imam was famous 
for not speaking at meetings […] on orders from the Imam”.76  
Following the posting of a permanent Arab League delegate, Assayed Hassan Bin Ali 
Ibrahim presented his letter of credence to the Court of England in 1950 77  and 
diplomatic missions were opened in Lebanon and Italy in 1955 (PAAA B12 1064a, 19 
March 1955; PAAA B12 1064a, 20 April 1955).78 In 1958, a Yemeni mission was also 
opened in Saudi Arabia (PAAA B12 1064a, 24 February 1958),79 followed by legations 
in Jordan (1961), Iraq (1961), the German Federal Republic (1961), as well as 
Indonesia (1962). 
The emergence of Yemen’s institutionalized diplomatic network was accompanied by 
the gradual opening of foreign missions on Yemeni soil. German sources indicate that 
in 1953 a British chargé d‘affaires was based in Taiz (PAAA B12 1058a, 1954; PAAA 
B12 1060a, 13 October 1955), while an Egyptian chargé d’affaires lived in Sanaa (see 
PAAA B12 1060a, 13 October 1955; PAAA B12 1058a, 1954). A few years later, in 
1957, Italy was reported to have a chargé d’affaires in Hodeidah (PAAA, B12 1058a, 
27 June 1957; PAAA, B12 1058a, 14 May 1958).80 Initially, none of these foreign 
diplomats, who were all based in different cities, operated at the level of ambassador. 
This was viewed as a reflection of the Imam’s mistrust vis-à-vis foreigners and foreign 
influences. “He even wants to minimize contact among foreign representatives,” 
claimed one German diplomat at the time, who argued that the Imam perceived 
external reform projects – or “progress”, as he called it – as a potential threat to his 
“traditional rule” (PAAA, B12 1058a, 27 June 1957). Allegedly, the vice king of 
Hodeidah had told a German diplomat in 1957 that he would prefer a flawed Yemeni 
 
76 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 May 2019. 
77 The Foreign Office List for 1952. Public Record Office Library.  
78 The establishment of a Yemeni legation in Rome has been linked to the Imam’s personal health 
and related hospital trips (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017). 
79 In 1957, Yemen was reported to have embassies and consular missions in the UK, the US, Italy, 
Egypt, Lebanon and Ethiopia (PAAA, B12 1058a, 27 June 1957). 
80 By the end of the 1950s, the number of diplomatic missions inside Yemen grew to also include the 
US, Russia, China, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and West Germany (PAAA B12 1064a, 25 June 1960). 
Other countries had also established formal diplomatic relations with the Yemeni Imamate but 
handled Yemeni affairs through missions outside the country, mostly based in Jeddah and Cairo 
(PAAA B12 1064a, 17 November 1953). Examples include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sudan, Pakistan, 
and France.  
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administration over a more efficient imposition by foreign powers (PAAA, B12 1058a, 
27 June 1957).81  
In spite of the Imam’s skepticism and the limited presence of foreigners in Yemen, 
diplomatic relations and corresponding institutions developed further. Peterson (1982) 
explains the expansion of Yemeni diplomacy and foreign policy institutions by 
reference to the Imam’s ego and related processes of transnational socialization. 
“Eventually, the desire to be considered as an equal in the community of nations […] 
resulted in the acceptance of diplomatic representatives in Sanaa or Taiz by the 1950s 
and the dispatch of the Imamate’s own permanent emissaries abroad” (Peterson, 
1982, p.74).  
I.1. Liminal diplomatic space: reward, exile, and threats  
Under Imam Ahmad (1948-1962), the Yemeni diplomatic service was filled with 
members of the royal family, including, among others, four of the Imam’s brothers,82 
the Imam’s nephew,83 and at least one of his sons.84 Other diplomatic positions were 
occupied by notables from among the country’s elite, including, for instance, Qadi 
Mohammed al-Amri and his son-in-law Abdurahman Abu Talib, as well as Qadi 
Mohammed Abdullah al-Shamy and other members of the al-Shamy family. 
The high number of royal family members in the Yemeni diplomatic service is 
indication of both nepotism and political rivalries that have traditionally divided the 
Yemeni royal family. Threats faced by the Imam frequently stemmed from within his 
 
81 The limited number of foreign diplomatic missions could have also been linked to the low number of 
foreign residents in Yemen. A German diplomat counted eleven foreigners in Sanaa in 1953: Two 
Italians (doctors), one Albanian refugee with a Syrian passport (doctor), two Palestinians (doctors), 
two Syrians (teachers), two Egyptians (teachers), and two Persians (traders) (PAAA B11 347, 19 
December 1953).  
82 Emir Seif al-Islam al-Hassan, was Yemeni representative to the UN (PAAA B12 1063, 14 
December 1956; PAAA B12 1063, 31 January 1958), Emir Seif al-Islam Abdurahman, was 
temporarily appointed as minister of foreign affairs, Emir Abdullah was permanent representative to 
the UN and minister of foreign affairs (until 1955), while Emir Seif Ul-Islam Ismail was permanent 
representative at the United Arab Republic in Cairo (PAAA B12 1058, 28 December 1961; PAAA B12 
1058a, 10 May 1955). 
83 Emir Yahya Bin al-Hussein, the Imam’s nephew, served as diplomat in Western Germany (PAAA 
B12 1058, 21 November 1960) 
84 Imam Ahmad’s son, Crown Prince Mohamed al-Badr, had been minister of foreign affairs (since 
1955). One of the most influential Yemeni diplomats at the time was Hassan Bin Ibrahim. He served 
as Yemen’s representative to Rome, Germany, Italy, Moscow, Prague, Egypt/UAR, and the UN, and 
was appointed minister of foreign affairs in 1962. (PAAA B12 1059, 25 January 1962). 
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inner circle, specifically from close relatives aiming to take the throne. In an attempt to 
protect his power, the Imam began using Yemen’s newly established network of 
diplomatic legations as a liminal space of exile. For instance, in 1958, Imam Ahmad 
posted his nephew Emir Yahya Bin al-Hussein to Germany, following the latter’s 
alleged involvement in a failed revolt in 1956 and his temporary imprisonment 
thereafter (PAAA B12 1058, 21 November 1960).85 While his diplomatic appointment 
allowed the Emir to “escape” prison at home, he complained about his low diplomatic 
rank abroad (as first secretary), which he deemed unfit for a prince. When asking the 
Imam for permission to return to Yemen, the Imam allegedly responded with a rather 
unappealing ultimatum: to either return to prison in Yemen, or to continue working as 
a diplomat in Germany. Yahya Bin al-Hussein preferred to stay in “diplomatic exile” 
(PAAA B12 1058, 21 November 1960). Given the coercive nature of his diplomatic 
function, Yahya Bin al-Hussein’s loyalty and honest representation of the Imam’s 
interests can be questioned.86 While in Germany, he openly called for changes inside 
Yemen and told other diplomats that the Imam deemed it safer to know him outside 
than inside the country (PAAA B12 1058, 21 November 1960).  
Another member of the royal family member who was sent into diplomatic exile 
following his alleged participation in the 1956 revolt was Emir Seif al-Islam al-Hassan, 
the brother of Imam Ahmad (PAAA B12 1058a, 19 July 1956; PAAA B12 1058a, 13 
July 1955). Soon after his appointment as permanent representative to the UN and 
head of the Yemeni delegation at the UN General Assembly (PAAA B12 1063, 14 
December 1956; PAAA B12 1063, 31 January 1958), his son, who according to 
German diplomats was also deemed a political threat by the Imam, was appointed 
ambassador to Ethiopia. “Given that his father rivaled with the crown prince as 
pretender to the throne, his posting abroad might well be linked to the Imam’s effort of 
removing from vicinity as many intelligent princes and potential opponents to his son 
as possible” (PAAA B12 1066, 18 March 1962).  
 
85 Emir Yahya Bin al-Hussein had previously been imprisoned for two years following his alleged 
involvement in the revolt (PAAA B12 1058, 21 November 1960). 
86 Adding personal grievance to existing political tensions, Yahya Bin al-Hussein’s father, Prince Seif 
al-Islam Abdullah, was executed on the Imam’s order for his leading role in the revolt (PAAA B12 
1058, 21 November 1960). 
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As these examples indicate, “exterior diplomatic spaces” carried a broad range of 
meaning and functions in Yemeni politics. To the Imam, “the international sphere” 
constituted a double-edged sword, facilitating both the removal and the creation of 
potential rivals. While the Imam could get rid of disagreeable family members by 
posting them abroad, the diplomatic realm came with its own set of dangers. Prince 
Seif al-Islam Abdullah, for instance, a leader and alleged orchestrator of the 1956 
coup-attempt, had previously served as foreign minister, representing Yemen at the 
United Nations and conducting special diplomatic missions abroad. According to Little 
(1968), it was Abdullah’s international experience and subsequent strive for reform 
that explains his leading role in the attempted 1956 coup. “As his mind broadened in 
contact with leading figures of other countries, he conceived the desire to modernise 
Yemen to an extent that Imam Ahmad would never contemplate” (p.47). While 
international experience, specifically the learning of foreign languages and diplomatic 
practice, was considered an asset, it also increased the risk of subversion. 
I.2. Divided, shifting and improvised representation during the 1962 Revolution   
The regime change, and Yemen’s subsequent civil war (1962-1970), temporarily split 
the Yemeni diplomatic service between royalists and republicans. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the incumbent Imam, Mohammed al-Badr, fled to Jeddah in Saudi 
Arabia where he began allocating ministerial positions to family members and 
royalists. Besides establishing a cabinet, with Mohammad Ahmad al-Shamy as foreign 
minister, the Imam continued dispatching diplomats abroad, appointing his minister of 
information, Hussein Ibn Ali Murfik, ambassador to West Germany in January 1964, 
while making his private secretary, Ibrahim Kibsi, General Consul there. Kibsi was 
allegedly asked to advocate the “royal perspective” among foreign missions in Bonn 
(PAAA B36 117, 15 January 1964). In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the 
Imam’s royal government was supported by at least one Yemeni diplomatic legation.87 
Diplomats in Washington D.C. dispatched letters to other foreign representatives in 
late 1962, emphasizing the Imam’s continued political leadership (PAAA B12 1066, 9 
 
87 One diplomat reported that the royalists “still had two or three embassies” after the revolution 
(Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017). 
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October 1962). Notably, these letters were branded with royal letterheads and stamps 
(PAAA B12 1066, 7 November 1962) (see Figure 8).  
In contrast, the Yemeni mission in the Federal Republic of Germany promptly turned 
republican after the 1962 revolution, with diplomats engaging in a range of improvised 
state performances to display their shifting loyalty and representation. For instance, 
they crossed out all royal identifiers in diplomatic documents, including the crown of 





Figure 8: Royalist Letterhead and Stamp 
Extract of a Yemeni diplomatic letter sent on 9 October 1962 using the royalist letterhead and 
stamp.88  
 
88 PAAA B12 1066, 9 October 1962; PAAA B12 1066, 7 November 1962. 
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At a time of rupture, at which no single hegemonic understanding of the state was able 
to assert itself, small objects and mundane human practices emerged as important 
sources of meaning, able to impact grand political representations. Documents linked 
physically disconnected sites, constituting the “basic glue” by which diplomats 
managed to “relate to each other and organize their activities” (Bueger, 2014, p.398). 
By shifting focus onto “the little things” (Mul̈ler, 2013), including the spontaneous 
altering of stamps by pencil, this chapter acknowledges that “political situations are 
not merely discursive constructs” but assemblages, involving material artefacts and 
behavioural strategies (Barry, 2013, p. 428).  
 
 
Figure 9: Improvised Diplomatic Scripts 
Published in Bonn, Germany, this letter shows an arrow that was drawn by pencil to point out the 
crossed-out crown in the Imamate’s emblem. Similarly, the words “Mutwakilia Kingdom” are crossed 
out in both the English and the Arabic letterhead.89  
 
 
89 PAAA B12 1059, 3 October 1962. 
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Figure 10: New Republican Letterhead and Emblem90 
Divisions within the Yemeni diplomatic corps also surfaced, and were made public, at 
the UN. A delegation of royalist diplomats attended the 17th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which began in mid-September 1962 a few days 
prior to the Yemeni “revolution”. When the new republican foreign minister Mohsin al-
Aini arrived in New York following the regime change, he found that the “Yemeni seat” 
at the UNGA was already taken. Eager to translate domestic regime change at UN-
level, he put together a team of sympathetic Yemeni students and young professionals 
living in the US to advocate the “republican narrative” among UN diplomats.91 In his 
memoirs, al-Aini (2004) recalls that he and his team “were working in the corridors of 
the United Nations, outside official meetings, making contacts with various delegations 
and the UN Secretariat” (p.74). On 19 December 1962, following the official 
recognition of the Yemeni republican regime by the US and other states, the UN 
credentials committee approved al-Aini’s republican “delegation” as the legitimate 
representatives of Yemen, a decision that was confirmed in a UN assembly vote. 
Although al-Aini was asked to wait until the 17th session had concluded, he and his 
 
90 PAAA B36 469, 5 May 1971. 
91 “We explained to them, verbally and in writing, all the past oppression, backwardness, isolation, 
and deprivation that Yemen had suffered” (Al-Aini, 2004, p.69). 
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team entered the General Assembly right after their credentials were approved in order 
to claim Yemen’s seats.  
“As soon as the president of that General Assembly’s regular session […] 
announced that the delegation of the Yemen Arab Republic was the legitimate 
representative of Yemen, we headed right away to Yemen’s seat amidst roaring 
applause by most […] as the Royalist Delegation withdrew” (p.75). 
In the context of civil war, the diplomatic sphere emerged as an important battle ground 
for international recognition. Both sides deemed it beneficial to rely on diplomats to 
globally advocate their respective portrayal of events. 92  Diplomatic actors were 
equipped with symbolic and functional tools constitutive of statehood, including 
stamps and letterheads. Their use was traced in this chapter by closely examining 
Yemeni diplomatic documents.  
I.3. The foreign ministry in Sanaa: new buildings, staff, and training 
Inside Yemen, the 1962 revolution impacted the foreign ministry in multiple ways. 
Following the regime change, the institution moved from Taiz to Sanaa, temporarily 
operating inside the former premises of the Imam’s palace guard. One Yemeni 
diplomat recalled laughingly “it was based in a few offices at the gate of the republican 
palace [formerly known as the Imam’s palace]. A few offices! That was wizarat al-
kharijiyya [the foreign ministry]”.93  
Besides these geographical changes, a diplomatic law was issued which, according 
to German analysis, mimicked Egyptian regulations and signalled the involvement of 
Egyptian advisors.94 Moreover, the ministry was re-organized by December 1964, 
when it reportedly comprised a protocol department, an international department, a 
consular department, a cultural department, an information section, and a political 
department (PAAA B36 115, 10 December 1964).95 An Egyptian report dated 5 August 
 
92 Passports began to be issued in Yemen under Imam Yahya, as demanded by officials in countries 
visited by Yemeni workers (Peterson, 1982).  
93 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017.  
94 As in Egypt, Yemeni diplomats were forbidden to marry non-Arab foreigners, for instance (PAAA 
B36 115, 5 August 1963). This stipulation can still be found in Article 28, section 5, of Yemen’s 1991 
diplomatic law (Law No. 2 of 1991 Concerning the Diplomatic and Consular Service, 1991). 
95 At the time, the foreign ministry still had an office in Taiz, which was headed by Ahmad Mufarrah, 
the director, and including a foreigners department and an information department (PAAA B36 115, 
10 December 1964).  
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1967 described the functioning of the Yemeni Foreign Ministry, supposedly to prepare 
its later re-organization by Egyptian officials. According to the report, “the ministry in 
Sạnaʿāʾ had 45 employees, but significantly fewer desks and chairs”. With some alarm, 
the report noted that ministry officials did not respect formal hierarchies, granting all 
employees direct access to the minister. It further criticized that ministry officials did 
not keep minutes, did not receive reports from Yemeni missions abroad, and that the 
number of employees under each director was typically limited to two or three, 
“suggesting a top-heavy organisation” (Rogers, 2018, p.175). 
Post-1962 changes extended to the level of personnel, infusing the Yemeni diplomatic 
service with new “revolutionary characters”, such as members of the army and 
intellectuals who had supported and risen in prominence with the 1962 revolution. 
Hamud al-Gaifi, for instance, who worked as an army officer, became Yemeni 
ambassador to Egypt in October 1963. Likewise, in March 1964, Saleh al-Ashwal, who 
had risen through the ranks in the police, and later the military, was appointed 
ambassador to the USSR, following his temporary membership in the newly 
established presidential council (PAAA B36 117, 28 March 1964). Civilian examples 
include Mohammed Ahmad Noman, who was appointed head of the Yemeni mission 
to the Arab League, and Ahmad Hussein al-Marwani, who became deputy head of the 
Yemeni delegation to the UN in New York. Al-Marwani had worked at a radio station 
in Sanaa during the Imamate, where he was tolerated, but suspected of harbouring 
oppositional sentiments. Following the revolution, al-Marwani rose to the rank of 
information minister, before being sent in a diplomatic capacity to the US (PAAA B12 
1066, 22 November 1962). Mohammed Ahmad Noman, in turn, was the son of Yemeni 
oppositionist Ahmad al-Noman, who had fled the Imamate in the late 1950s and 
supported the revolution and the revolutionary government (al-Aini, 2004).  
While the re-shuffling inside the ministry and in Yemeni legations was partially based 
on diplomats’ alleged political orientation and perceived loyalty, the chaos and flux that 
followed the 1962 regime change was seen by some as an opportunity to get rid of 
personal rivals. Suleiman Wafa Dajany, for instance, who worked as a diplomat in 
Bonn between 1956 and 1962, was fired by the temporary foreign minister al-Baydany, 
allegedly due to personal differences. Dajany, who considered himself neutral and had 
assumed he could keep his diplomatic position following the revolution, took on a job 
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as a local employee in the Saudi embassy after his dismissal, while also seeking 
German citizenship (PAAA B36 45, 9 April 1963). In other cases, shifts in Yemen’s 
diplomatic personnel were of a nepotistic nature, reflecting the change of powerful 
personalities and their respective entourage within Sanaa. In March 1967, for 
instance, Ali Abdullah as-Sallal, the son of the Yemeni president, was appointed 
ambassador to the USSR. Diplomats in Moscow, who assumed as-Sallal junior to be 
in his mid-20s, found his experience and knowledge unfit for his high rank as 
ambassador. It was speculated that the president had used the ambassadorial 
appointment to remove his son from an increasingly dangerous context of war (PAAA 
B36 299, 19 March 1967).  
While the 1962 revolution triggered change and division within the Yemeni diplomatic 
service, these developments were accompanied by strands of continuity, often 
necessitated by rare professional expertise. Rather than removing diplomats as 
“royalists”, most were asked to continue their service under the new republican regime. 
Kharabash, for instance, who served as the director of the Imam’s foreign ministry in 
Taiz, was appointed foreign policy advisor to the YAR’s first president al-Sallal (PAAA 
B36 45, 13 March 1963). Likewise, Dr. Tarcici was kept by the republican government 
as a diplomatic representative to Lebanon. Tarcici was a Lebanese citizen who had 
lived in Yemen for a long time, built a fairly close relationship with Imam Ahmad, and 
was sent to Lebanon as the Imam’s diplomatic agent in 1959 (PAAA B12 1066, 25 
October 1962). Tarcici’s political survival was linked by German diplomats to his 
personal relationship with interim YAR foreign minister al-Baydani (PAAA B12 1066, 
23 November 1962). Similar to Tarcici, Abdul Koddos al-Wazir, who used to serve as 
the Imam’s chargé d’affaires in Rome (1959-1961) re-entered the YAR diplomatic 
service after a brief moment in British exile, as ambassador, first in Beirut and Rome 
(1970-1974), and later in Amman (1975-1978) (PAAA B36 137676, 21 November 
1978).96  
Following the end of civil war in 1970, a few royalists were integrated into the 
republican government and its foreign ministry, and an increasing number of security 
 
96 The Yemeni embassy in Jordan was simultaneously accredited to Pakistan, Turkey and Lebanon 
(PAAA B36 137676, 21 November 1978). 
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sector employees were allegedly transferred into the diplomatic service.97 Moreover, 
the ministry was relocated twice in the early 1970s. It first moved from its “palace 
guard” facilities into a town house at al-Ulufi square, newly named after a martyr of the 
1962 revolution. Allegedly, the house had previously been confiscated from the royal 
family and their in-laws. “It's called ‘Beit al-Kibsi’”, recalled one diplomat, laughingly 
pointing out the ministry’s ongoing inhabitation of (formerly) royal spaces. 98  The 
ministry soon re-located again, moving to a “modern Sanaani house” that had been 
built specifically for that purpose in 1974 (see Figure 11). “It’s like an office, corridors 
with rooms on the side, like a modern office building,” recalled one diplomat.99 
 
 
Figure 11: Former Foreign Ministry Building in Sanaa 
The former foreign ministry building was turned into the mayor’s office in 2008.100 
 
97 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 May 2019. 
98 The al-Kibsi house was described as “a two-storey house with a basement, a ‘Mafrag’ [living room, 
usually at the top floor], and a fountain” (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017).  
99 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017.  
100 Photo source: private. 
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Many years later, in 2007/8, the ministry moved into an even larger edifice that was 
paid for by the Chinese and was, again, specifically built to serve as a foreign 
ministry.101 In explaining the move, one diplomat said, “the ministry was getting bigger 
and bigger, in personnel, in functioning, it needed the space, new electronic 
archives...etc”.102 The ministry’s ongoing growth was accompanied by a new law 
determining its structure and organizational tasks. Similar to its legal predecessor in 
the early 1960s, it was said to have been influenced by the “Egyptian model”. As one 
Yemeni diplomat put it: 
“It was done with the help of the Egyptians, this law. So, we built our ministry in 
the Egyptian style. We had an [Egyptian] ambassador, I still remember his 
name, Ambassador Said Abd al-Sallam. As a retired ambassador they sent him 
to help us to make the rules, the regulations, in the early 70s”.103  
His colleague confirmed that the ministry’s structure mirrored the Egyptian influence 
at the time. “They exactly transferred the structure of Egypt to Yemen, with the help of 
special advisors from Egypt”.104  
I.4. Learning and embodying the Yemeni diplomatic service 
Following the end of the civil war in 1970, central goals of the YAR foreign ministry 
included the mobilization of development aid and the further training of its staff.105 As 
one German diplomat put it in August 1976 “development aid is the deciding almost 
sole criterium for good relations [with Yemeni diplomats]” (PAAA B36 108795, 1 
October 1976). Likewise, German diplomatic sources reported a strong interest on 
part of the Yemenis to be trained in practical matters of protocol, involving 
technicalities such as seating orders or the organization of state visits (PAAA B36 
 
101 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 
September 2017. 
102 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
103 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. His colleague confirmed that Egyptian legal 
experts helped drafting a new law for the diplomatic service in the early 1970s (Interview with Yemeni 
diplomat, 21 December 2017). 
104 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017 
105 By 1989, the YAR maintained official diplomatic relations with 73 states (PAAA 36 154168, March 
1988). 
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119924, 28 March 1977).106 While some Yemeni diplomats were trained by foreign 
governments, others participated in programmes by international organizations,107 or 
attended relevant courses at universities abroad. 108  “We received three or four 
scholarships every year”, recalled one Yemeni diplomat, who reported colleagues had 
enrolled in a course on diplomacy at the University of Oxford.109  
Available records suggest that Yemeni diplomats’ participation in foreign training 
programmes commenced in the 1970s and lasted well into the 1990s. One respondent 
re-called his enrolment in a workshop in Europe, where he learned to engage with the 
media and to approach foreign ministries with funding requests. “We came from 
developing countries,” he remembered, adding that all participating diplomats were 
trying to bring infrastructure, economic cooperation, and investment to their respective 
home country. The transfer of such technical knowledge was accompanied by more 
subtle forms of learning. In practicing media engagement, short interviews were 
recorded and later presented to and analysed by the group. “As soon as I saw my face 
on TV, I found that I have a big mustache,” remembered the participating Yemeni 
diplomat and laughed. “What the hell?! What is this mustache? Okay, this is not a 
mustache for a diplomat.” Claiming that a beard was normal, if not expected, in many 
countries in the Middle East, he figured it was inappropriate in the European context. 
He vividly compared himself to one of the workshop organizers, “this big guy, tall, big 
body, and did not have a mustache. So, I looked at my face, I am short, small one, 
and my mustache is like this…!” – and he gestured a large moustache. “So, as soon 
as we finished the class […] I reduced it”.110  
This anecdote illustrates that the learning of the Yemeni diplomatic service constitutes 
an embodied process that transcends the transfer of theoretical knowledge. It also 
shows that corporeal appearance is socially and materially mediated and closely tied 
to processes of identity constructions and wider power relations. Normative 
 
106 In 1977, the Yemeni government requested the German foreign ministry to train one of its 
diplomats in matters of diplomatic protocol (PAAA B36 119924, 13 February 1977).  
107 Allegedly, the UN, through the United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR), 
offered training to Yemeni diplomats in New York and Geneva (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 
December 2017). 
108 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017 
109 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
110 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. 
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professional images and practices are (re-)learned and (re-)produced in a context of 
material inequality: Yemeni diplomats travel to Europe where they are taught to draft 
funding requests and alter their bodily appearance so as to match the “European 
mainstream”.111 Certain imageries and practices are voluntarily translated and at least 
partially adopted in a process that resembles the “self-colonization” and “international 
socialization” described in the previous chapter.  
The corporeal and affective aspects of Yemeni diplomacy were further reflected in 
Saleh’s “hospital diplomacy”, which frequently bypassed Yemeni embassies and 
diplomats. 112  Throughout the 1980s, Saleh (and his family members) visited the 
military hospital in Koblenz, Germany, for regular medical check-ups. Many of these 
visits were linked to meetings with the German president. Thus, in 1984, the German 
foreign ministry thanked the hospital in a formal letter for the care and service provided 
to both the Yemeni president and people close to him. “Thereby the political relations, 
in whose development we are very interested, are complemented with a personal 
component, which is particularly important in Arab countries” (PAAA B36 137776, 2 
May 1984). In this example, the human body emerges as a biological organism, whose 
sustenance and care shapes diplomatic practice and inter-state relations. This 
process is not detached from broader material contexts, as “the body is never isolated 
in its activity but always already engaged with the world” (Weiss, 1999, p.1). The 
unequal distribution of medical equipment and expertise was reflected in diplomatic 
practice, providing German diplomats and politicians with an advantage, if not 
leverage, in its diplomatic relations with Yemen.  
Corporeal aspects of diplomacy also informed the increasing securitization of Sanaa’s 
diplomatic scene. As discussed in the previous chapter, the centralization of state 
power under Saleh was accompanied by a strengthening of the military and the 
intelligence sector. Possibly as a result, Yemeni government officials demonstrated 
 
111 “Europe” and “European” are treated here as hyperreal terms in that they refer to certain figures of 
imagination that are grossly generalized and whose geographical referents remain somewhat 
indeterminate. 
112 For instance, in August 1984, Ali Abdullah Saleh sent his seven children as well as a supervisor for 
two weeks to Cologne for a medical check-up in the nearby clinic in Wiesbaden. He informed the 
German foreign ministry but asked them not to share that knowledge with the Yemeni embassy in 
Bonn, which did not know of his plans (PAAA B36 137777, 13 August 1984). 
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increasing suspicion against foreigners, especially diplomats, whose interaction with 
the local population was severely constrained. In August 1983, an announcement was 
made requiring foreign diplomats in Sanaa to inform the foreign ministry’s protocol 
department about the date and topic of each meeting they intended to have with 
Yemeni officials and ordinary citizens. The movement of foreign bodies became 
closely monitored and restricted, which shaped diplomatic practice and relations. 
German diplomats at the time suggested three possible reasons for the government’s 
tightened control: 1) the foreign ministry’s increasing bureaucratization; 2) concern 
about diplomats’ potentially subversive influence; and 3) “the strange fear of 
espionage”. The latter had escalated to such an extent that, according to one German 
diplomat, “a simple map, which could be purchased last year in any book shop, can 
[now] only be bought with a special permit issued by the foreign ministry” (PAAA B36 
137776, 13 August 1983).  
II Learning the Yemeni diplomatic service in the PSRY/PDRY 
Under British colonial rule, South Yemen was denied any claims to sovereign 
statehood and was forbidden to establish official diplomatic relations with foreign 
governments. While a “minister of external affairs” was appointed in 1959, it was a 
meaningless title as responsibility for foreign affairs remained firmly in the hands of 
the British (Little, 1968). In acknowledgment of British colonial power over South 
Yemen, foreign officials refrained from establishing any embassies in Aden. Instead, 
a few countries sought representation through lower-ranked consulates, such as 
France, India, Italy, and the US.113 Others relied on the establishment of so-called 
“honorary consulates” (PAAA B12 938, 9 June 1954), institutions that are even further 
removed from the formal state representation of embassies.114 Honorary consulates 
are offices that focus on administrative tasks and may be led by non-diplomats of a 
nationality different to the country they represent. In 1953, German foreign ministry 
employees contemplated establishing a consulate in Aden. Fearing that it would upset 
 
113 These countries were reported to have consulates in Aden in 1954 (PAAA B12 938, 9 June 1954). 
114 In June 1954, the following professional consulates existed in Aden: France, India, Italy, the USA. 
The following countries had “honorary consulates” in Aden: Ethiopia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal, Sweden (PAAA B12 938, 9 June 1954) 
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the British, they ultimately decided against it and instead opted for the creation of an 
honorary consulate (PAAA B12 938, 16 November 1953). After all, Aden was 
considered part of Britain’s overseas territory, “where for strategic reasons, the British 
government generally did not like seeing foreigners and foreign representation” (PAAA 
B12 938, 16 November 1953). 
It was only with independence on 30 November 1967, that the PSRY/PDRY 
established a fully functioning ministry of foreign affairs and started building its 
diplomatic service. Its first minister of foreign affairs was Sayf al-Dhalai, who had 
emerged as a skilful negotiator during independence talks with the British in Geneva 
(Brehony, 2011). Under his discretion, first diplomatic missions were set up abroad in 
1968.  
British and South Yemen representatives had already agreed to enter into full 
diplomatic relations once independence was formally announced in Geneva. Only a 
few days after its independence, the PSRY government gave its “agrément” to British 
ambassador Hooper (NA FCO/8/282). In May 1968, it then announced the 
appointment of its own ambassadors to the UK, the US/UN, Egypt, and the USSR (NA 
FCO/8/282).  
The early development of the PSRY diplomatic service illustrates the close 
relationship between diplomatic relations, state sovereignty, and international 
recognition. According to Eckes (2015), external sovereignty hinges on a 
government’s ability to take effective action at the international level, most notably by 
entering into diplomatic relations – a step that is widely presumed to require 
international recognition (Murphy and Stancescu, 2017). In other words, the 
demonstration of external (diplomatic) competence, and the success of a 
government’s claim to statehood, are inherently relational and dependent on the policy 
choices of foreign governments.  
In the case of South Yemen, international recognition and external sovereignty were 
denied to the Federation for the political reason of not upsetting British colonizers. 
Likewise, it appears that British colonizers, while willing to grant increasing domestic 
(administrative) autonomy to Yemenis, were reluctant to give up their control over 
Yemen’s foreign affairs. After all, the building of formal diplomatic structures required 
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international recognition and was as such considered a constitutive step toward 
external state sovereignty, or “statehood proper”. Not willing to risk their position of 
control, the British blocked Yemeni politicians from developing any external relations, 
let alone a functioning foreign service. Many years later, the historical link between 
Yemen’s diplomatic service and (external) state sovereignty re-gained in significance. 
With the outbreak of war in 2015, having a diplomatic service became crucial to regime 
survival.  
 
Figure 12: PRSY Letterhead  
Once the PRSY embassy was established in London, its members of staff began using symbolic 
objects and markers similar to those used in other embassies.115 
 
As was the case in the north, building a diplomatic service in the PRSY (and later 
PDRY) constituted a lengthy process of learning. The first PRSY ambassadors to the 
 
115 NA FCO/8/1705 
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UK and the US/UN were both young men without any prior diplomatic experience. Ali 
Jafr Muhammed Nasser was only 30 when being posted as ambassador to the UK. 
He had previously attended government schools in Aden and was educated at 
university level in the UK, where he spent six years in London, taking a degree in 
mathematics and chemistry, and one year in Edinburgh, on a post-graduate teachers’ 
course. Upon his return to Aden he was appointed deputy dean of Aden College in 
1967 before joining the young PSRY government. As British officials noted, appearing 
to speak from a position of superiority, “he seems […] to be somewhat overwhelmed 
by his new role as Ambassador and this might show itself in shyness and taciturnity” 
(NA FCO/8/282). Prior to taking office in London, Ali Jafr Muhammed Nasser was 
invited to a cocktail party at the British embassy in Aden. Following the event, British 
ambassador Hooper reported to the Foreign Office, 
 “Ali Ja’afar is of course completely new to diplomatic life, and the thought of all 
the formal side, in particular climbing into a boiled shirt and white tie (which I 
suggested he should hire from Moss Bros. if he could reconcile it with his Arab 
Conscience!) and going to see the Queen seems to be rather on his mind” (NA 
FCO/8/282). 
Minuscule practices of clothing, orientalising language (e.g. Arab conscience), and 
individual emotional clues (e.g. Ali Jafr’s discomfort) point to wider power relations and 
processes of socialization within the world of diplomacy.116  
Similar to Ali Jafr, Ismail Said Noman was only 27 when he was appointed 
ambassador to the United States and the United Nations. Prior to his diplomatic 
career, he had studied chemistry in the US and worked in the Aden Electricity 
Corporation. Like other appointed diplomats at the time, he was assumed to have 
been a member of the NFL, though not a very high-ranking one. According to British 
analysis “one can only assume that the Southern Yemen Government chose him 
because they could not find anyone else and, more positively, because of his 
American experience” (NA FCO/8/282). 
 
116 Fadhl Ahmad Sallami, who took on the role of UK ambassador after Ali Ja’afar, had also attended 
Aden College and used to serve in various government departments under British rule prior to 
independence (NA FCO/8/1705). 
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In September 1968, the PSRY showcased its diplomatic activity at the UN in New 
York, sending a delegation of four representatives to the General Assembly, including 
Ismail Noman and Jaffer Muhammad Nasr, as well as two Foreign Ministry employees, 
Anwar Qutb and Abu Bakr Shafiq. 117  Abu Bakr Shafiq had only recently been 
appointed ambassador in the foreign ministry after having been replaced as governor 
of the first province (which included Aden) - “probably to keep him on the pay-roll”, as 
a British diplomat suggested at the time (NA FCO/8/282). By 1970, the PSRY (PDRY) 
had a diplomatic representative in the United Kingdom, the United Arab Republic, the 
USSR, East Germany, the United Nations, Somalia, China, and Ethiopia (NA 
FCO/8/1446).  
Following the re-shuffling of the Cabinet in 1970, Ali Salim al-Beedh became foreign 
minister, assisted by Permanent Secretary Mohammed Hadi Awad, who had also 
attended a teachers’ course in Edinburgh during British occupation (NA 
FCO/8/282).118 The ministry at the time was structured into the minister’s office, a 
political department, a Western division, and a department for Protocol and Consular 
Affairs (NA FCO/8/1446). With only four departments, the foreign ministry was 
considerably smaller than the ministry of interior, for example, which had over ten 
departments at the time (NA FCO/8/1446). Later, regional divisions were added within 
the ministry of foreign affairs covering 1) Eastern Europe and the SU, 2) Asia and 
Australia, as well as 3) Africa and Latin America (PAAA B36 137731, 19 November 
1982; PAAA B36 137894, 16 December 1986). The size of departments was reflective 
of the PDRY’s foreign policy emphases. In June 1981, for instance, the one-man 
department for Western affairs was increased to three employees, reflecting the 
growing importance of Western countries to the PDRY (PAAA B36 137731, 9 June 
1981).   
 
117 Ismail Noman and Ali Jafr Muhammad Nasr were described as “lightweight young men with no 
diplomatic experience” (NA FCO/8/282). 
118 The former president and prime minister Qahtan al-Sha’bi refused to cooperate with the new 
regime and declined a fairly substantial pension “and a choice of an Ambassadorship in any country 




Figure 13: Former PDRY Foreign Ministry 
This photo was allegedly taken in the 1970s and shows the PDRY foreign ministry building in Aden. It 
was found in the same “Facebook archive” than Figure 7.119 
 
Throughout the 1970s, the PDRY’s diplomatic service expanded further, with missions 
being added in Iraq, the Arab League, and Lebanon (PAAA B36 104807, 1973). By 
November 1975, the young republic had established formal diplomatic relations with 
40 states, a number that rose to 73 by 1980 (PAAA B36 108803, 10 November 1975; 
PAAA B36 137633, 15 August 1980). Among those, 25 states were represented in 
Aden, including the Soviet Union, Somalia, Romania, Korea, India, East Germany, 
France, Egypt, Cuba, China, the UK, and Bulgaria. 
All of the PDRY’s high-ranking diplomats were party members (PAAA B36 137731, 1 
November 1982), many of whom had studied abroad and held high-ranking positions 
in government prior to their diplomatic appointment.120 “They were not career- and 
 
119 [Untitled illustration of the former PDRY Foreign Ministry building in Aden]. Retrieved 6 February 
2019 from https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=oa.350057438429477&type=1 
120 In October 1977, Dr. med. Abdel Aziz Addaly, who previously served as minister of health, was 
appointed as ambassador to Moscow, for example (PAAA B36 119926, 25 October 1977). 
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professional diplomats but party advocates”, one Yemeni diplomat claimed in 2017.121 
As was the case in the north, diplomatic appointments in the PDRY were driven by 
notions of reward and/or exile. Centering on loyalty and trust, they were highly 
responsive to political power struggles. In 1981, for instance, newcomer-president Ali 
Nasser Mohammed got rid of the incumbent chief of the general staff by appointing 
him ambassador to Ethiopia (PAAA B36 137730, 17 February 1981). The move was 
intended to undermine the position of the second most powerful man in the PDRY, Ali 
Ahmad Nasser Antar. Rather than dismissing Antar directly from his position as 
defense minister, Ali Nasser Mohammed began removing powerful figures in his 
immediate military surrounding (PAAA B36 137730, 17 February 1981). Another 
example of enforced “diplomatic exile” occurred in the aftermath of violent 1986-
events, when Dr. Ali Muthana Hassan was posted as new ambassador to Bonn, 
Germany. He had previously served as director of the foreign minister’s office and was 
considered an influential figure representing a powerful political grouping in the 
governorate of Lahj. He was presumed to be ambitious and it was rumored that his 
diplomatic posting was a way “to simultaneously satisfy and neutralize him” (PAAA 
B36 137894, 19 November 1986).122 In total, 13 new ambassadors were posted 
abroad following the deadly clashes of 1986. While some filled diplomatic posts that 
had been vacant, for instance in Budapest and Delhi, others replaced ambassadors 
who were suspected of continuously siding with the ousted president Ali Nasser 
Mohammed, for instance in Djibouti and Rome (PAAA B36 137894, 30 September 
1986). 
II.1. Liminal diplomatic space and the securitization of diplomatic practice 
Much like their northern counterparts, foreign diplomats in Aden were often viewed 
with suspicion by the central government, whose officials were wary of potentially 
corrupting external influences. Diplomatic representatives from abroad were closely 
monitored and highly constrained in their movement and interaction with locals. In 
1987, an Aden-based German diplomat wrote: 
 
121 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017 
122 He had studied in Paris, where he also did his PhD in international law. He previously served as 
Chargé d’affaires in the mission to the UN in Geneva (PAAA B36 137894, 19 November 1986). 
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“Having contact with foreigners is a punishable offence for Yemenis. Besides 
grocery shopping or similar forms of ‘cultural contact’, each conversation [with 
Yemenis] requires a prior written appointment [scheduled] by the foreign 
ministry. Natives are only allowed to visit the embassy if they received 
permission by the protocol department. In front of the embassy, an armed 
soldier of the security forces ensures that nobody enters without such 
permission. In Aden, the maintenance of close [personal] contacts is only 
possible within the very small colony of foreigners, in this case, especially with 
the other three Western embassies (Great Britain, France, and Italy). Diplomats 
are not allowed to leave the city of Aden without written permission” (PAAA B36 
140010, 27 January 1987). 
PDRY diplomats as well were closely monitored, suggesting that the diplomatic realm 
was seen by central government officials as a multi-functional field that came with both 
benefits and risks. In particular, diplomats’ relations with foreign actors and potential 
exposure to oppositional political ideas was regarded as a threat, running the risk of 
complicating diplomats’ loyalty to the PDRY government. Such suspicion was 
presumably amplified by geographical distance, which stood in the way of 
governmental surveillance, and could have deadly consequences. In 1980, the PDRY 
foreign minister Mohammed Saleh Mutea, who served as interior minister (1969-1973) 
and as foreign minister (1973-1979) was accused of conspiratorial relations with the 
Saudi secret service and of plotting to turn the PDRY into a conservative Islamic state 
(PAAA B36 137730, 7 March 1981). Mohammed Saleh Mutea was executed for his 
alleged crimes soon after accusations against him were issued (PAAA B36 137730, 4 
March 1981). A year later, in summer 1981, the head of the ministry’s department for 
Western countries was also executed. He had worked closely with al-Mutea and, like 
his former boss, was accused of having spied for imperial powers and Saudi Arabia 
(PAAA B36 137730, 6 August 1981).  
While these events resemble a staged Greek drama, marked by conspiracy and 
deadly power struggles, the government’s suspicion against PDRY diplomats was not 
entirely unfounded. In 1982, diplomatic German cables sent from Aden mention the 
planning of a coup d’état by South Yemenis who lived in exile. The potting notably 
involved Mohammed Saeed Abdullah, the incumbent PDRY ambassador to Hungary, 
 105 
who used to work as the head of the secret service under the former PDRY president 
Abdul Fattah Ismail. Ambassador Mohammed Saeed Abdullah was said to have met 
with Abdul Fattah Ismail, who lived in exile, on multiple occasions in 1982 and 
allegedly handed out unauthorized diplomatic passports to members of the conspiracy 
(PAAA B36 137730, 7 September 1982; PAAA B36 137730, 27 September 1982).  
III Between unification and division: representing the Republic of Yemen  
Diplomatic cooperation between YAR and PDRY representatives preceded 
unification. Already in 1977, the two Yemeni heads of state, Ibrahim al-Hamdi and 
Salim Rubai Ali, agreed that each Yemeni embassy should co-represent the other in 
countries where one state lacked representation (PAAA B36 119926, 26 February 
1977). Similarly, northern and southern diplomatic representatives began making 
public statements in the name of both Yemeni governments in the late 1980s, for 
example at the FAO conference in Rome in 1989 (PAAA B36 154169, 20 November 
1989). “When Yemeni diplomats were debating at the UN, one representative would 
speak on behalf of the other between 1987 and 1990”, recalled one Yemeni 
diplomat.123 As early as 1989, embassies began uniting following a strict 50-50 rule. 
Half of the embassies were headed by northern ambassadors, who were assisted by 
financial and administrative attachés from the south, and vice versa. Notably, this rule 
only applied to the level of ambassador and positions crucial to the allocation of 
resources. In Germany, the newly established “Republic of Yemen” kept the former 
YAR embassy building, with YAR diplomat Yacubi remaining ambassador there.124 In 
the UK, the embassy building of the former PDRY in Cromwell Road, South 
Kensington, was turned into the official representation of the new unified republic. In 
addition to merging Yemeni embassies abroad, foreign embassies in Aden were 
converted into consulates (Bonnefoy, 2018, p.46). 
 
123 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017. 
124 In a diplomatic note sent to the German foreign ministry in May 1990, the Yemeni embassy 
formally announced unification and the establishment of the “Yemen Republic”, which, as was 
emphasized, had its own national anthem, its own flag, and its own “state logo”. Notably, the 
notification was validated by the new stamp, illustrated above (PAAA B36 154169, 22 May 1990). 
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Figure 14: YAR Embassy Stamps 
The YAR embassy in Bonn informed the West German foreign ministry as early as 1989 of its new 
representation and corresponding changes in its emblems and stamps.125 
 
The same 50-50 rule that regulated the merger of Yemeni embassies also applied to 
the fusion of its northern and southern foreign ministries, which was initially headed 
by two foreign ministers: Abd al-Karim al-Iryani (north) and Abd al-Aziz al-Dali (south) 
(Bonneyfoy, 2018). Northern heads of departments were assisted by southern deputy 
directors and the other way around.126 The decision to combine the employees of two 
ministries drastically increased the overall size of the new foreign ministry. Several 
Yemeni diplomats claimed that the PDRY government, in an attempt to boost its 
 
125 PAAA B36 154169, 22 August 1989. 
126 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017. 
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influence, had at least doubled the number of its foreign ministry employees shortly 
before unification.127 Implying ongoing indignation over what was perceived as foul 
play, one diplomat proclaimed, “until now, we still are trying to get rid of that legacy”.128 
North-south divides within the foreign ministry were revived during the 1994 war, when 
several diplomats supported their former political leaders.129 As one interviewee put it, 
“we had one country, one embassy, but different views among the staff”.130 Reports of 
open conflict between Yemeni diplomats are numerous, pointing to the UN and Syria 
among other places. At UN level, Yemeni diplomats from the south are said to have 
called for separation, while their colleagues from the north promoted unity. Their 
diverging claims and agendas were allegedly supported by different foreign 
ambassadors. 131  Likewise, open conflict reportedly erupted between Yemeni 
embassy employees in Damascus and elsewhere.132  
Notwithstanding such internal divisions, institutional structures continued to evolve. 
Regional departments were established in the aftermath of unification, with desks 
covering countries, sub-regions, and/or specific topics.133 In 1991, “Law No. 2 of 1991 
Concerning the Diplomatic and Consular Service” was issued, outlining basic 
structures and practices within the Yemeni diplomatic service. Though having been 
amended over the years, it still applied at the time this research was conducted.  
The ministry’s re-structuring involved the establishment of a diplomatic training 
institute, which took on an important role in the hiring and coaching of Yemeni 
diplomats.134 According to Yemeni law, newly recruited diplomats “must have passed 
the entrance examination conducted for that purpose by the ministry” (article 29). 
Before commencing their work, they were further required to spend one year at the 
training institute. In addition to coaching new recruits, the institute offered courses to 
experienced diplomats, even ambassadors, teaching them on specific topics (e.g. 
 
127 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 
2017. 
128 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
129 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017. 
130 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017. 
131 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 21 December 2017. 
132 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 May 2019. 
133 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
134 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
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foreign direct investment) or preparing them for upcoming postings. Occasionally, the 
institute also provided training to officials from other ministries who engaged in 
international affairs or dealt with foreigners.135 While a large part of diplomats’ training 
was thereby moved “in-house,” the option of external training remained. Article 66 of 
the ministry’s diplomatic law specifically outlines the possibility of obtaining a 
certificate or degree (abroad) “in fields related to diplomatic work”. Application of the 
law has been inconsistent, with one diplomat describing the early 2000s as a “period 
of implementation of the law”, during which new recruits entered the foreign service 
by passing the entrance exams.136 
 
 
Figure 15: Structure of the Yemeni Foreign Ministry  
This figure portrays the structure of the Yemeni foreign ministry (until 2002) as described by Yemeni 
diplomats in 2017. 
 
 
135 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
136 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 May 2019. 
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The Yemeni foreign ministry was structurally divided into a financial and administrative 
section (including civil servants working on largely technical and managerial affairs) 
and a section of “political affairs” (employing diplomats who worked abroad). Both 
sides contained a range of departments and divisions, whose number, size, thematic 
focus, and level of activity would vary, flexibly adapting to changing political realities.137 
The Department of Borders, for instance, was created in the early 1990s, at a time 
when Yemen faced a range of border issues with Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. While the 
department was considered important between 1994 and 2000, it was described as 
“not very active” at the time this research was conducted.138  
Similarly, the subdivisions within each ministry department would reflect shifting 
political needs. Within the GCC & Iran department, for instance, a single desk was 
deemed sufficient for covering Oman, while an entire section dealt with affairs related 
to Saudi Arabia. 139  Further reflecting the ministry’s institutional fluidity was the 
emergence and disappearance of official positions. For a while two deputy ministers 
for political affairs were employed by the ministry, for instance. One covered the two 
Americas, Europe, and international organizations, while the other one focused on 
African, Asian, and Arab countries.140 Similarly, the ministry temporarily replaced its 
vice minister with a prime deputy minister in 2002.141  
Much of this fluidity is related to the personalized social dynamics that have marked 
the foreign ministry from the beginning. Political sway frequently rested with key 
figures, which meant the closer diplomats worked to the president, minister, or 
ambassador the more influence and material benefits they could expect to gain. In 
fact, important topics were often handled by those in power, not those holding relevant 
offices.142 The former director of a department in Sanaa complained that particularly 
 
137 Each department was commonly subdivided into smaller organizational units. 
138 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. In 2000 the Jeddah border treaty was signed, 
determining the territorial border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which has been disputed since 
the 1930s (Bonnefoy, 2018). 
139 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
140 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
141 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
142 A further example of the personalized social dynamics inside the Yemeni foreign policy was 
reported in 1978, when Saleh appointed Yahya Gaghman as his “personal representative”, or his 
“personal ambassador”, as one German diplomat put it. Gaghman delivered numerous “special 
messages” between the president and other heads of states, in a process that side-lined the foreign 
ministry (PAAA B36 119922, 8 October 1978). In 1980, the foreign ministry received only 1.8% of the 
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intriguing matters never reached him and other directors. “All the issues, the important 
issues, we did not know about them”.143 They stayed within the minister’s office, which 
consisted of around 15 employees, each in charge of a different topic or region. The 
tasks of office employees reflected the ministry’s broader structure, specifically its 
various thematic and regional departments.  
Personal and relational qualities such as loyalty and trust frequently motivated 
departures from codified rules within the Yemeni diplomatic service. One former 
ambassador admitted openly to have violated existing chains of command by reporting 
only to those he trusted:  
“During my time as ambassador, serving under Saleh, I sent my reports directly 
to the office of President Saleh. Usually ambassadors are supposed to send it 
to the foreign ministry, but I did not trust the foreign ministry, there is no real 
confidentiality there”.144 
Neo-patrimonialism also impacted appointment practices and shaped individual 
careers within the ministry. Notwithstanding official rules that prohibited the affiliation 
with any political party, membership in the General People’s Congress (GPC) party 
was identified as a career-advancing step. It allowed diplomats to build relevant 
networks and showcase their political support and loyalty to Ali Abdullah Saleh.145 
Lacking the alleged advantages of GPC-membership, one diplomat complained “I am 
not with the political party of Ali Abdullah Saleh, I am not with the opposition, I was 
independent, and I am still independent until this time. So, I don't have that one 
[person] who will push me [i.e. support me]”.146  
Next to diplomats’ GPC-membership, kinship was named as an important factor in 
neo-patrimonial appointment practices. President Saleh’s brother-in-law, for instance, 
worked as cultural attaché in Washington D.C. for fifteen years, before being promoted 
to the rank of ambassador for another twelve years.147 In many instances, diplomats 
 
government’s budget (as opposed to 28.1% for the army and 13.3% for the Ministry of Education) 
(PAAA B36 137629, December 1980). 
143 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. 
144 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 February 2017. 
145 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. 
146 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. 
147 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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openly admitted to having entered the diplomatic service with the help of their fathers 
and their fathers’ contacts. It was no secret that the former minister of financial and 
administrative affairs, Ambassador Mohammed Hussain Hatem (2000-2014), for 
instance, had his two sons appointed to the diplomatic service. According to one 
interviewee, “there was a time, I would say between the 1980s until the early 2000 
when the Iryani family, and people who married into the Iryani family, were very 
prevalent in the foreign ministry”.148 Another diplomat laughed when remarking that 
“all Yemenis say that the foreign ministry is a house for the Iryani family”.149 Prior to 
Yemen’s unification, Dr. Abdul Kareem al-Iryani served as YAR minister of 
development, education, prime minister, and minister of foreign affairs (1984-1990). 
Following unification in 1990, he continued working as foreign minister (1990-1993) 
and as prime minister (1998-2001), later serving as Ali Abdullah Saleh’s political 
advisor. During Abdul Kareem al-Iryani’s time in government, an increasing number of 
Iryani family members were said to have joined the foreign ministry. Those who were 
ambassadors “wanted their sons to continue in the same field”, which may explain the 
family’s ongoing prevalence within the Yemeni diplomatic corps.150  
IV Conclusion 
“While the hybrid character of modern diplomacy is universally accepted among 
practitioners […], there is as yet little scholarship regarding the genealogical details” 
(Neumann, 2013, p.26).  
This chapter’s micro-level analysis outlined how shifting personal, material, and 
environmental factors have impacted the development of Yemen’s foreign service. 
Arguing that mundane and seemingly unremarkable behavioural and material aspects 
can assign meaning to state institutions, it studied the role of “little things”, such as 
stamps, letterheads, and markers of diplomats’ physical appearance. It demonstrated 
that ideas regarding the diplomatic corps, their enactment and embodiment, have 
been multiple, fragmented, and at times contradictory. Historically, the (re-) learning 
 
148 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 February 2017. 
149 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
150 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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of the Yemeni foreign service has been influenced by multiple external actors, being 
deeply embedded in global geopolitics and unequal power relations. Institutional 
developments have also been responsive to domestic politics and socio-political 
events. The ministry’s social composition, for example, has reflected changes in 
government, and corresponding ideological and organizational shifts. In addition, 
personal rivalries, ambitions, loyalties, and relationships of kinship, friendship, and 
trust have impacted diplomatic practice, specifically appointments and promotions. By 
genealogically tracing the institutional plasticity and formation of the Yemeni 
diplomatic service, this chapter sheds light onto the heterogeneous hybridity of 
modern diplomacy.   
It also adds historical depth to this study’s argument that the Yemeni diplomatic service 
has to be conceptualized as a dynamic and fragmented socio-material institution to 
comprehend its paradoxical combination of institutional endurance and fluidity. 
Historically, the development of Yemen’s diplomatic service has been marked by 
change, as reflected in its initial institutionalization, the expansion of its organizational 
structure and size, and shifting internal loyalties and fault lines. These transformative 
processes have been accompanied by various continuities. Not all political ruptures 
were translated into radical institutional reform. The 1962 revolution, for instance, was 
marked by the retaining or re-deployment of diplomats who had served and remained 
associated with the royal Imamate elite. As this chapter’s analysis suggests, 
professionalism may be viewed as a source of continuity inside the Yemeni diplomatic 
service – an idea that will be further explored in the following analysis.  
Besides professionalism, this chapter introduced a number of practices and themes 
relevant to this study’s investigation of the Yemeni diplomatic service after 2011. For 
instance, it explored the political meaning and practical value of liminal diplomatic 
space, including reward-and-exile strategies. It also examined internal conflicts, such 
as the ongoing north-south divide that followed unification in 1990. Such historical 
background information facilitates the interpretation of later developments by shedding 
light on historically specific meanings and allowing for the separation between change 
and continuity. 
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5 A Revolutionary Moment of Diplomatic Voice and Exit  
 
 
While much has been written about 2011 events in Yemen (Heinze, 2018; Lackner, 
2017; Bonnefoy, 2018; Durac, 2012; Clausen, 2015), to date, no research has 
zoomed-in on the micro-level events that have occurred within Yemeni state 
institutions. To address this gap in the literature, and answer this project’s second 
research question, the following analysis focuses on the country’s diplomatic corps at 
the time of the uprising. Using narratives shared by Yemeni diplomats as a starting 
point for discussion, this chapter specifically focuses on diplomatic practice and 
diplomats’ experience of 2011 events. In doing so, it broadly conceptualizes diplomats 
as subjects constituted by an inherently reflexive and fluid sense of self and plural 
conditions of identities (Sok̈efeld, 1999). This approach acknowledges the unique 
individual make-up of each state official, which might overlap with, but never be 
entirely replaced by standardized professional roles. Social and family contexts, as 
well as individual life experience, are crucial to the formation of subjects that later act 
and express themselves in a professional capacity. In other words, diplomats’ values, 
emotions, and worldviews are presumed to inform their practice, both at home and at 
work. Agency therefore exists in and through diplomats’ practical involvement in socio-
material webs of relations (Sewell, 1992).  
Empirically speaking, this study’s holistic framing of diplomats facilitates the 
incorporation of its ethnographic material, much of which contains affective and highly 
personal registers. At a conceptual level, it allows for the development of a unique 
framework that captures the importance of individual agency to our understanding of 
diplomatic institutions and practice. Rather than emphasizing a single “diplomatic 
habitus” or “role” that is shared by all diplomats and underlies generally consistent 
patterns of diplomatic practice, this study shifts focus onto diplomats’ agential qualities 
to better understand potentially unique, non-consistent diplomatic activities in a 
moment of rupture.  
Tied to the study of diplomats’ individual agency, this chapter elucidates how the 2011 
crisis was interpreted by Yemeni diplomats as a particular professional challenge. 
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More specifically, it examines what viewpoints and behavioural strategies diplomats 
developed in response to the political uprising and regime change. To structure the 
multiplicity of diplomatic behaviour that emerged at a time of new political openings, 
radical politicization, strong emotion, and “cognitive liberation”, Hirschman’s (1970) 
conceptual trio of exit, voice, and loyalty is applied. His much-cited framework helps 
capture diplomats’ oscillation between practices marked by diplomatic loyalty on the 
one hand and expressions of protest, including practices of voice and exit, on the 
other. At times, diplomats aimed at combining the two, by re-defining loyalty through 
shifting claims of representation.  
In examining diplomats’ behavioural choices at work, two alternative framings of 
diplomatic roles and responsibilities emerge, which have a long-standing history in 
bureaucratic state theory. On the one hand, interviewees put forth an ideal type that 
portrays the diplomat as “an obedient civil servant”. Closely tied to the norm of loyalty, 
this conception acted as a powerful baseline influencing the development of diplomatic 
behaviour in the context of 2011. On the other hand, Yemeni respondents displayed 
opinions and practices that depict the diplomat as an “emotional political agent”. In the 
midst of Yemen’s “revolutionary moment”, diplomats chose, and were in some cases 
torn, between these two ideal types, which both informed diplomatic behaviours. Their 
navigation of differing professional expectations, emotions, and personal opinion was 
frequently narrated by reference to “diplomatic professionalism”, which emerged as a 
guiding social construct.  
The remaining part of this chapter is divided into three main parts. First, Yemen’s 
uprising and regime change in 2011 are outlined. Next, Hirschman’s theoretical 
framework is introduced alongside relevant insights taken from bureaucratic state and 
diplomatic theory. The third and main part of this chapter then examines this study’s 
empirical material. It is subdivided into four sections, beginning with diplomats’ 
subjective experience of the 2011 events, which highlights the importance of emotions 
and the uncertainty and confusion that marked diplomatic responses. The following 
three sections then explore cases of diplomatic loyalty, voice, and exit. Hirschman’s 
(1970) concepts of voice and exit are used as umbrella terms which help conceptualize 
reflective diplomatic practices in a moment of change. 
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I The 2011 uprising, political opportunities, and cognitive liberation 
On 17 December 2010, street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in the 
small Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. His self-immolation is commonly portrayed as a 
tragic reaction to the economic and social status quo (Seib, 2012; Mabrouk, 2011; 
Murphy, 2011). Unpredictably, Bouazizi’s death catalysed the “Jasmine Revolution” in 
Tunisia, which inspired a wider pro-democracy movement in the Middle East and North 
Africa. In early 2011, “Arab Spring” protests spilled into Yemen, inspiring citizens of all 
age groups, provinces, and socio-economic backgrounds to rally against long-term 
president Ali Abd Allah Saleh. A day after Ben Ali stepped down as president of 
Tunisia, Yemeni students, civil society activists, and political opponents launched 
large-scale demonstrations in Sanaa, kick-starting the formation of a country-wide 
protest movement (Durac, 2013). Nascent demonstrations gained real momentum 
with the resignation of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 (Durac, 
2013). His departure motivated thousands of activists to gather in front of Sana'a 
University, while tens of thousands took to the streets elsewhere in Yemen calling for 
political change (International Crisis Group, 2011). Main squares in Yemeni cities, 
including Hodeidah, Aden, Taiz, and Sanaa, were re-named into “change squares”, 
filled with tents that housed not only protestors but also a variety of cultural and political 
events. In a colourful emotional atmosphere of excitement, anger, hope, and 
anticipation, poems were recited, political debates were held, passionate chants filled 
the air, and politicized street graffiti spread in and around urban centres. Emphasising 
the emotional nature of “revolutionary moments” like the Arab Spring, Bellin (2012) 
insists that,  
“ordinary people do not take to the street in mass numbers thanks to protracted 
intellectual meditation on policy alternatives or ideology. Rather, ordinary 
people take to the streets when they feel compelled by some strong emotion 
such as anger, fear, or euphoria” (p.136).  
Bellin’s argument is echoed in Sultany’s (2017) study of the 2011 uprisings, which 
finds that “the Arab uprisings were brimming with emotional intensity and acts of 
collective creativity” (p.113).  
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At first, established political actors in Yemen reacted cautiously to protests. Instead of 
calling for Saleh’s resignation, members of Yemen's parliamentary opposition 
coalition, called “Joint Meeting Party” (JMP),151 opted for gradual reform and political 
dialogue (Phillips, 2011). Their approach witnessed a radical U-turn following March 
18, when “dozens of men wearing civilian clothes” shot at least 45 protestors using 
military assault rifles (Human Rights Watch, 2013, para 1). Since “state security forces 
made no serious effort to stop the carnage”, the incident was widely ascribed to Ali 
Abdullah Saleh – although he never publicly admitted his involvement (Finn, 2011). 
What became labelled as “Friday of Dignity” added fuel to public and political uproar 
and reconfigured the socio-political composition of Yemen’s protest movement. 
Importantly, it triggered a large set of defections from the army and Ali Abdullah 
Saleh’s party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), which included ministers, 
members of parliament (Lackner, 2017), and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, Yemen’s second 
most powerful figure who headed the First Armoured Brigade and “swore to protect 
the demonstrators” (Lackner, 2017, p.37).  
Giving in to rising internal and external pressure, Saleh agreed to negotiate Yemen's 
future with international actors and representatives of the Yemeni JMP in April 2011. 
Following protracted negotiations, he eventually signed the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) initiative in November 2012, which stipulated his resignation and outlined the 
details of a two-year transition plan, including convening a National Dialogue 
Conference (NDC). While losing his office as president, Ali Abd Allah Saleh was 
granted immunity and remained head of the powerful GPC party. He was replaced by 
Yemen's former vice president, Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi, whose legitimacy has been 
contested ever since he took office.  
Groups and actors who had initiated and joined the protests were not involved in 
negotiations and the design of the transition plan. Thus, many perceived the GCC 
agreement as an inter-elite bargain that reshuffled power among existing players, 
rather than fundamentally changing state–society relations (Nevens, 2011). As 
 
151 The JMP embraces six of Yemen's most prominent opposition parties, including the Islah party. As 
Phillips (2008) describes it “the JMP was built in defence against the GPC, but it also mirrors one of 
the GPC's main characteristics – an ideologically bereft umbrella-group for elites that exists to protect 
their group interests” (p.124).  
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Clausen (2015) suggests, the exclusion of many activists was in part “facilitated by the 
UN and the Gulf states, which prioritized short-term stability and dealing with 
established political actors” (p.19). Side-lined protestors and opposition leaders placed 
their hope in the National Dialogue Conference, which commenced in March 2013 and 
was required to include “all forces and political actors” in Yemen, specifically “the 
youth, the Southern Movement, the Houthis, other political parties, civil society 
representatives and women” (GCC cited in Lackner, 2012, n.p.).   
Acknowledging that developments in Yemen did not amount to a complete reversal of 
existing power relations, this project suggests that the 2011 uprising and the 
subsequent political transition contained both “revolutionary” as well as “counter-
revolutionary” elements (Sultany, 2017). As early as 2 February 2011, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh rendered the capital’s main “Tahrir Square” inaccessible to protesters by setting 
up large tents for his political supporters from within the military and security sectors. 
“All of Saleh’s backers were fed and supplied with daily rations of qat, thus ensuring 
that they stayed and came out on pro-Saleh counter-demonstrations during the 
following months” (Lackner, 2017, p.36). While this pre-emptive move did not stop 
protesters from claiming other public spaces, especially “change square” in front of 
Sanaa University, it illustrates the co-existence of change and conservatism that has 
marked the 2011 uprising.  
As suggested in the following analysis, protests and regime change in Yemen created 
both “political opportunities” and subsequent cases of “cognitive liberation” (Caren, 
2007), which according to political and historical sociologists, shape actors’ formation 
of political goals, strategies, and tactics (Caren, 2007). McAdam (1982) argues that 
new political opportunities result from “any event or broad social process that serves 
to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is 
structured” (p. 41). The emergence of new opportunities may in turn lead to individual 
cases of “cognitive liberation,” the vague feeling “that the current political system lacks 
legitimacy and […that] participation could make meaningful change happen” (Caren, 
2007, p. 2). These and other theoretical approaches to political action are commonly 
summarized as “political process theory”, or simply “opportunity theory”. Political 
process theory has traditionally been applied to social movements operating outside, 
and often in opposition to, state institutions. Yet, as suggested in this chapter, the 
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theory may also be used in examining intra-state power struggles and institutional 
reform. It is complemented in the following analysis by bureaucratic state theory, 
specifically Hirschman’s conceptual trio of exit, voice, and loyalty, and literature on the 
theoretical framing of bureaucrats and civil servants, including diplomats.  
II Hirschman’s trio, behavioural “ideal types” and diplomatic practice 
In the analysis below, diplomats’ practices are categorized and examined with the help 
of Hirschman’s theoretical work on bureaucrats. While Hirschman’s conceptual 
framework is widely applied in contemporary social science research, it has not been 
used in diplomacy studies, where norms of loyalty are frequently taken for granted and 
diplomatic agency is often underplayed (e.g. Murray et al, 2011). By theorizing a 
variety of behavioural choices, Hirschman’s theoretical work presupposes actors’ 
subjectivity and allows for the study of internal institutional heterogeneity. While his 
much-cited framework lends itself as a useful tool in analysing the empirical data 
presented below, it will be shown to require a number of adjustments.  
Bureaucracy scholars generally describe exit as the act of physical withdrawal, for 
instance when positions are no longer regarded as being fulfilling or because 
bureaucrats “are unwilling to compromise their sense of moral integrity” (Zacka, 2017, 
p.233). While exit may occur quietly through resignation or transfer (Quinlan,1993), it 
can also be exercised in tandem with, and as a form of, “voice”, through the publication 
of resignation letters for example (Levinson, 2015). In the latter case, the alternative 
facing bureaucrats is “not so much between voice and exit as between voice from 
within and voice from without (after exit)” (Hirschman, 1970, p.104). 
Contrary to bureaucratic exits, the option of “voice” is messier as “it can be graduated, 
all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest” (Hirschman, 1970, p.16). At its 
broadest, voice implies the articulation and enactment of critical opinions. Following 
Hirschman (1970), it is here defined as  
“any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state 
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management 
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of 
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forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and 
protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion” (p.30). 
Choices regarding practices of voice and exit are often impacted by notions of loyalty 
which is described by Hirschman (1970) as the “special attachment to an organization” 
(p.77). As a rule, he claims, loyalty “holds exit at bay and activates voice” (p.78). 
According to Hirschman, loyalty does not necessarily translate into silence, obedience, 
and strict compliance, but can exacerbate practices of voice or lead to more subtle 
forms of “loyal muddling” (Levinson, 2015, p.8).  
For greater conceptual clarity, the following analysis distinguishes between internal 
and public expressions of voice, while acknowledging that conceptual boundaries 
between them are blurry. Taking into account the specificities of the diplomatic 
profession, it also re-theorizes loyalty as a professional norm closely associated with 
political neutrality and emotional detachment. As will be shown throughout the 
following analysis, diplomats oscillated between notions of loyalty on the one hand 
and practices of protest, including voice and exit, on the other. At times, they aimed at 
combining the two, by re-defining loyalty through shifting claims of representation. In 
these instances, voice and exit were justified by reference to diplomats’ loyal 
representation of the Yemeni people, as opposed to the regime or president. 
In examining diplomats’ behavioural choices at work, two alternative framings of 
diplomatic roles and responsibilities emerge. Both are reflected in academic writing, 
specifically bureaucratic state and diplomatic theory.152 On the one hand, interviewees 
put forth an ideal type that portrays the diplomat as ‘an obedient civil servant’. Closely 
tied to the norm of loyalty, this conception acted as a powerful baseline influencing the 
development of diplomatic behaviour in the context of 2011. On the other hand, 
Yemeni diplomats displayed opinions and practices that painted an image of the 
diplomat as an ‘emotional political agent’. In the midst of Yemen’s ‘revolutionary 
moment’, diplomats chose, and were in some cases torn, between these two ideal 
types, which both informed diplomatic practices. At a time of rupture, no course of 
 
152 Diplomatic theory describes the multi-disciplinary writing on diplomats and diplomacy, including 
recent literature in the fields of international relations and political geography.  
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action seemed obvious or common-sensical. Diplomatic practice was reflective and its 
analysis foregrounds diplomats’ creative agency (Bode, 2017).  
The “obedient servant view” mentioned above, and its conceptualization of the rule-
oriented, apolitical, and impersonal state actor, has been traced by scholars to the 
intellectual current of “civil prudential thought”, which first emerged in seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Europe. Perceiving the state as a structure of offices, civil 
prudentialists argued that its various office holders had to “learn to distinguish their 
responses to questions facing them in an official capacity from other commitments 
they might have, whether in relation to clan, kith or religious belief” (DuGay, 2007, 
pp.127-128). Linking political neutrality to emotional detachment, scholars following 
the civil prudential tradition frequently cited Max Weber, who famously argued that 
bureaucracy “develops the more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized’, the more 
completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation” (Weber, 1978, 
p.975).153  
These arguments presumably impacted the field of diplomacy studies, where the 
“ideal ambassador” has been described “as a person governed by his reason rather 
than by his passions” (Bull, 1977, p.169).154 Diplomacy scholars tend to view the 
diplomatic service as a neutral conduit that serves the technocratic execution of 
normative and value-based decisions made by politicians elsewhere. In fact, as 
Russell (2004) notes in her survey of classical theorists, there exists a tradition 
advocating the ability of diplomats to “repress their emotions” (p. 394).  
This conceptual approach came under criticism for its empirical inaccuracy and 
dubious normativity (Applbaum, 1999), especially in the aftermath of World War II. 
Weber’s portrayal of bureaucrats was brushed aside as a bizarre sketch of an ideal 
type that is rarely, if ever, found in social life and that cannot be empirically proven. 
Decrying the horrors of impersonal Nazi bureaucracies, scholars also broadened the 
scope of bureaucratic responsibility to include wider notions of individual morality 
 
153 To date, bureaucrats are expected to ignore personal moral preference or sentiments (Du Gay, 
2007), instead working sine ira et studio, without anger and fondness (Albrow, 1997; Weber, 1978; 
Hoag, 2011). 
154 A survey conducted within the US State Department in the 1960s indicates that 70 to 80 percent of 
employees endorsed the idea of “acting rationally and avoiding emotional display” (Harr, 1969, p.128). 
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(DuGay, 2007). The ideal bureaucrat, including diplomats, was theorized to measure 
his or her conduct “not so much against the demands of their office, but against a 
wider conception of moral principle and socially beneficial outcomes” (DuGay, 2007, 
p.112). It was argued that bureaucratic and diplomatic actors are involved in doing 
politics and that diplomatic behaviour is necessarily emotional. The diplomatic 
profession in particular was acknowledged to require judgment calls and diplomats’ 
own interpretation, emotional capacity, and situational instinct. In fact, it has been 
argued that diplomats, more than other state officials, need to mix the formal with the 
personal whilst at work. After all, diplomacy is “a system of communication between 
strangers” (DerDerian, 1993, p.224) and as such “rooted in relationships, not 
transactions” (Gould-Davies, 2013, p.1465). As Jones and Clark (2015) aptly put it:  
“Diplomats are not merely apparatchiks giving voice to a full-throated state-
centered vision of power. Critically they are individuals with their own lived 
experiences and subjectivities that constitute the everyday of the diplomatic 
world” (p.3).  
In contrast to the “obedient civil servant” image, these arguments portray diplomats as 
more than mere implementers of foreign policy; they appear as emotional political 
agents who play an important role in shaping international relations. Both perspectives 
were utilized by Yemeni diplomats in narrating their behavioural choices and practices 
during 2011, notably informing their varying accounts of “diplomatic professionalism”. 
III “Revolutionary diplomats”? Tracing experiences of the 2011 uprising  
“I was going to receptions less because it is embarrassing to go, because they 
gonna ask you [about the uprising]... and if you say what you are believing [in 
change, or the Arab Spring] it is not professional, and if you say something good 
about your government or Ali Abdullah Saleh, they will laugh at you. It was 
emotional. So, I went to receptions less. When I was meeting with my Arab 
diplomatic friends, like from Egypt or Tunisia, […and] they asked, I said 
‘Insha'allah it will be better’ and they laughed and they told me ‘we used to say 
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the same thing, but give it a few months and you will be saying something more 
honest about Ali Abdullah Saleh’”.155 
As indicated by this mid-level Yemeni diplomat, the 2011 uprising impacted Yemen’s 
diplomatic corps in multiple ways. For one, it triggered a range of emotional responses, 
with diplomats describing their experience of 2011 using words such as “anger”,156 
“shock”, 157  “relief”, 158  “worry”, 159  “surprise”, 160  and “care”. 161  Taking diplomats’ 
expressive language seriously, this study foregrounds emotions as “a key element of 
human thought and behaviour” (Hall, 2015, p.7). Feeling uncomfortable at diplomatic 
events, the diplomat referred to above developed strategies of avoidance, indicating 
that strongly felt emotions may inform professional conduct. Whether “happy, tired, 
anxious or relaxed, we virtually always mentally operate on a background of emotions 
and constantly apprehend the world from a certain emotional perspective” (Roy, 2016, 
p.84). By paying attention to diplomats’ emotional expressions and their political 
effects, this study hopes to add to a small body of literature, which offers insight into 
diplomats’ use of emotions as a calculative tool (Hall, 2015; Jones, in press).162 While 
the feelings conveyed in the context of this research seemed sincere, and no obvious 
strategic purpose could be read into them, emotional genuineness is difficult to prove. 
Given the blurry line between earnestly felt and strategically deployed emotions, this 
project focuses primarily on the emotional effects that informed diplomats’ behavioural 
choices.  
Emotions interacted closely with a strong sense of incertitude. Many diplomats 
experienced the 2011 events as “a period of uncertainty”163 and confusion. “What will 
happen next? What will we do? What should we do? Diplomats were all confused,” 
commented one respondent. 164  A central dilemma revolved around professional 
 
155 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
156 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
157 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
158 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
159 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
160 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 September 2017. 
161 Interview with a Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
162 Hall’s book “Emotional Diplomacy” (2015) examines “the display of mandated emotions as part of 
one’s professional role” (p.2). Likewise, Jones (in press) explores “the calculative performance of 
emotions” within the United Nations Security Council (p.2).  
163 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
164 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
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norms, especially those associated with loyalty and representation. In devising 
behavioural strategies, diplomats oscillated between 1) perceived norms of loyalty, 
political neutrality, and supressed personal emotions and 2) moral, emotional, political, 
and/or opportunistic activism. As one interviewee, who worked abroad during 2011, 
framed the impasse, “should you as a Yemeni diplomat do something against Ali 
Abdullah Saleh?  […] Or do you have to be a professional and not do anything and 
stay with the government? It was a very big question I faced”.165 He added, “I wanted 
to side with the people, but I am an official, so what is the right thing to do?”166 
Ultimately, the diplomat in question followed the lead of his superior, the Yemeni 
ambassador, who publicly took position against Ali Abdullah Saleh. Describing the 
ambassador as a role model, he explained, “he had a huge impact on me; I tried to be 
like him”.167 As this indicates, diplomats’ opinions and behaviour do not occur in a 
vacuum but are embedded in multiple webs of transnational relations, including 
professional affiliations within and across embassies.  
III.1. Diplomatic loyalty as a baseline assumption and professional norm 
In narrating 2011 events, Yemeni diplomats celebrated newly emergent protest 
activities, while also engaging in considerable (self-)criticism. Critical voices commonly 
emphasized diplomatic norms of loyalty, political neutrality, and the strict containment 
of emotions at work. In describing what a diplomat should or should not do, 
respondents did not commonly cite national diplomatic laws or international legal 
documents pertaining to diplomatic conduct, such as the Vienna Convention. Instead, 
expressions of diplomatic professionalism were assumed to be self-evident, acting as 
an unspoken baseline and threshold against which behavioural strategies were 
developed and judged.  
Emphasizing “political neutrality” and “emotional detachment”, the norms of loyalty 
expressed by Yemeni respondents resemble “obedient civil servant” views, which, as 
mentioned above, have long been promulgated within the fields of bureaucratic and 
diplomatic theory. Claiming that “one’s own beliefs about the good are never good 
 
165 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
166 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
167 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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reasons for action” (Applbaum, 1999, p.124), writers and theorists have long expected 
state officials to serve consecutive governments no matter their party politics. “The 
key to being able to do this […] is to cultivate a degree of indifference to the 
enthusiasms of all political parties; to display, in effect, party political impartiality” 
(DuGay, 2007, p.115). In this view, diplomats are considered neutral agents rather 
than “political architects” (Keens-Soper & Schweizer, 1983, p.33). While diplomats 
may share their expertise with superiors, and even raise objections, they must never 
turn into proactive policy-makers. If their word is disregarded, they are obliged to 
nevertheless execute instructions, always mindful of the fact that “the civil service, of 
which the diplomatic service is a branch, is supposed to possess no politics” (Nicolson, 
1963, p.81).  
Reflecting these normative assumptions, several Yemeni diplomats deemed the 
concept of a “revolutionary diplomat” to be an oxymoron. As one former ambassador 
put it, “you cannot criticize the head of state publicly and remain ambassador. You 
have to make a decision: either you stay and shut up, or you protest and leave”.168 
Yemeni diplomats generally agreed that they should not voice their personal political 
opinion. “How can you continue your work, stay professional, if you side personally 
with one party?” wondered a senior Yemeni diplomat, who deemed it crucial to 
maintain professional distance from government positions.169 “You might say ‘my 
government says…’ or ‘the position of my government is…’. You have to make clear 
that it is not your position”. Others agreed that “you should separate between politics 
and your work”.170 While one Yemeni ambassador admitted having had “sympathies” 
with demonstrators, he did not participate in any protest himself “because I thought I 
am a career diplomat, my sympathies should not matter”.171 In the Yemeni context, 
being a “career diplomat” was equated with professional training, experience, and a 
range of qualifications, such as language skills. It was contrasted with “non-career 
diplomats” who entered the diplomatic service through non-merit appointments. As 
 
168 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
169 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
170 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 July 2017. 
171 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 July 2017. 
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this indicates, unevenness and difference inside the Yemeni diplomatic service was 
structured around notions of professionalism and competent diplomatic practice. 
In 2011, diplomats’ (politically neutral and unemotional) loyalty emerged as a key 
marker of their professionalism. Pointing to two of his colleagues, one respondent 
maintained, “they are no real diplomats. They are personally taking sides”.172 Another 
respondent added, “a diplomat should be a career diplomat. He should serve the 
government that swore him in”. 173  In reflecting on Yemen’s 2011 uprising, his 
colleague agreed, claiming that “professional and smart diplomats never cared about 
it. They told themselves ‘I work for the ministry, the ministry works for the government 
- basta’. You know? Professional… like in any other country”.174  
As these examples illustrate, acting as an “obedient civil servant” was in many cases 
tied to claims of loyalty, which in turn was considered a professional norm and 
requirement. While some diplomats foregrounded diplomatic loyalty in explaining their 
own passivity during 2011, others used the concept to criticize the political activism of 
their colleagues. Whether or not expressed commitments to loyalty and 
professionalism constituted sincere motivating factors is difficult to determine. In some 
cases, diplomats admitted that their “political neutrality” was born out of self-interest 
and opportunism. One Yemeni ambassador, who worked abroad during the 2011 
uprising confessed, “I knew that Saleh would go […]. How, when, I could not have 
predicted it at that time. But who will take over, that was my worry; and this is why I 
kept quiet”.175 A further reason for staying silent was the prospect of being recalled to 
Yemen. “I thought if I resign, I have to go back home. And at that time, I felt that it was 
not safe. Because the upheaval was still ongoing, so I preferred to stay out”.176 At a 
time of uncertainty, political neutrality and the practice of professional loyalty appears 
to have constituted a safe option. “It's not really ‘I am a diplomat, I should not be 
involved with the issues in this country’. It is [rather] some way of escaping a critical 
 
172 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
173 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 July 2017. 
174 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
175 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
176 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
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situation”, one diplomat suggested.177 His colleague agreed, saying, “I kept myself on 
the sidelines, just watching both [sides]”.178  
Claims of loyalty were not monopolized by diplomatic “quietists”. Diplomats who chose 
to engage in expressions of voice frequently constructed their narratives around the 
very same concept. In these instances, loyalty either informed self-doubt and criticism, 
or was modified through shifting claims of representation. For instance, one mid-
ranking Yemeni diplomat, in discussing his expressions of “voice”, deemed his own 
practices to be “unprofessional”: “This is something I think is not right, when you let 
your emotions and your political beliefs affect your diplomatic job”. Without hesitation 
he added “[But] I would do the same thing [again] because I believe my country is 
more important than my career”.179 Here, notions of professional loyalty are contrasted 
with moral behavioural clues, i.e. concern for the well-being of society. Diplomats’ 
negotiation of such inner conflict was closely tied to different interpretations of their 
representative function, producing diverging claims of who or what was represented. 
One ambassador, who himself stayed silent throughout 2011, proclaimed that all 
“ambassadors are supposed to represent the interest of the country. Nothing but the 
interest of the country”.180 When asked who defined those interests, he laughed out 
loud, his deep bass voice echoing through his office, “that is a very difficult question,” 
he said, paused, and added “it should be the president, elected by the people”. 
Lowering his voice, he later explained, “some diplomats thought it was difficult to 
represent the president [in 2011]”. Indeed, several of his colleagues put forth 
alternative views, claiming to represent the country, or the Yemeni people, rather than 
the head of state. It appears that re-direction of one’s representative duty could 
facilitate the maintenance of diplomats’ moral integrity and justify expressions of voice.  
The contestation of loyalty that marked the Yemeni diplomatic service in 2011, 
heightened governmental distrust and led to the increased monitoring of diplomats. 
Several respondents reported that high-ranking government officials, including the 
foreign minister, engaged in a range of measures to ensure ongoing diplomatic 
 
177 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. 
178 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
179 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
180 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 July 2017. 
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obedience. In Sanaa, the foreign minister was said to have gone to great lengths to 
convince ministry employees of the risks and danger contained in the uprising and its 
socio-political aftermath.181 Moreover, diplomats claimed that in early 2011 the foreign 
ministry sent circulars to Yemeni ambassadors asking them to report on dissenting 
embassy employees182 and to pledge their loyalty to Saleh’s government in writing.183 
“All of us ignored it,” claimed one Yemeni diplomat in looking back on 2011 events. 
“We didn't send anything, and we didn't really talk about it”.184  
While professional norms of loyalty and diplomatic ideal types of obedient civil 
servants were questioned and re-negotiated in the context of the uprising, they helped 
support strands of continuity throughout 2011, notably in personnel. For example, the 
ongoing work of Yemen’s long-term foreign minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, who remained 
in office until 2014, helped ensure “a semblance of continuity in policy and relations, 
which revolved especially around the issues of fighting terrorism and mobilising 
international donors” (Bonneyfoy, 2018, p.48). At lower levels, no notable changes in 
staff were reported in 2011, in spite of considerable internal division and the noticeable 
contestation of diplomats’ loyalty.    
III.2. From voice to exit: navigating socio-political uncertainty 
At a time of crisis Yemeni diplomats tried “to draw the right trajectories through the 
stormy waters of [socio-political] turmoil” (Vigh, 2006, p10). Evaluating shifts in their 
broader context and their own possibilities for movements within it, they formulated a 
wide range of protest activities, including individual cases of disobedience, sit-ins, the 
establishment of a diplomatic labour union, and ambassadorial resignations. While all 
people navigate, “the intensity of our navigational efforts depends on the speed and 
volatility of social change” (Vigh, 2006, p.13). In 2011, Yemen’s socio-political 
landscape changed rapidly, rendering diplomats’ “social navigation” within and beyond 
the workplace particularly visible.185 In an exceptional moment of protest and regime 
 
181 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 July 2017. 
182 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
183 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
184 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
185 Inspired by practice theory, the concept of navigation is often used in examining practices in 
unstable and changing contexts (Johnson-Hanks, 2002; Mertz, 2002). 
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change, marked by people’s increasing freedom of expression, established 
behavioural guidelines were questioned and deviated from. Many diplomats began 
voicing their opinions more unreservedly and engaged in outright political action, 
thereby challenging their portrayal as “obedient civil servants”. Hirschman’s (1970) 
concepts of voice and exit skilfully frame their diverse behavioural strategies, which 
foreground the role of emotions and diplomats’ political and moral agency.186  
III.2.1. Syndicates and sit-ins: diplomats’ expression of voice  
In 2011 the Yemeni diplomatic service was marked by division.187 “There was a big 
split in the foreign ministry,” a high-ranking official remembered, explaining that some 
employees were “with the revolution”, while others were “with Saleh”.188 While these 
examples suggest that internal differences were framed in political terms, conflicts and 
justifications were in fact more complex. In describing the politically-laden context of 
2011, one diplomat complained that professional arguments at the time were all too 
readily squeezed into a with-or-against Saleh binary. When he and a fellow Yemeni 
diplomat criticized the resignation of Yemeni ambassadors as “unprofessional”, he 
said, others “thought we loved the president. But we defended the Constitution, rules, 
there should be procedures! But they misunderstood and that’s why they attacked 
us”.189 In moving beyond simplified political binaries, the following analysis suggests 
that emotions, moral arguments, and professional norms all shape diplomatic 
behaviour. These interacting factors are studied by reference to broader material 
configurations, specifically diplomats’ self-interested pursuit of securing advantages in 
the workplace.190  
 
 
186 By emphasizing diplomats’ emotions and agency this study contributes to a novel body of literature 
that shifts focus of analysis toward an individual level, exploring emotional and psychological 
processes taking place ‘inside’ the diplomat. Examples include Costas (2006), Costas and DerDerian 
(2010), Rathbun (2014), Liebmann (2008), Holmes (2013), Cornut (2018), and Jones and Clark 
(2019). 
187 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
188 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 July 2017. 
189 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
190 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 September 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 
2017. 
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III.2.1.1. Individual internal voice: expressing disobedience and criticism 
Diplomats’ expression of voice embraced a number of practices. For one, diplomats 
engaged in individual acts of disobedience, challenging the authority of their superiors. 
One respondent, who served as ambassador abroad during the uprising, 
remembered, laughing, that he ignored ministerial instructions in 2011:  
“I remember they [the minister’s office] asked us to tell the media that what is 
happening [is] a revolution against the legitimacy and the Constitution and the 
president, which we never did. I couldn't do it”.191 
The same ambassador described other instructions that came from the foreign 
ministry in 2011 as “insane” and “irrational”. “The foreign ministry started sending 
circulars saying that we have to start promoting Yemen as an attraction, a tourist 
attraction, and I said, ‘this will look silly. Come on, I can't do that’”.192 This example 
suggests that Yemeni diplomats critically evaluated and selectively implemented 
orders, which rendered their practices highly reflective.   
Besides disobeying orders, diplomats were reported to have engaged in individual 
acts of confrontation and overt verbal criticism of their superiors. Rather than linking 
such antagonism to the 2011 context, diplomats suggested that individual forms of 
internally expressed criticism constituted a well-established practice. It appears that 
diplomats have long provided their opinion, assessment, and recommendations to 
superiors in embassies and the ministry. “Sometimes, if you want to say your opinion, 
you can write it in a letter to the foreign minister,” remarked one ambassador.193 He 
went on emphasizing the importance of keeping differing opinions within the 
institutional confines of the foreign service.  
III.2.1.2. Collective internal voice: joint criticism and the formation of a syndicate 
In 2011, diplomats’ criticism increased in fervour and was frequently expressed 
collectively. It centred around internal ministerial practices which were deemed to be 
unfair, specifically salaries, appointment and promotion procedures, nepotism, and 
 
191 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
192 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
193 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 1 December 2016. 
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corruption. One interviewee vividly remembered a meeting in 2011 during which the 
minister of foreign affairs and the deputy minister of financial and administrative affairs 
were accused of corruption and were “verbally attacked by colleagues”. He recalled:  
“At that meeting I was looking at his [the foreign minister’s] face and at the face 
of the deputy minister of finance…--they felt so humiliated. They felt weak in 
front of the employees. Because we blew their cover of corruption […]. And I 
felt sorry that they felt this way. Really. I felt sorry”.194  
Cases of collective criticism also occurred in Yemeni embassies abroad. In one 
instance, a Yemeni ambassador recommended his embassy staff to refrain from 
voicing any public opposition, instead hosting internal get-togethers to exchange 
political criticism. In explaining his behaviour, he described a fatherly sense of 
responsibility toward “his” staff. “I felt like I should protect them, I had that obligation”.  
“I said ‘look, you don't have to do anything public, keep your views to yourself, 
we can exchange them between us, but don't make them public because you 
will be punished […].’ They liked the idea; we used to go and sit together and 
criticize Saleh together”.195 
Taking their criticism one step further, diplomats in Sanaa decided to launch a more 
organized effort at reform by establishing the “Syndicate for Foreign Ministry 
Employees” (niqaba mu’athafi wizara al-kharigiyya). One respondent compared the 
syndicate’s formation to an “institutional revolution”, saying:  
“We were picking our battles inside the ministry. At that time, there was an 
institutional revolution inside Yemen - in all the ministries [people] tried to 
change [things] from inside”.196  
The syndicate’s formation was considered “a result of the Arab Spring”,197 which acted 
as a catalyst, uncovering cases of long repressed resentment within the foreign 
ministry. In reflecting on the syndicate’s formation, one diplomat singled out the role 
of “anger” and the professional grievances mentioned above, suggesting that many of 
 
194 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
195 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
196 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. 
197 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 15 February 2017. 
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his colleagues “were angry because they didn't get their promotions within a certain 
period. You know, sometimes, some people waited two or three years longer [than 
others] to get their promotion”. His colleague agreed that “because of the Arab Spring, 
people started to talk”, exchanging complaints and aspirations. “They wanted to get 
appointed abroad and they wanted to get their promotions”.198  
These anecdotes point to the role of emotions, suggesting they acted as “key 
determinants” of diplomats’ behaviour. In fact, Roy (2016), who has researched the 
role of emotions in international relations, claims that “we most often behave the way 
we do because we feel a specific emotion (such as fear or anger) or in order to reach 
certain emotional states” (p.84). Arguably, the establishment of a syndicate was driven 
by heightened emotions and presumably inspired by the political activism in 2011.  
In addition, social media played a facilitating role in the establishment of the Yemeni 
diplomatic syndicate. One of the diplomats involved in its set-up remembered, with a 
sense of pride, that the idea of a syndicate was initially born on Facebook:   
“One of my colleagues wrote about the idea on his Facebook page and then 
we grabbed the idea. […] There was no such thing as a syndicate to fight for 
diplomats. A syndicate, ‘niqaba’ in Arabic, is almost [always] for workers, there 
is no such thing for diplomats. But it didn't matter to us, we liked the idea. So, 
we were fighting for it. We established it”.199  
A preparatory committee was established with the task of drafting a union constitution 
and board members were elected. Over time, diplomats decided to further specialize 
their union representation by distinguishing between foreign ministry employees, who 
were said to work on “technical” administrative and financial affairs, and diplomats who 
engaged more directly in international relations abroad. In 2014, a second ministerial 
union, “the syndicate for Yemeni diplomats” (niqaba al-diplomaseen al-yemeneen), 
was established to deal with specific questions regarding diplomats’ postings and 
living conditions abroad, including matters such as health insurance.  
As the establishment of the Yemeni syndicate demonstrates, the enactment of 
“collective internal voice” may have real “structural effects” (Mitchell, 1991, p.94). In 
 
198 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
199 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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Yemen, changes in diplomatic practice manifested in new institutional configurations, 
indicating that diplomatic institutions are more fluid and adaptive than often assumed 
(Styhre, 2007). As Casey (2002) aptly put it, “organizations, despite their formal 
adherence to bureaucratic rationalities and legitimation are really unstable, weakly 
coherent, fragile ensembles of compromises between constant sources of pressures, 
constraints and contestation” (pp.76-77). In a moment of political crisis and 
uncertainty, the internal re-negotiation of power relations may lead to altered 
institutional practices and structures.    
III.2.1.3. Public voice: publicized letters and organized strikes 
Besides expressing their “voice” internally, diplomats also began engaging in a broad 
range of “public voice”, including protests, sit-ins, and the publication of a letter of 
complaint. Motivated by political ideals, opportunism, and emotions, a number of 
foreign ministry employees joined demonstrations on the streets of Sanaa. “I joined 
protests in the first four weeks with my friends. I was a diplomat at the time”, 
remembered a young Yemeni respondent, specifying “I did not agree with people who 
called for a violent and sudden transition. I wanted a smooth, peaceful transition”.200 
While diplomats who participated in demonstrations did so outside their official work 
hours, they also engaged in protest activities whilst at work, blending their expression 
of voice with their professional roles.  
On 2 October 2012, diplomats organized a strike in Sanaa, which according to one 
interviewee, “was mostly about the dysfunctionality of the diplomatic service”. 201 
According to newspaper reports, a range of offices and departments of the Foreign 
Ministry were closed in protest against “nepotism and unfair appointments” (Marib 
Press, 2012, n.p.).202  
Seemingly inspired by these events, diplomats in embassies outside of Yemen 
mimicked the idea of public protest. In 2012, Yemeni diplomats in Riyadh and Jeddah, 
for instance, opposed their salary cuts at the time by threatening to organize a strike 
(al-Itaja, 2012; al-Sufiyani, 2012). 
 
200 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
201 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017. 




Figure 16: Ambassadors’ Letter to President Saleh203  
 
In addition to strikes, nine Yemeni ambassadors (in Canada, Germany, Algeria, 
France, Austria, Russia, Switzerland) drafted a public letter to the incumbent president 
Ali Abdullah Saleh on 19 March 2011, criticizing him and government officials for the 
killing of protestors which had taken place the day before, on the “Friday of Dignity” 
(Sahafahnet, 2011; al-Masdar Online, 2011). While apologizing for their political 
interference, the letters’ signatories empathetically condemned the events of March 
18.  
 
203 Source: Private. 
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Deploying highly moralistic language, signing ambassadors described the death of 
protestors as a "horrific crime”, which they declared “has weighed our conscience and 
led us to direct this letter to your Excellency to demand an impartial investigation.” 
Specifically, the letter reads, “We, the ambassadors of the Republic of Yemen 
[…] have great difficulty understanding what happened yesterday” and that the 
government’s “official explanation of what happened will not stand and will not be 
accepted by the world unless the people responsible […] receive the punishment they 
deserve […]. Failure to hold them accountable will make it hard for us to defend the 
official response [internationally]”.  
By emphasizing their obligation to “defend” Yemeni events abroad, signing 
ambassadors’ pointed to their liminal position, connecting “the world” and “home”. 
Their statement was arguably informed by their “interaction with events taking place 
in the homeland [‘ard al-watan]” as well as their professional “responsibility to 
represent the homeland and defend its interests”. Prior to sending the letter, signing 
ambassadors allegedly tried to garner support and gain more signatories, which 
triggered considerable debate within the Yemeni diplomatic corps.  
Resembling the normative bureaucratic ideals described by du Gay, ambassadors 
presented themselves as moral agents and as “representatives[s] of the people”. The 
letter, which was covered by the Yemeni media,204  seemed to lack political impact 
and remained without major internal consequences. While some high-ranking 
diplomats considered the letter to be “unprofessional”, others did not think it went far 
enough. As one Yemeni ambassador critically commented, “if you send this message 
[…] you have to resign. Because you cannot criticize the head of state publicly and 
remain ambassador. You have to make a decision: either you stay and shut up, or you 
protest and leave”.205 While none of the above-mentioned signatories resigned, other 




204 While the letter in question was allegedly intended for, and sent to, the president in confidence, 
one of the signatories was said to have leaked it.  
205 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
 135 
IV.2.2. Exit: ambassadorial resignations and claims of moral selfhood 
Following the killing of protestors on the “Friday of Dignity”, several ambassadors 
resigned - allegedly in opposition to Ali Abdullah Saleh. Yet, it appears that only four 
resignations were really pushed forward. The first one to leave was Abdullah Saidi, 
Yemen’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. At least three 
other Yemeni ambassadors promptly followed suit. One of them declared that he felt 
relieved after having submitted his resignation: “Because I did not sleep for the last 
two days, because of the shock over what I saw live on TV. People being killed in cold 
blood". He added,  
"I come from a family that has been fighting for the freedom of Yemeni people. 
I respect my ethics and professionalism. I have worked hard to secure 
international support for the development of my poor people. I cannot tolerate 
working for a government that I am in utmost disagreement with. And I cannot 
tolerate any questions from the media as to what happened. What should I say? 
That these people were killed because of what?"206  
Another resigning ambassador claimed to regret his decision, explaining it was 
unprofessional and contributed to the division of his country: 
“Honestly, now I regret. Not for me, but for the state, the country. We made the 
wrong decision […]. You are ambassador. You are not prime minister, you are 
not minister, you are not vice president, you are ambassador. We have to be 
practical [...]. We couldn't distinguish between power and the state, between Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, whether we like or dislike him, and the state”.207  
The first quotation portrays the ambassador as a person of moral integrity, who 
critically evaluates tasks and orders and refusing to represent a government deemed 
to be unethical or otherwise misled. The second argument emphasizes the 
ambassador’s role as “neutral implementer”, who ought to represent the state 
irrespective of who is heading its government.  
 
206 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
207 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 September 2017. 
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In spite of official statements, it is not clear whether ambassadorial resignations were 
the sincere result of great political conviction and a strong moral compass. 
Commenting on the resignation of their colleagues, several Yemeni diplomats 
discussed the possibility of opportunism. Rumours circulated within the diplomatic 
service indicating that those who resigned were promised rewards by powerful 
opposition figures. Rather than reading exit as a singular act, this chapter looked at 
the plural interpretations that informed resignations and point to the importance of 
intentionality and emotions. Expressions of regret further indicate the temporal, 
contextual, and fluid nature of diplomats’ behavioural strategies. 
IV Conclusion: change and continuity in a “revolutionary moment” 
This chapter illustrated the varying behavioural strategies deployed by diplomats in 
the context of the 2011 uprising. While Hirschman’s much-cited framework of exit, 
voice, and loyalty served as a useful conceptual framework, it was adjusted to more 
adequately conceptualize the meaning of diplomatic behaviour. Taking into account 
the specificities of the diplomatic profession, the concept of loyalty was re-theorized 
as a professional norm closely associated with political neutrality and emotional 
detachment. Likewise, the notion of voice was more explicitly divided into internal and 
public, as well as individual and collective forms, although these conceptual 
boundaries are admittedly blurry. 
Loyalty emerged as a central concept within diplomats’ professional world in 2011. As 
shown above, it informed and co-existed with the emergence of voice and exit. In fact, 
in some cases, loyalty was modified so as to legitimize acts of protest. This involved 
changes in representative claims, with diplomats suggesting representing the Yemeni 
people or state, rather than the regime or president. In other instances, the norm of 
loyalty caused considerable self-doubt, if not regret, among diplomats who had 
engaged in practices of voice or exit. Finally, throughout the 2011 uprising, 
professional norms of loyalty were named as a justification for the silent continuance 
of routine practices.  
As the above analysis has shown, the co-existence of change and continuity that had 
marked Yemen’s “revolutionary moment” from the beginning was reflected in micro-
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level developments within the Yemeni diplomatic service. Professional norms of 
loyalty helped maintain strands of continuity, notably in personnel and diplomatic 
practice. This points to possible limitations of the revolutionary process, which was not 
translated into the immediate replacement of staff or drastic changes in diplomatic 
practice. Yet, diplomats’ engagement in voice and exit did trigger cases of 
transformation within the diplomatic setting. Close analysis of diplomats’ subjective 
experience during 2011 suggests that practices of both voice and exit were linked to 
diplomats’ emotions, morality, and self-interest. For example, anger and professional 
material grievances motivated acts of protest and the establishment of a diplomatic 
syndicate. As this suggests, the study of diplomatic agency is crucial to the 
understanding of diplomatic practice in critical moments. 
Practices of voice, especially the establishment of a diplomatic syndicate, accentuated 
frontlines that have long run through the foreign ministry and were structured around 
material benefits linked to differences in age, personal relations, and diplomatic rank. 
Those in higher up positions were often older and/or well-connected to powerful 
political figures working inside as well as outside the foreign ministry. “Established 
consuls and ambassadors were against it [the syndicate] and said that it was not good 
for the image of the diplomatic service”, claimed one Yemeni diplomat, adding that 
those in ambassadorial positions received numerous benefits and were therefore 
opposed to change. Younger diplomats, on the other hand, struggled financially and 
were eager to get promoted and posted abroad.208  
Behavioural strategies and concomitant power struggles were informed by material, 
as well as psychological and emotional factors. As Coicaud (2016) put it:  
“The material character of the social dimension of international affairs is not 
material without also incorporating psychological aspects (including emotions 
and passions). Conversely, the psychological character of international 
relations is not psychological without being material as well. Ultimately, they are 
not simply intertwined. They are mutually constitutive” (p.144). 
 
208 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 15 February 2017. 
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Rather than buying into the widespread dichotomy of hearts and minds, or emotions 
and thoughts, this study treats affective and cognitive processes as inherently 
integrated. In doing so, it follows novel strands of research in international relations 
which examine the role of emotions in judgement and decision making (Ariffin, 2016).  
Overall, the findings of this chapter suggest that institutional boundaries are highly 
permeable, allowing broader socio-political changes to impact internal institutional 
developments. They correspond with previous studies suggesting that diplomatic 
practice evolves in response to changed contexts. For instance, Jones and Clark 
(2015) argued that diplomats negotiate, challenge, change, and/or re-affirming the 
worth of routine practices, thereby rendering agreed upon professional habits more 
social sustainable. As the Yemeni case study demonstrates, diplomats, as emotion-
capable actors, who inhabit both professional and non-professional roles, carry 
broader societal shifts in sentiment, aspiration, and opinion into the foreign ministry. 
Portraying foreign policy apparatuses as microcosms of broader political and social 
trends emphasizes bureaucracy’s fluidity and calls into question depictions of the 
diplomatic service as a conservative, even counter-revolutionary force (Sharp, 2009; 
Ross, 2007; Frey & Frey, 2004). In fact, it indicates that resistance and contestation 
are as common within as they are outside state institutions.  
As shown throughout this chapter, diplomats varying behavioural strategies and their 
corresponding rationalization reflect two alternative conceptual framings of the “ideal 
diplomat”: one portraying the diplomat as an obedient civil servant, and the other 
picturing the diplomat as an emotional political agent. Both approaches can be found 
in bureaucratic state theory as well as diplomatic theory. By demonstrating that 
Yemeni diplomats oscillated between these two professional ideal types in the context 
of uncertainty and socio-political turmoil, this research contributes to a more nuanced 
and “humanized” conceptualization of agents and agency in world politics. Its empirical 
findings show that “neither individuals nor groups are rational in the utility-maximizing, 
unemotional way supposed by most theories of world politics” (Crawford, 2000, p.156). 
Instead, it appears they are driven by “the rich assemblage of thoughts, feelings, 
affects, emotions, habits, principles, beliefs, and so on, which together set the stage 
for how we act and decide” (Saurette, 2006, p.503). In a moment of rupture, diplomats 
thought about and discussed alternative practices at work, carefully evaluating 
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professional norms, political aspirations, and moral responsibilities, among other 
things. As this indicates, diplomatic practice during the 2011 uprising has been highly 
reflective. In the context of crisis, diplomats made the conscious choice to practice 
voice, exit, and/or loyalty. Even the continuance of routinized activities must therefore 
be viewed as a deliberate decision. The development of different behavioural 
strategies was accompanied by conflicting narratives of justification, putting forth 
different conceptions of diplomatic loyalty and representation.  
Finally, this chapter’s findings allow for some tentative conclusions regarding the 
reproduction of “the Yemeni state” in a moment of division and uncertainty. The main 
material structures of Yemeni diplomacy were not disrupted or destroyed in 2011, thus 
continuing to display an image of stability. Yemeni embassies abroad maintained their 
regular opening hours, with diplomats following their day-to-day routines under the 
watchful eye of presidential portraits that continued to decorate embassy walls.  
Zooming-in on the micro-level developments unfolding within Yemeni foreign policy 
institutions, however, reveals considerable division, highlighting “the limits of a state-
centred approach that takes for granted the idea of a centralised diplomacy and a 




6 Professionals, Loyalty, and the Politics of War 
 
 
Diplomats’ ability to navigate unchartered waters became crucial at a time of rupture 
and uncertainty. Interpreting the 2011 uprising as a professional challenge, they 
responded with a variety of strategies shaped by various networked relations and 
positionalities. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, their different behavioural 
choices centred around the concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty and were closely tied 
to diverging understandings of “diplomatic professionalism”.  
While strategies of voluntary exit are less relevant in this chapter, the interrelated 
themes of professionalism, voice, and loyalty continue to inform its analysis of 
diplomatic agency and practice in the context of violent conflict. In 2015, Yemen’s 
political transition, epitomised by the National Dialogue Conference, collapsed into 
civil war, with two self-acclaimed governments fighting for territorial control and 
international recognition. Where competing authorities claim to be the government of 
the same state, politics centre on representation, legitimacy, and sovereignty. It is a 
matter of who acts as the representative organ of the state, able to claim being “the 
depository of its sovereignty” (Talmon, 1999, p.500).  
This study interprets government efforts to gain and maintain the international 
recognition of its legitimacy and sovereignty claims as an array of ongoing state 
practices, which notably involve the management and maintenance of Yemen’s 
diplomatic service. Diplomats, after all, play a central role in the “political ordering of 
the state and its projection abroad” (Jones & Clark, 2015, p.3). The Yemeni civil war 
constituted a “critical moment” in which diplomats “who are doing things together […] 
and who have to co-ordinate their actions, realize that something is going wrong; that 
they cannot get along anymore; that something has to change” (Boltanski and 
Thev́enot, 1999, p.359). In analysing the controversy and power struggles that marked 
the Yemeni diplomatic service in 2016-17, this chapter considers processes of 
(dis)ordering, which occur “between justification and critique” (Gadinger, 2016, p. 
188). Recent research has suggested that routine diplomatic practices are being 
“disordered” in moments of contested state legitimacy (Jones & Clark, 2015). By 
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focusing on the experience and practices of Yemeni diplomats, this chapter explores 
the micro-level dynamics of Yemen’s (dis)ordered state representation during civil war. 
It shows that diplomatic efforts to sustain coherent geopolitical representations of the 
state are severely challenged in the context of civil war.  
To provide historical context, this chapter first outlines the events that led to the 
outbreak of war in 2015. Next, it zooms in on diplomatic practices related to voice and 
loyalty, specifically diplomats’ contested freedom of expression and appointments. 
Focusing on the important role of social media, it argues that the exiled Yemeni 
government managed the existent array of diplomatic voices more rigidly during the 
civil war than it did in 2011. The war posed a unique challenge to governmental 
authority, rendering the diplomatic presentation of a joint and favourable narrative 
more important. This has likely to do with shifts in governmental sovereignty claims. 
In Yemen, the government’s claim to external, as opposed to internal sovereignty, 
became more important with the outbreak of civil war, when domestic political authority 
was severely and violently contested within state borders. 
The second part of this analysis focuses on changing appointment practices within the 
Yemeni diplomatic service. In a moment of war, diplomatic appointments emerged as 
a neo-patrimonial survival strategy and as an “ordering device” used by the exiled Hadi 
government. Lacking access to ministry institutions in Sanaa, government officials 
assigned diplomatic posts to untrained and inexperienced “loyalists”. This pushed the 
reward-function of embassy positions to new heights, triggering a “crisis of 
professionalism” among career-diplomats and altering the institutional meaning of the 
Yemeni foreign service. Discontent over appointments began to increasingly overlap 
with broader political and regional fault lines, including the historical north-south divide 
described in chapters three and four. The analysis of changing institutional forms and 
functions points to the fluidity of diplomatic structures and their responsiveness to 
broader socio-political events.  
By examining the internal conflict surrounding diplomats’ speech acts and 
appointments, this chapter sheds further light on the concept of diplomatic loyalty. As 
Keller (2007) highlights, loyalty can be a principle, an ideal, as well as emotions, 
desires, actions, or beliefs. “Behind all these ways of thinking about loyalty,” he writes, 
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“is the idea of a certain kind of relationship between individuals and the things to which 
they are loyal” (p.1). In the case of diplomats, the primary object of loyalty is commonly 
perceived to be “the state”, although various other loyalties might be interfering. As 
this chapter argues, diplomatic loyalty is best viewed as a normative concept (re-
)produced through ritual practice. As such, it may, but does not have to overlap with 
loyalty as defined by Hirschman: the heartfelt personal affiliation to an organization or 
entity (e.g. the government or the state). By studying the emotions, inner conflicts, and 
motivations woven into the concept of loyalty, the following analysis adds ethnographic 
depth to Hirschman’s framework. Moreover, its theorization of loyalty helps 
understand diplomats’ subjectivity and action. Notably, diplomatic loyalty emerged as 
an important source of continuity in a situation of considerable internal division and 
conflict. By outlining what was legitimate to do and say, it helped to streamline and 
unify diplomatic practices so as to maintain the illusion of a singular “state voice” in 
international affairs. 
This chapter’s conclusion examines broader theoretical implications regarding the 
(re)production of the state. It elaborates in more detail how micro-level developments 
inside the diplomatic service reflect back on macro-level perceptions and 
understandings of Yemeni statehood. It suggests that practices structured around 
diplomatic loyalty, no matter their effectiveness, were essential to governmental claims 
of legitimacy and sovereignty – two concepts that emerged as crucial factors to regime 
survival in the Yemeni civil war.  
I From uprising to civil war: conflict and disintegration in Yemen 
On Sunday, 21 September 2014, members and supporters of the Houthi movement 
marched into Sanaa, taking over central state institutions such as the State Radio 
channel, the cabinet headquarters, the parliament, the Ministry of Defence, and the 
Central Bank of Yemen. 209  A Houthi “supervisor” (mushrif) was subsequently 
 
209 A day prior, the Houthis had gained control of the state TV headquarters, a compound which 
includes the TV channels Al-Yemen, Saba News Agency, and Al-Iman (Schmitz & Burrowes, 2018, 
p.Ixxviii). 
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appointed to each central ministry, including the ministry of foreign affairs. 210 
According to Yemeni diplomats, the supervisor of foreign affairs was initially assigned 
responsibility for the ministry’s financial dealings – although he later monitored political 
and diplomatic issues as well.  
On the evening that followed the Houthis’ takeover, representatives of the rebel 
movement signed the National Peace and Partnership Agreement with President 
Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, UN Special Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar, and 
members of various political groups, parties, and movements. Among other things, the 
agreement stipulated the formation of a new government within a one-month period 
(Peace and National Partnership Agreement, 2014). Accordingly, in October 2014, a 
new cabinet was announced in agreement with, and including members of the Houthi 
movement. Already prior to this political reshuffle, the long-term foreign minister al-
Qirbi had been replaced with the former ambassador to Iran, Jamal Abdullah al-Sallal. 
A few months later, Abdullah Saidi was appointed head of the foreign ministry.211 As 
mentioned in chapter five, Abdullah Saidi had previously resigned as ambassador to 
the UN in New York in 2011.212 
The political collaboration between Yemen’s transition government and the Houthi 
movement was fleeting. On 17 January 2015, the Houthis kidnapped the director of 
the president’s office Ahmad Awad Bin Mubarak in protest against the federal reform 
plans being devised at the time (Lackner, 2017). According to Lackner (2017),  
“They then demanded that Hadi accept Huthi nominees as vice president, 
deputy ministers in most ministries and more than 160 top officials in senior 
positions in security and other key institutions. At this point the president and 
the prime minister had two options: resign or openly operate as Huthi puppets. 
 
210 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 May 
2018. According to Lackner (2017), Houthi “supervisors” were installed in ministries and media 
institutions. Their “advice” was to be accepted by ministers and others (p.50). Likewise, Hill (2017) 
observed that “following the peace and national partnership agreement, a new government was put 
into place. Ever since, Houthi supervisors monitored each ministry. However, ministers soon found 
that Houthi ‘supervisors’, deployed to monitor activities in every ministry, treated them with suspicion. 
‘You couldn’t even walk into the building, let alone get the supervisor to rubber-stamp your official 
documents, if the Houthis didn’t trust you,’ one cabinet minister said” (p.266). 
211 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 May 2018. 
212 Having studied political science in the US, first at Long Island and then at Columbia University, he 
had joined the foreign ministry at a young age and was generally considered a career diplomat. 
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They chose the first” (p.51).  
On 22 January 2015, President Hadi and Prime Minister Bahah resigned and were 
placed under house arrest, alongside a number of other cabinet members, including 
the minister of foreign affairs al-Saidi. Notwithstanding his removal, ministry 
employees continued going to work and reported back to Saidi. “I went to his house 
and told him what happened, but not that often. Because they [the Houthis] didn't allow 
people to go. But sometimes we arranged visits for all those from the ministry who 
were interested in visiting him, as a sign of support”, recalled one interviewee.213 
Following the government’s resignation and Abdullah Saidi’s house arrest, diplomats 
in Yemeni embassies abroad reportedly lost contact with the foreign ministry. As one 
chargé d’affaires at the time remarked, “we lost contact! Imagine! With the ministry! 
For almost one year! Only financial issues were sent to us. Any instructions about what 
to do, […] no policy guidelines…--nothing!”.214  
In an ongoing effort to establish themselves as rightful political leaders, the Houthis 
issued a “constitutional declaration” on 6 February 2015, and established the Supreme 
Revolutionary Committee, which was supposed to run the country for two years. They 
also created a presidential council of five members and dissolved the parliament, 
which they planned to replace with a 551-members “Transitional National Council”.215  
While members of the Houthi movement were busy consolidating their political power, 
President Hadi managed to escape to Aden on February 21. Upon arrival, he decreed 
the city as Yemen’s temporary capital and aimed at establishing his government there 
(Lackner, 2017). Escalating Houthi attacks southwards jeopardized these plans. Most 
Yemeni and international commentators had begun speaking of a “Houthi-Saleh” 
alliance by that time, emphasizing the strategic cooperation between both parties. Air 
strikes on Hadi’s palace in March pushed him to move to Riyadh (Lackner, 2017). Prior 
to his arrival in Saudi Arabia, Hadi took steps to ensure international support, attending 
 
213 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
214 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 September 2017. When President Hadi appointed his cabinet 
in exile, al-Saidi was still under house arrest in Yemen. Hence, Hadi declared Riyadh Yassin to be 
foreign minister. While al-Saidi managed to flee Yemen soon afterwards, he did not gain back his 
previous position, allegedly because of internal power struggles and animosities (Interview with 
Yemeni diplomat, 3 July 2019). 
215 Lackner (2017) found that none of these reforms had materialized into functional political bodies. 
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an Arab League meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh on 24 March 2015 to appeal for GCC 
military support (Lackner, 2017, p.52). Hadi also asked the UN Security Council for 
backing by “all means and measures to protect Yemen and deter Houthi aggression” 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015, n.p.).  
In April 2015, Hadi began appointing a cabinet, which underwent extensive reshuffling 
over the following years. Presenting itself as the “legitimate” Yemeni government in 
exile, it was operating from within the residence of the Yemeni ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia, which had been empty since 2011.216 Within the first year of its establishment, 
the exiled foreign ministry witnessed a quick succession of ministers: Abdullah Saidi 
was replaced by Reyad Yassin Abdulla, who was replaced a few months later by 
Abdulmalik al-Mekhlafi. According to diplomatic accounts, al-Mekhlafi began re-
establishing contact with the Yemeni embassies, instructing diplomats abroad to 
answer solely to Riyadh. Allegedly he told ambassadors abroad that “no political order 
will come from Sana’a” and that they were to adopt the views of the exiled foreign 
ministry. 217  One diplomat claimed that under al-Mekhlafi “everything was re-
established” and that “the system itself had to be re-created”.218 In moving forward, 
embassies were asked to send their letters and reports to the exiled foreign ministry.  
The ministries of the Hadi government were all located inside the ambassadorial 
residence, where according to one diplomat, “each ministry has a room”.219  The 
foreign ministry was located in one of the most elegant and largest saloons inside the 
ambassadorial residence, while the minister’s staff (around four diplomats) was 
working in a second smaller room. While a foreign ministry “office” (maktab) was also 
established in Aden (see fig. 1), it was rarely mentioned by diplomats and seemed to 
be fairly inactive.  
 
 
216 Following the previous ambassador’s end of term in 2011, no replacement was hired until October 
2016. 
217 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
218 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 15 February 2017. 
219 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
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Figure 17: The Foreign Ministry Office in Aden 
The foreign ministry “office” (maktab) in Aden mostly dealt with administrative issues.220 
 
The confined space available to exiled government employees in Riyadh shaped 
social and professional dynamics. As one diplomat described it, “when you are in the 
middle of government, at a very intense time, and you have all ministries in one 
building… - it was intense. You know all the ministers”.221 Internal power struggles and 
personal feuds among government members were reflected in numerous changes of 
cabinet.  
Notwithstanding its improvised character and changing social composition, Hadi’s 
exiled government found international support in the form of UN Resolution 2216, 
issued on 14 April 2015. It called for the Houthis’ withdrawal from Yemeni cities, the 
reinstatement of the government of President Hadi, and renewed efforts to implement 
the outcomes of the National Dialogue conference.222 The resolution has constituted 
an important point of reference for members of the Hadi government and Yemeni 
diplomats abroad. 
 
220 [Untitled illustration of the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Aden]. Retrieved 17 August 2019 
from https://yemen-press.com/newsgfx/yp30-06-2016-937182.jpg 
221 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 February 2017. 
222 For more information on the National Dialogue Conference read chapter four. 
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Multilateral diplomatic efforts to resolve Yemen’s political stalemate were severely 
challenged by the outbreak of war. According to Lackner (2017), “the transition 
process which started in late 2011 effectively ended in early 2015 when the Huthi 
movement formally took power in Sanaa and the country was overcome by a civil war” 
(p.52). On 26 March, Saudi Arabia formed an alliance with nine other countries and 
launched a military intervention called “Decisive Storm”.223 The coalition’s official goal 
was to support the “legitimate” exiled government of Yemen in its fight against the 
Houthi movement. With the intervention, the military conflict in Yemen spiralled into a 
prolonged and brutal war, involving foreign ground troops, alliance air strikes, and a 
cruel and ongoing naval blockade. In 2017, the United Nations described the situation 
in Yemen as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises since World War II (BBC, 
2017). 
Being “cut off” from the outside world, the foreign ministry in Yemen’s capital lost most 
of its functions. While Houthis appointed their own foreign minister, Hisham Sharaf, 
the management of Yemeni diplomacy shifted from Sanaa to Riyadh. In 2017, it 
appeared that the only two active departments inside the foreign ministry in Sanaa 
were the protocol and the consular department. “Because other departments are 
political departments, usually dealing with the outside, now there is no dealing with the 
outside,” diplomats explained.224  In fact, one diplomat who worked in the Houthi 
ministry in 2015 re-called that colleagues informed the Houthis “frankly” that “since 
they are not recognized internationally”225 their work in diplomacy, and thus the foreign 
ministry, was limited. According to Yemeni diplomats abroad, many of their colleagues 
in Sanaa therefore stayed at home, waiting and hoping to be assigned an embassy 
post. As will be discussed below, the ministry in Sanaa has remained a pool of 
professionals used in appointment decisions made by Yemeni officials in Riyadh. 
Given the researcher’s lacking access to ministry employees in Sanaa, the following 
analysis focuses mostly on narratives and practices by Yemeni diplomats abroad. This 
analytical focus should be kept in mind when assessing the diplomatic experience 
 
223 Alliance members initially included the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Senegal, and Sudan (Qatar dropped out later). While not formally part of the coalition, the UK, the US, 
and France have continuously provided weapons, intelligence, and training to alliance members 
(Lackner, 2017). 
224 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
225 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
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discussed below.  
II Contentious diplomatic practice in the context of civil war 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Yemeni diplomats chose and oscillated 
between exit, voice, and loyalty during the 2011 uprising and regime change. This 
chapter, while still studying the Yemeni diplomatic service in a moment of crisis, shifts 
attention to the outbreak of civil war. With the emergence of two self-acclaimed 
Yemeni governments, the contestation of state authority and legitimacy reached 
unforeseen heights. This, in turn, posed new challenges to the Yemeni diplomatic 
service.  
“While situations of stability require continuous routine operations of ordering 
practice,” Bueger (2014) observed that “in situations of crisis and controversy much 
more work is required to establish order” (p.396). The following analysis suggests that 
in Yemen the (dis)ordering of diplomatic practices revolved around the concept of 
loyalty. Specifically, it examines conflicts about internal appointment practices and 
diplomats’ free speech. In peaceful times, the coherent representation of the state 
might be described as the unconscious by product of routinized diplomatic practices; 
a “diplomatic orchestra” that plays without a conductor (Pouliot, 2010). Yet, in the 
context of Yemen’s civil war, government officials began to increasingly monitor and 
manage diplomatic voices to thereby “order” diplomatic practice and maintain the 
illusion of state presence. In other words, to continue playing as a single orchestra, 
deviant voices had to be silenced and alignment be ensured, notably through the 
monitoring of speech acts and the appointment of loyalists. 
II.1. The (dis)ordering of diplomatic voice 
Looking back at the uprising and the outbreak of war, one Yemeni diplomat declared 
he and his colleagues had learned from 2011 events: “we knew that you can’t take a 
position when you have to represent a country and a government”.226 Yet, several 
alternative narratives suggest that diplomats continued criticizing leading government 
figures. This posed an additional threat to the Hadi government’s claim to legitimacy 
 
226 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
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and power. “Where [diplomatic] practice becomes liable to contestation and conflict, 
[…] erosion is likely of contemporary expressions of state legitimacy” (Jones & Clark, 
2015, p.10). From this perspective, the (re)ordering of dissident diplomatic voices 
emerges as a crucial condition for the creation of a single state narrative, the illusion 
of coherent state presence, and the government’s international recognition as the 
primary custodian of state sovereignty. 
With the outbreak of war, the boundaries of diplomats’ “acceptable voice”, both online 
and offline, were anything but clear. According to Yemeni diplomatic law,  
“the head of the mission and members of the corps may not write and publish 
books or write press articles related to the nature of their work in local and 
foreign newspapers and magazines without the prior approval of the Minister” 
(Law No. 2 of 1991 Concerning the Diplomatic and Consular Service, 1991, 
Article 44).  
The vague reference to content “related to the nature of their work” and failure to 
mention online publication platforms left considerable room for diplomatic discretion. 
In a moment of severe political division, diplomats expressed a variety of critical 
political opinions, producing a “cacophony of state” that undermined one of the primary 
functions of the diplomatic service: the projection of coherent state presence and 
permanence.  
Several diplomats indicated that the Hadi government responded by closely 
monitoring their linguistic practices following the outbreak of war. Diplomats’ use of 
online media facilitated governmental scrutiny, which was otherwise complicated by 
geographical distance. As one diplomat explained, in a regretful tone, “unfortunately, 
yes […], if they [members of the Hadi government] see something they do not agree 
with on the Facebook page of any diplomat, they will take it as legal evidence [against 
him/her]”.227 This practice follows broader trends in national justice systems to use 
social media information as evidence in criminal and even legal proceedings (Burkell 
at al, 2014). 
 
227 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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With the progression of war and hardened political fault lines, two rigorously enforced 
boundaries emerged to delimit diplomats’ dissent. They included (1) the questioning 
of Hadi’s legitimacy and/or acknowledgement of the Houthi authority; and (2) the 
criticism of important members of the war-alliance, notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
These discursive instructions were tied to stark normative constraints on diplomats’ 
freedom of expression: one respondent bluntly declared that questioning or opposing 
Hadi’s legitimacy “doesn't make you a diplomat anymore”.228 Contrasting opposition 
to Hadi with diplomatic professionalism, he went on to say, “If you do not recognize 
the president, and the government, and the state, and you say ‘al-Houthi is my 
president, or al-Sammad - a Houthi leader - is my president’, this is […] a problem”.  
Contrary to 2011, when the expression of diplomatic voice was of little consequence, 
perceived transgressions were punished in 2016-17. Several respondents pointed to 
a Yemeni diplomat in Rome, for example, who was said to have lost his job over siding 
publicly with the Houthis. Other “dissenting diplomats” were temporarily removed from 
their official duties or denied their appointment abroad. For instance, five diplomats 
were removed from the ministry’s short list of appointees in 2016 due to their alleged 
“Houthi affiliation”. According to one respondent, “some of the diplomats considered 
had very pro-Houthi Facebook posts, but only in five cases was it clear [that they 
opposed Hadi] and they were excluded”.229 When asked for examples, the respondent 
explained, “they wrote some posts on Facebook about Saudi, about President Hadi, 
about recognizing President Hadi as the president of the Republic of Yemen”.230 The 
tightening of government control inside the diplomatic service, and the emergence of 
strict situation-specific guidelines, indicate that ‘‘what is legitimate and what can be 
done are continuously tested in action” (Nicolini, 2009, 1406 cited in Jones & Clark, 
2015, p.3).  
Regardless of the heavy consequences, accusations of being supportive of the 
Houthi-Saleh alliance were made dangerously fast at times. “Now it is very easy… - if 
you say anything, anything [you are considered pro-Houthi]. For example, if you 
criticize killing innocent people in Yemen, that means you are pro-Houthi, so you go 
 
228 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
229 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 15 February 2017. 
230 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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back home. It happened to some diplomats, who are really in favour of the Saudi-
coalition,” claimed one of the interviewees.231 Another interviewee expressed a similar 
opinion, worrying that his opposition to the war might be misunderstood. “I am against 
war everywhere, not just in Yemen,” he explained. In his view, the diplomatic 
profession was inherently pacifist: “even if force is a means in the conduct of foreign 
policy, it is when diplomats failed that violence starts”. As a diplomat, he went on 
saying, “you should be a link, a contact, between your home country and the country 
you are based in. I think war is not a solution. I am not taking sides, but people say 
‘oh, if you say this you are favouring the other side’ [i.e. the Houthis]”.232 In illustrating 
how easily allegations of Saleh-Houthi loyalties were put forth, and undermined 
careers, one diplomat shared the following anecdote: 
“I will tell you a small incident that happened [in 2016]. Our Chargé d'affaires in 
Moscow, he was interviewed on television. And he had a slip of tongue and 
instead of saying the Republic of Yemen, he said the Arab Republic of Yemen. 
The Arab Republic of Yemen was the northern republic of Yemen. And they 
said, ‘he is pro Ali Abdullah Saleh, he did not forget the north of Yemen’. They 
kicked him out of his post […]. And just two days ago, the minister who kicked 
him out, at the meeting of Arab ministers of foreign affairs in Cairo, he had the 
same slip of tongue!” He laughed and added, “I will show you the video and 
you’ll see his face when he realized what he did. It was unfair! It was a slip of 
tongue. That's it”.233 
This example illustrates that affiliation with the north of Yemen was readily equated 
with Houthi sympathies. It also points to the narrow dichotomist framework that 
confined diplomatic speech acts in 2016-17. Tolerating no mistakes and leaving little 
room for “middle grounds”, the government’s management of diplomatic voices was 
based on zero-sum conceptions and processes of stereotyping and de-
individualization (Spillman & Spillmann, 1997). Consideration for anyone in the 
“enemy group” was likely repressed due to perceived threat and feelings of opposition 
(Spillman & Spillmann, 1997). Such dualist scripts have been described as a common 
 
231 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 October 2017. 
232 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
233 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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“constitutive practice” in war, “designed to validate particular styles of intervention” 
(Jeffrey, 2007, p.445). In Yemen, the international recognition of the Hadi government, 
and the “demonization” of the Houthi-Saleh alliance, constituted an important basis for 
Saudi-led military interference in the country. As one Yemeni diplomat put it, “the thing 
is they [Saudi Arabia] need Hadi to make claims of legitimacy. And Hadi knows that”.234  
The discursive dichotomy inside the Yemeni diplomatic service led some observers to 
cynically remark “it was not diplomacy any more it was advocacy”.235 Indeed, many 
Yemeni diplomats offered a rigidly one-sided portrayal of the Yemeni conflict at 
academic and political events, repeatedly criminalizing “the Houthi militia” which was 
accused of being the instigator of war and of having boycotted its peaceful resolution 
ever since. In contrast, the Hadi government was officially presented as “the legitimate 
government” (al-hakuma al-sharaiyya; or “al-sharaiyya” in short, “the legitimate”), 
which relentlessly aimed at reaching peace. Where the use of dichotomist speaking 
points could be observed, it resembled the recitation of a numbered list, including 
points that had little to no relation to the situational dynamics of events. Rather than 
“thinking diplomatically about […] content, and especially about the sorts of arguments 
that people get into about the world” (Sharp, 2009, p. 10 cited in Jones & Clark, 2015, 
p.8), some diplomats seemed to present pre-formulated bullet points and slightly 
broader official scripts. Following Jones and Clark (2015), this chapter considers the 
use of speaking points as a crucial practice of “ordering diplomacies” (p.6). Especially 
in a moment of crisis, they constitute often-used “artefacts for structuring discussions, 
interviews and media meetings in order to get the right ‘message out’” (p.6). 
Accounts of strict dualistic instructions surrounding diplomats’ speech are 
corroborated by research on Yemen’s elite diaspora, which cites a Yemeni scholar, 
activist, and expert in saying, 
“they want to fit you in a category, but they can’t figure out what that category 
is. Independent Yemenis are [perceived to be] a big threat because they don’t 
know who is moving them. My greatest opposition has become my own 
government. They have now put me in the Houthi sympathizer box because I 
 
234 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 February 2017. 
235 Interview with a former Yemeni politician, 4 November 2016. 
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am critical of the Hadi government and the war...” (Sama’a Hamdani cited in 
Aboueldahab, 2019, p.14). 
A London-based Yemeni-British filmmaker agreed, saying, “your decision is to be 
Yemeni, but people assume you are either pro-Houthi or pro-Saudi” (Aboueldahab, 
2019, p.14).   
The partisanship of Yemeni diplomats is further corroborated by claims regarding their 
surveillance of Yemenis abroad. According to Aboueldahab (2019), “Yemeni 
diplomatic missions in foreign countries” followed a rigid “with-or-against-us” mentality 
“in their attempts to thwart the activities of Yemenis outside of Yemen” (p.14). Such 
partisanship was named as an official reason for establishing the Sanaa Center for 
Strategic Studies (SCSS). One of the organisation’s founders presented the SCSS as 
an alternative to official Yemeni diplomacy, saying, 
“I was frustrated with the very little content internationally about Yemen and the 
fact that, when there is content, it is rubbish. So, we [started] the Sana’a Center. 
A Yemeni platform by Yemenis, for Yemenis, and to do research on Yemen. 
We have non-resident scholars in several countries. They are our ambassadors 
to the world. A big part of our research takes place ‘on the ground.’ We take the 
findings and communicate them to the world. Part of our agenda is to influence 
decision-making on Yemen. The Yemeni government or the Saudis spend $2 
million to try and influence decision-making through [public relations 
campaigns]. So, okay, I’ll spend two megabytes on the internet to do the same. 
We are more powerful in D.C. than Yemeni diplomatic missions. Because we 
are independent. Diplomats come to us” (al-Muslimi cited in Aboueldahab, 
2019, p.17). 
Another diaspora member agreed that by providing objective research and information 
about the Yemeni conflict, “the Sana’a Center does what the foreign ministry failed to 
do” (Afrah Nasser cited in Aboueldahab, 2019, p.17).  
Besides trying to suppress (in)direct challenges to the Hadi government’s legitimacy, 
government officials regarded diplomats’ disapproval of the Saudi-led alliance as a 
serious transgression. “You can say I represent Hadi but he did this thing in the wrong 
way... that's okay, that's acceptable”, claimed a Yemeni diplomat, adding, “but if you 
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are not with the allies, which is the main point for the Yemeni government, then you 
are not representing us anymore”.236 A variety of personal stories, circulating in the 
diplomatic service, suggest that diplomats’ criticism of alliance members had serious 
consequences. One diplomat, for instance, claimed his colleague was removed from 
the shortlist of appointees because he had made fun of the spokesperson of the Saudi-
led coalition on Facebook. “It was not even a post, it was a comment,” he complained, 
emphasizing the importance of such distinctions.237 
Likewise, his colleague, who had criticized Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates on Facebook confessed that he was subsequently removed from his high-
ranking position abroad. In sharing his story, he passionately declared, “I would like to 
tell you that it wasn’t personal, but it was personal […]. I am a human being in the end, 
I am not a machine, my family members are being killed [in Yemen], including my own 
brother”.238 Frustrated and upset about the war and its high rate of civilian casualties, 
he voiced his protest online. “It was not easy for me. I tried to shut up. I did many 
times, many months. But I just… I can’t,” he sighed. “You know, these are my family 
members. And this is my country. You can’t just keep silent”.239 Being very active on 
Facebook, his posts became increasingly angry, critical, and offensive. Referring to 
the “Kingdom of evil Arab Zionism” (Saudi Arabia) and the “United Arab Whores” 
(United Arab Emirates), he declared online “no one with an atom of mind or insight 
can accept what is happening between Yemen and its neighbours now. The Houthis 
[al-Houtha] made a big mistake ‘internally,’ but what our neighbours did was a bigger 
sin by any means. War crimes and genocide that the Yemenis will never forget….”.  
His online comments did not go unnoticed. In his own words, “the deputy minister 
informed me through a mutual colleague and friend that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the 
Emirates are not satisfied with me because I am criticizing the daily killing they are 
doing in Yemen […]. I don't give a shit if they like me or not. These are my people, this 
is my country, we are talking about!”.240 Having to choose between loyalty to his family 
and “his people”, on the one hand, and the government and its alliances, on the other, 
 
236 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
237 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 October 2017. 
238 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 28 February 2017. 
239 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 28 February 2017. 
240 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
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the diplomat picked the former. This behaviour poses an obvious challenge to the 
government’s attempted production of a coherent and carefully managed state image 
that would portray its rule as legitimate.   
The involvement of social media complicates the analysis of diplomatic choices 
regarding their speech.241 Being neither prototypically “private” nor obviously “public”, 
Facebook has been described as a social space of “blurred edges” (Gelman, 2009). 
According to Burkell et al (2014), it occupies a liminal territory between “open” and 
“closed”. While posted information is “generally intended for a small network of friends 
and family … [it] is left available to the whole world to access” (Gelman, 2009, p.1315). 
Diplomats might have perceived Facebook as a “private” platform, where the 
expression of critical voice was permissible and compatible with ongoing “diplomatic 
loyalty”.  
Several commentators have noted the tension between social media’s facilitation of 
free speech and the negative effects it has on user privacy (Gelman, 2009). In the 
Yemeni case study, members of Hadi’s foreign ministry treated diplomats’ contentious 
online content as grounds for diplomats’ exclusion. At the same time, diplomats’ online 
behaviour became an important consideration in appointment strategies. As discussed 
in more detail below, diplomats who publicly supported the Saleh-Houthi alliance were 
frequently considered non-eligible candidates for promotions and posts abroad. While 
it was mostly the content of posts that mattered, one diplomat suggested that their 
frequency and wording also played a role. In commenting on the Facebook posts 
described above, he opposed their high number and the language used. “It should be 
respectful,” he maintained.242  
Facebook had already emerged as a unique medium of diplomatic expression in 2011. 
The idea of establishing a ministerial labour union was allegedly born on Facebook 
and Yemeni diplomats began to increasingly rely on a “closed” Facebook group in 
expressing their criticism, specifically regarding the ministry’s internal regulations and 
 
241 Another high-ranking diplomat had criticized Hadi’s opposition to the establishment of an impartial 
UN committee to investigate human rights violations in Yemen on Facebook. “I expressed my views 
openly during the war,” he recalled. “That was not very professional, but I was angry […]” (Interview 
with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017). Notwithstanding his critical comments online, the diplomat 
was later offered a high-ranking post abroad.  
242 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 July 2017. 
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work conditions. Occasionally, their comments took on a personal note, channelling 
long-held frustrations and individual rivalries. One diplomat recalled that in 2011 a 
colleague “wrote something about fighting corruption, and [that] we should just kick 
out those corrupt people...etc. and I made a comment ‘does that include you?’ He 
deleted the post and left the page”.243 Much like documents, social media constitutes 
a “techno-object” that connects diplomats across geographical sites and professional 
ranks, facilitating and carrying diplomatic practice. It thereby resembles the “basic glue 
by which people relate to each other and organize their activities” (Bueger, 2014, 
p.398). Facebook in particular emerged as a core materiality in internal power 
struggles and the (dis)ordering of diplomatic practice. In comparison to 2011, it 
appeared to be monitored more heavily by members of the Hadi government in 2016-
17.  
This chapter’s analysis of diplomats’ online posts adds to a new body of research on 
“digital diplomacy” (Bjola & Holmes, 2015; Hocking & Melissen, 2015; Kampf et al, 
2015), including studies on “Facebook diplomacy” (Spry, 2018).244 For the most part, 
existing literature examines the goal-oriented use of social media in diplomatic 
communication strategies, for instance by analysing foreign ministries’ official 
Facebook pages (Spry, 2018; Spry 2016; Manor, 2016; Kampf et al, 2015). Social 
media is largely viewed as a new tool, which, if used correctly, holds great potential in 
the conduct of diplomacy (Kampf et al, 2015; Manor, 2016). By shifting focus onto 
diplomats’ individual online practice, this chapter adds a new perspective to the field 
of “digital diplomacy”, which points to the challenge, not the promise, of social media 
in diplomatic affairs.  
Yemeni diplomats’ use of their individual Facebook sites constituted a double-edged 
sword in the Hadi government’s attempted construction of a single and ordered 
“national voice”. Existing laws, professional norms, and government instructions often 
failed to prevent the plurality of diplomatic voices online, which were linked to 
emotions, morals, and political opinions. At the same time, social media facilitated the 
 
243 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 October 2017. 
244 “Facebook is the most commonly used social media platform, both generally and for diplomatic 
purposes, in most countries” (Spry, 2018, p.67). 
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government’s monitoring of diplomats’ expressions abroad, thereby helping its 
management and streamlining of diplomatic practice.  
II.1.2. Refraining from criticizing political authority 
While some Yemeni diplomats “spoke up”, it appears that many others preferred to 
keep their opinions to themselves. It is difficult to determine whether their quietism was 
motivated by fear, opportunism, a strong commitment to “diplomatic loyalty”, or any 
combination of these factors.  
One young and mid-ranked respondent saw the possibility of expressing his critical 
opinion restrained by professional standards. “My work as a diplomat is limited. I am 
part of the embassy, the embassy is part of the ministry, and the ministry is part of the 
government,” he explained. “I cannot say much about the bombing of cultural heritage 
in Yemen because technically ‘we’ [he indicated quotation marks] invited them [the 
Saudi-led alliance]”. 245  While the diplomat in question did not voice disapproval 
himself, he admired colleagues who did express criticism for “having principles”, as he 
put it. The omission of voice is based on perceived professional norms and underlying 
notions of diplomatic loyalty.  
A possibly more prominent reason for diplomats to stay silent was fear: fear of losing 
one’s job, fear of having to leave the safety of one’s host country, and fear of putting 
family members and friends in Yemen at risk. “For those diplomats who are outside, 
they are afraid,” claimed one respondent, adding that in the context of civil war, the 
prospect of returning to Sanaa was dooming to many. “It is not about them, it’s about 
their families, their kids might get killed […in Sanaa], either by airstrikes, or by cholera, 
or some other diseases”.246 His colleague agreed that “everyone is trying to be quiet 
[…]. Not just to keep the job, but also to keep their friends and families inside 
Yemen.”.247 In his opinion it was not uncommon for diplomats to be surrounded by 
friends and family members with different political outlooks: “sometimes brothers have 
a different point of view”. By refraining from public voice, he suggested, some 
diplomats tried to avoid “hurt[ing] their feelings or their beliefs”. Moreover, he claimed, 
 
245 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
246 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
247 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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some diplomats worried that their criticism might put family members in Yemen at risk. 
Diplomats were silent, in his words, “not only for jobs, but also because they have 
friends and family inside”.248  
As this indicates, the Yemeni diplomat is entangled in a complex web of socio-material 
relations which shape his or her practices at work, specifically those structured around 
voice and loyalty. Agency, in that sense, is not individually held but materially mediated 
and distributed through various social networks. Concern about the safety of one’s 
family and the risk of unemployment, for example, impacted diplomats’ behavioural 
choices, challenging widely held conceptions of the diplomatic profession as 
comfortable and safe. As shown in this chapter, diplomats’ decision to engage in the 
ordering or disordering of diplomatic practice was highly reflective, involving 
consideration of personal relationships that went beyond professional logics and 
norms. This indicates that in a moment of severe crisis, professional habitus and 
norms alone may not suffice to maintain the co-ordinated and smooth projection of 
state presence. 
II.2. The reward and punishment of diplomatic appointments  
Besides the practice of voice, appointment and promotion practices emerged as 
particularly contentious and as an important “ordering device” in 2016. In fact, this 
chapter suggests that the ordering and projection of macro-level representations in 
Yemen cannot be fully comprehended without acknowledging the role played by 
recruitment processes. 249  Following the completion of their official term in 2014, 
Yemeni ambassadors were called back to Sanaa. No new ambassadors were 
appointed until October 2016, with the exception of embassies in Washington D.C. 
and Abu Dhabi, as well as diplomatic missions to the Arab League in Cairo and to the 
UN in New York. For almost two years, other Yemeni missions around the world were 
run by their respective chargé d’affaires.250 It is unclear why President Hadi waited for 
almost two years before appointing other ambassadors in October 2016. Some 
suggest he was focused on domestic military reforms and the political transition 
 
248 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
249 A similar argument is made by Grindle (2012), who studied historical and more contemporary civil 
service reforms in ten different countries across Europe and America. 
250 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
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process, while others claim he held back ambassadorial positions as a source of 
leverage.  
In 2016, the exiled foreign ministry put an end to the two-year rupture of its annual 
rotation process, preparing the replacement of Yemeni diplomats around the globe. 
Office employees of the Yemeni foreign minister in Riyadh began inspecting the large 
pool of career diplomats that have remained inside Sanaa, contemplating whom to 
post abroad and in what position. In fact, once the exiled foreign ministry resumed 
diplomatic appointments in 2016, the assignment of embassy posts became an 
essential tool of regime survival and “diplomatic ordering”, exiling opponents and 
rewarding “loyalists”. As mentioned in chapter three, Yemen has long been referred to 
as a neo-patrimonial state, with informal patrimonial loyalties penetrating into formal 
political institutions. Given these state structures, “solutions to problems are 
[commonly] created through the dispersal of resources, benefits, and status” (Phillips, 
2008, p.5). Lackner (2017) described the seeming continuance of such neo-
patrimonialism under Hadi, using the military reforms he conducted in 2013 as an 
example: 
“Although in principle the plan was to replace Saleh cronies with individuals 
loyal to the state and the Constitution, in practice most new appointees were 
from Abyan, Hadi’s own home governorate; this in turn led to accusations that 
he was filling the posts with his own cronies” (p.41).  
As discussed in the remainder of this chapter, similar arguments have been made with 
regards to the diplomatic service. The first ambassadorial appointment made by Hadi 
in summer 2015 positioned his friend and political supporter Ahmad Awad Bin 
Mubarak in Washington D.C..251 One year later, another long-term acquaintance of 
Hadi, Yassin Saeed Noman, became ambassador to London, while Mohammed 
Marem, who previously headed Hadi’s presidential office, was appointed ambassador 
to Cairo in late 2016. Besides friends and acquaintances, Hadi and his entourage were 
 
251 Mubarak’s political career began in the aftermath of 2011, when he became NDC secretary 
general and later director of the president’s office (Lackner, 2017). Born in Aden, Mubarak was “a 
university business administration teacher whose main qualifications appeared to be excellent English 
and lack of political baggage,” wrote Lackner (2017) in commenting on Mubarak’s (unsuccessful) 
nomination as prime minister in 2014 (p.50). 
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said to have appointed “relatives of relatives”,252 thereby continuing a long tradition of 
appointing family members to the Yemeni diplomatic service. “What happened lately 
[is that] Hadi and his advisors appointed the sons and relatives of those who are 
around him, or of those whose loyalty he wants to buy, to the foreign service abroad”, 
said one Yemeni diplomat.253 In 2016, he specified,  
“Hadi started to give [diplomatic] posts here and there, the prime minister is 
doing the same […]. The minister himself appointed two of his sons […]. 
Everybody is doing it. So, now the foreign service is filled with non-diplomats, 
people who […] don't even know anything about law, [or] about politics”.  
“It has nothing to do with your qualifications”, other diplomats were keen to 
emphasize,254 with one adding, “Third World thoughts, this is what I call it!”255 In 
reiterating the personal nature of appointment strategies, one respondent reflected 
self-critically on his recent appointment abroad, explaining he was given his position 
by the minister and his staff “because they are my friends. They thought it would be a 
good place for me, because it is in a region I like and because it allows me to work 
with someone I know”. 256  One interviewee outlined the socio-political dynamics 
framing diplomatic appointment strategies in 2016-17 as follows: 
“Those who jump from boat to boat, they jump from the boat of Ali Abdullah 
Saleh to the boat of Hadi, and they went to Riyadh. Some of them were with Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, some of them they were not, but they took their chances. And 
they are pushing hard for positions, for work. They stay there in Riyadh causing 
the government a lot of problems, but there is no place to put them”.257  
Next to rewarding loyalists, diplomatic appointments were also used to “exile” 
opponents. Ahmad Saleh, for instance, the son of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
was appointed ambassador to the UAE in a 2013 military shake-up that was aimed at 
solidifying loyalty to the new president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi (Gordon, 2013). 
Ahmad Saleh had previously held an influential military position inside Yemen, acting 
 
252 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
253 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
254 Interviews with Yemeni diplomats, 12 February 2017 and 17 August 2017. 
255 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
256 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
257 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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as the head of the elite Republican Guard. Likewise, two nephews of Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, who had served in the Presidential Guard and the intelligence service, were 
appointed military attaché to Germany and Ethiopia (Gordon, 2013; al-Jazeera, 2013).  
Following the outbreak of war, which posed Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Hadi 
government against an alliance of Saleh loyalists and Houthi members, Ahmad Ali’s 
ambassadorship was revoked in March 2015.258 His removal from office preceded UN 
Resolution 2216, which designated him for sanctions. Ahmad Ali was placed under 
“house arrest” in his UAE residence for at least two years (Shaker, 2017; Spencer, 
2017). Later, he was not allowed to leave the country259 and lived “under close scrutiny 
of UAE services”, as one diplomat explained in 2018, adding that “after his father’s 
killing, he was freer to meet visitors”.260 While released from his official diplomatic 
positions, Ahmad Saleh was said to have played an important diplomatic role in 2017. 
UAE officials, unlike their Saudi colleagues, looked favourably at a possible 
compromise with the Saleh faction at the time and were reported to have relied on 
Ahmad Ali as a conduit for negotiations with his father (Spencer, 2017).  
While contemporary literature on the Yemeni state describes the military and the 
Ministry of Finance as two institutions central to neo-patrimonial governance (Phillips, 
2008), this chapter proposes that following the outbreak of war in 2015, the Yemeni 
diplomatic service emerged as an increasingly important institutional arena for neo-
patrimonial state practice. Likely reasons for this shift were deteriorating living 
conditions inside Yemen and the government’s move to Riyadh. Establishing its new 
headquarters in Saudi Arabia, the Hadi government lacked access to most of its 
material infrastructure, including ministry buildings, which rendered the neo-
patrimonial strategy of distributing government offices and related material rewards 
more difficult. At the same time, employment inside the country, where life was marked 
by war and all its accompanying miseries, lost attraction. An increasing number of 
Yemenis aspired to leave the country and was seeking employment abroad. In this 
context, embassy posts emerged as an attractive new resource in patterns of neo-
 
258 Ahmad Saleh was replaced by Fahd Saeed al-Menhali, from the southern Hadramawt 
governorate, who was appointed ambassador to the UAE in December 2015. 
259 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 January 2019. 
260 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 9 January 2019. 
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patrimonial governance. Positions abroad offered traditional rewards, such as money 
and status. They also promised safety, a “resource” whose value had gained in the 
eyes of Yemeni diplomats since the outbreak of war.  
While the Hadi cabinet had initially planned to move away from neo-patrimonial state 
practices (Lackner, 2017), notably including the appointment of family members and 
friends, analysis of Yemen’s diplomatic service suggests that in a moment of crisis the 
opposite held true. The continuance of long-established appointment practices 
corroborates the established argument that “systems of patronage” are highly 
adaptable to changing contexts and may accomplish a multitude of tasks related to 
state building and governance, including the securement of loyalty to the ruler (Grindle, 
2012).  
II.2.2. Diplomatic appointments and the neo-patrimonial import of fault lines  
Given the country’s political division and the distrust among Hadi government officials, 
the identification of potential Houthi-allies inside the foreign ministry in Sanaa 
constituted an important part of the selection process of new appointees. Allegedly, 
the foreign minister, al-Mekhlafi, gave instruction to consider every diplomat in Sanaa 
a member of the Hadi government, “unless he proves the opposite”. As stated above, 
“evidence” of working against the Hadi government was collected online. The effort 
that went into the monitoring and selection of new appointees reasserts that agency 
should not be reduced to resistance (Ahearn, 2001). “Supporters of the status quo are 
no less creative than those who contest and oppose [it]” (Cornut, 2018, p.723). To 
ensure the ongoing projection of state presence and capacity, high ranking ministry 
an government officials developed a number of ordering devices, including the strict 
monitoring of diplomatic speech acts and carefully devised appointments and 
promotions.  
The 2016-17 appointment and promotion strategies inside the Yemeni diplomatic 
service triggered discontent that was structured along broader generational, regional, 
and political fault lines at the time. The 2016 re-instatement of retired ambassadors, 
for instance, was said to have upset younger career diplomats. Looking back, one of 
the ambassadors who experienced the sudden reversal of his retirement status 
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claimed he was asked to return, “because they [government officials] feel that I can 
help.” He then added, “Maybe also as a retirement reward for what I did. Because I 
am already retired.” As will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven, diplomats 
receive much higher salaries abroad than “at home”. While all are entitled to retirement 
payments, these sums have been referred to as “peanuts” by one diplomat, who 
claimed that the pension for ambassadors fell at around 700 US dollars a month.261 
Discussing the re-instatement of formerly retired ambassadors, one interviewee 
bluntly declared it was all “for loyalties”.262 Upon further reflection he said in a more 
conciliatory tone, “some of them are good ambassadors, even those who are brought 
back to life, but still they are taking the opportunities of others, young, you know, who 
have been waiting”. According to Grindle’s historical analysis (2012), conflicts over 
spoils, like the ones described above, have been common in patronage systems 
elsewhere: traditionally, “those who benefited from extensive patronage opportunities 
struggled against those extolling the virtues of a merit-based civil service” (p.2). 
Besides generational conflicts, a possibly more important divide emerged along 
geographical fault lines.263 The appointment of non-career diplomats who were either 
members of Hadi’s family, his personal friends, or from his home – or neighbouring – 
governorate(s) prompted narratives of “southern favouritism”. “Most of them [new 
appointees] are from the south. And those from the south they are controlling the most 
important embassies in the world: New York, London, Geneva, Berlin, [and] 
Washington”.264 In many cases, it appeared that personal emotions of anger and envy 
became entangled with a binary discourse separating “professional diplomats” from 
the north, with “unprofessional diplomats” from the south. One specific point of 
criticism pertained to alleged acts of misrepresentation by southern diplomats. Several 
 
261 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
262 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
263 The use of “north” and “south” categories in this chapter reflects the discourse deployed by 
Yemeni diplomats. It should be noted that they gloss over important nuances. For instance, many 
individuals who have “re-surfaced” in the exiled Hadi government have been described as a non-
representative fraction of “the south”, belonging to a small educated elite (Interview with Yemeni 
diplomat, 11 January 2017). One Yemeni diaspora member highlighted the multitude of southern 
identities, asking, “‘What are you talking about? Which south? The Hadi south? Or Hirak? The post-
unification south? Or pre-unification? Pre- independence south? Or post-independence south?” 
(anonymous interviewee cited in Aboueldahab, 2019, p.15) 
264 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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northern diplomats accused their southern colleagues of representing southern rather 
than national interests, thus lacking in “esprit d’état”, as one interviewee put it.  
In spinning this narrative further, one respondent claimed that Hadi attempted to co-
opt and thereby silence politically active southerners by appointing them to the 
diplomatic service. “They appoint them because they are from the southern part of 
Yemen and they are activists in the southern movement so when you want to keep 
them calm, you convince him to work in an embassy and have a nice life”.265 While 
these claims could not be confirmed in the context of this study, one recently appointed 
non-career diplomat from Aden did identify with the south and the southern movement, 
saying that Sanaa had a “very different culture from us [emphasized]” and that “I have 
never been involved in politics before. I was more with the Southern movement, you 
know, which wanted [Southern] independence”.266 
Overall, the hardened political fault lines that marked the Yemeni war caused concern 
that “being from the north” created an “association-by-default” with the Houthi 
movement.267 The latter had originated in the northern governorate of Saada and has 
maintained a hegemonic position in the north since the outbreak of civil war. Political 
conflict was translated into a professional challenge, leaving diplomats from the north 
worried that their regional background put them at a disadvantage in regard to 
diplomatic appointments and promotions. 
II.2.3. Crisis of meaning: diplomatic professionalism and the “neo-patrimonial turn” 
The increasing number of non-merit appointments caused a shift in the perceived 
function of embassy posts, which became linked to diplomatic privileges, rather than 
work. “People are being appointed in embassies without really having a job, just for 
the residency, the privileges. They will be paid salaries and be given the immunity […]. 
But they will not show up at the embassy”, complained one diplomat.268 His colleague 
shared a similar view, saying that some appointees only “want to join because they 
want to go to Germany, [...] Riyadh, Paris [...]. They chose the best places”.269 
 
265 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
266 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 February 2017. 
267 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
268 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
269 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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Allegedly, a newly appointed non-career diplomat could simply request “having his 
salary and his diplomatic visa”. As one interviewee put it, “you can live a good life for 
four years in a safe shelter, you know, a good and nice life. That's all. Very few of them 
want to really be real diplomats”.270 He went on saying: 
“Some ambassadors told them from the beginning, ‘if you do not want to come 
just stay at home.’ Because ambassadors always worry about people who are 
not professionals, they will come and make problems... So, some of them stay 
at home, some others come to the embassy and just stay at the desk, doing 
nothing, but at least they show themselves at the embassy”.271  
While most diplomats interviewed for the purpose of this study were self-declared 
career diplomats, others admitted having joined the diplomatic service recently by non-
merit appointment. They offered insight into the unique challenges they faced: “I come 
from outside, I have no diplomatic career,” confessed one interviewee. “So, you come 
with all those worries and concerns, you worry about what to say, how to behave, how 
to hold your knife…etc.”.272 The understandable insecurity contained in this quote is 
corroborated by the observation of a Yemeni colleague, who described that recently 
appointed non-career diplomats acted shyly at diplomatic events, standing together in 
small groups near the door, speaking only with other Arab diplomats due to their poor 
English skills. As this suggests, the diplomatic environment, including the grandness 
of its materiality and practices shaped by Western tradition (e.g. use of cutlery at 
formal dinner events), can be intimidating to Yemeni newcomers.  
Referring to the Yemeni diplomatic service as “a social welfare organization”,273 some 
diplomats joked about the purpose of adding an assistant military attaché to the 
already existing position of military attaché in Prague and Berlin, for instance.274 “We 
have a cultural attaché, I heard, in London, who does not speak English,” said one 
Yemeni diplomat who ridiculed recent appointments.275 He went on to ask, “I am 
wondering about the guy here [referring to the local Yemeni ambassador]. What is he 
 
270 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
271 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
272 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 February 2017. 
273 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 23 August 2017. 
274 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
275 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
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doing?” When the researcher admitted “I have no idea,” he responded, “I [emphasized] 
have no idea! He has no idea! Nobody knows!” He laughed and added “So that's how 
it looks like. It makes me sad...”.  
The increasing assignment of diplomatic posts to non-professionals caused bitterness, 
envy, and anger among career diplomats, leading some to question the functionality, 
value, and purpose of their work. One diplomat sounded upset when saying, “They 
are not from the diplomatic staff. And they give them high posts, for example minister 
plenipotentiary. I spent 20 years to reach this grade, I worked hard to get this grade. 
And someone else just comes from outside to be minister. It's not fair!”.276 He went on 
to say:277  
“When you see that someone just jumps to the same level than you are in and 
is getting the same or maybe a better salary than you do, but is not working and 
is staying home, whereas you have to work and be on time and spend money 
for coming to the embassy and going back…--and he is home! With what 
ambition will you work? What kind of attitude? And this is what most of the 
embassies are facing”. 
Diplomats discussing non-career appointments expressed concern about the Yemeni 
diplomatic service at large. “What do you expect from these embassies? How can they 
operate? How can they function? What can they achieve? Nothing […]! Zero 
performance and that's it!” proclaimed one interviewee.278 His colleague confessed, 
“the main problem for me, as a Yemeni diplomat, is that my ministry will be led by 
people with no experience […]. They have no experience and […] no idea [about] 
diplomatic work”.279  
The increasing neo-patrimonialism within the Yemeni diplomatic service politicized the 
meaning of professional titles and promotions. As a consequence, the advancement 
of diplomatic careers was widely seen, and judged, as a political choice. “If they would 
tell me now ‘be ambassador’, I would decline. I would not like to be in that position, I 
 
276 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
277 As one diplomat put it, Hadi’s staffing policies “created bitterness within the foreign service” 
(Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017). 
278 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
279 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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am not an opportunist”, one diplomat explained, adding, “in principle I would like it 
[being ambassador], but it would be bad in the eyes of my family and friends, I would 
feel ashamed”.280 His colleague agreed, recounting that he was asked to become 
ambassador but declined. “First I did not want to see his face,” he said with reference 
to Hadi and chuckled. “I don't like him. And it would look…,” he paused, “I would look 
[like a] hypocrite, criticizing all his actions since he became [president] and then, all of 
a sudden, I become his ambassador. I would not be happy with myself”.281 As these 
examples indicate, the meaning of being a diplomat and the function of diplomatic 
institutions, changed in the context of civil war. An increasing number of embassy 
posts became a spoil that was handed to loyalists. This pushed their reward-function 
to new heights.  
Internal debates surrounding neo-patrimonial appointment practices reached a peak 
in August 2017, when diplomats in Sanaa engaged in an act of public voice and issued 
a press release, which read,  
“the past period witnessed the appointment of a large number of staff in the 
diplomatic missions abroad who are not related to the diplomatic work, 
particularly sons and relatives of officials and close associates, and granted 
them high diplomatic ranks [….] at the expense of the ministry’s staff” (Press 
Release, Sanaa, 8 August 2017).282  
Referring to such practices as a violation of Yemeni diplomatic law, the statement ends 
by threatening, “employees of the ministry of foreign affairs […] retain their right of 
initiating a lawsuit”. Rather than being a constant and binding reference, Yemen’s 
diplomatic law emerges in this instance as a resource used by diplomats in legitimizing 
specific claims. News of the press release circulated in the Yemeni diplomatic corps 
and was discussed by several diplomats. While a photo of the document was 
forwarded to the researcher, it was unclear where the press release was published. In 
commenting on the document, one diplomat explained that its purpose was to put 
pressure on the minister to appoint diplomats from within the foreign ministry in 
 
280 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
281 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
282 Source: private. 
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Sanaa.283 The press release and its spread on social media managed to connect 
diplomatic sites and actors, indicating that anger over diplomatic appointments 
stretched across geographical space and political boundaries, motivating an act of 
organized public voice by diplomats in Houthi-controlled Sanaa. No lawsuit did follow 
the press release, which does not appear to have triggered any major changes. This 
suggests that the effectiveness of voice is not rooted in diplomatic law but linked to 
political power and intra-governmental hegemonic discourse. Diplomats’ attempt to 
alter the appointment practices of high-ranking government officials failed to have a 
long-lasting effect.  
With the increasing importance of diplomatic posts in neo-patrimonial governance, the 
Yemeni diplomatic service began growing considerably.284  
 
Figure 18: Listed Yemeni Diplomats in London  
The graph shows the increasing number of Yemeni diplomats listed in London between 2008 and 
2017. Ambassadors are not included in the count. The figure was compiled by the researcher using 
UK diplomatic lists available online. 
 
283While the exact number of signatories could not be determined in the context of this study, one 
diplomat suggested that most of his colleagues refrained from supporting the statement in fear of 
ruining their future chances of being posted abroad. He guessed the number of involved diplomats at 
40 or 50 (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017). 
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Given the increasing number of “extra positions” abroad, 285  the Yemeni foreign 
ministry in Riyadh allegedly faced difficulties getting their candidates approved by host 
governments. In trying to rationalize host governments’ reluctance, one Yemeni 
diplomat suggested that foreign officials worried about Yemeni diplomats who stayed 
in the country after having completed their official term. Diplomatic accounts suggest 
that the number of diplomats returning to Sanaa has decreased since the outbreak of 
war. “Last year, when they finished [their term], because of the war, they did not go to 
Yemen. They stayed as diplomats in the embassy”, explained one Yemeni diplomat.286  
Importantly, the number of Yemeni diplomats is not growing equally in all embassies. 
Some places appear to be more popular than others. The UK, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Canada, and Germany were mentioned as comparatively more attractive options, for 
example. According to Yemeni diplomats, they each offered different benefits, 
including financial ones or the possibility of applying for asylum. The heterogeneous 
topography of Yemeni embassies and their diverging valuation by diplomats is 
examined in more detail in the following chapter. 
III Conceptualizing Diplomatic Loyalty 
As mentioned above, the (dis-)ordering of diplomatic practices revolved around the 
concept of loyalty. Diplomatic loyalty, as defined in chapter five, remained contested 
following regime change. In fact, one diplomat went as far as to describe it as an empty 
performance: “we use the phrase ‘we are officials, we represent the country, we are 
not with any parties’, [but] this is in front of the Yemenis,” he said and laughed. In 
reality, he added, diplomats held different opinions regarding the Houthis and the war 
in Yemen and did not refrain from sharing their views.  
His comment suggests that diplomatic loyalty constitutes more than a norm; it 
resembles a set of “hollowed out” practices whose enactment lacks conviction and 
sincerity. As such, diplomats’ loyalty may be expressed “through the performance of 
or participation in rituals, or more generally in practices that are understood to 
 
285 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 January 2017. 
286 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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symbolize or express loyalty” (Keller, 2007, p.5). Diplomats routinely participate in 
structured ritual practices which are widely interpreted as a reflection of their loyal 
commitment to the state. Ritual practices may include the ceremony of being sworn 
in, pledges of allegiance, and the use of state symbols such as flags. 
 
 
Figure 19: Diplomatic Appointment Ceremony 
The photo portrays ambassadors who were sworn in by Hadi in Riyadh in 2016. The Yemeni flag to 
the president’s right is visibly complemented by the emblem of Saudi Arabia on the wall to his left.287 
  
Contrary to Keller (2007), this study questions the sincerity of loyalty expressed in 
these rituals. It follows Fletcher (1993), who suggests that rituals of loyalty function 
above all to publicly demonstrate “loyalty”. He admits that displayed loyalties may 
initially be unauthentic but maintains that their repetition over time establishes and 
deepens sincere communal loyalties (Fletcher, 1993).  
In the case of Yemen, diplomats’ personal opinions and allegiances did not seem to 
matter, as long as they were kept private. What was more important was the ongoing 
 




practice and visible appearance of diplomatic loyalty. The pretence of diplomatic 
“business as usual” was critical to the continued presentation of state capacity and 
permanence. The notion “as if” played an essential role in the construction of 
statehood through practice. As Pouliot (2010) put it, “people act as if there were a 
corporate state and it is precisely this performativity that makes the state look like a 
reified thing” (p.88). Indeed, one Yemeni diplomat explained:  “nobody is thinking 
about [actual] diplomacy now, or about a functioning foreign ministry”. In his opinion 
government officials were merely focused on appearances, thinking “okay we have a 
foreign ministry, we have ambassadors, and that's it. What will they do? That’s not the 
problem. It's fine…- we have a flag”.288 Acting as if Yemen remained a coherent state 
with a functioning diplomatic service helped maintain the illusion of state presence, 
bolstered the government’s portrayal of capacity, and supported its claims to 
legitimacy. 
In the context of civil war, division and mistrust became increasingly palpable within 
the diplomatic service, rendering diplomatic loyalty the linchpin of careers. “It's okay 
to be a little bit loyal to a certain camp […]. Everybody in Yemen is loyal to a certain 
camp, we have a civil war, so people are divided”, claimed one Yemeni diplomat.289 
What mattered more, in his opinion, was whether diverging political and personal 
loyalties were expressed in public. His statement exemplifies the performative nature 
of “diplomatic loyalty”, which must not reflect sincere identification with government 
interests and positions. The diplomat assumed that in 2016 many appointees, who 
passed the government’s “loyalty test”, did not actually “like the government or the 
president. But that's a little bit normal because they were under the airstrikes in Sana'a. 
For sure they will be upset. But they didn't say anything, so they passed”.290  
Diplomatic loyalty continued to matter in 2017 appointments, when an increasing 
number of diplomats was allegedly removed from the shortlist due to their presumed 
Houthi affiliation in 2017. In commenting on these developments, one interviewee 
pointed out that “the loyalty thing is becoming more and more sensitive”.291 He went 
 
288 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
289 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
290 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 15 February 2017. 
291 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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on arguing that questions of loyalty also impacted diplomats’ promotions, which were 
allegedly “frozen” by the prime minister and the president “because they are not sure, 
100 per cent, that all of the people on the list are loyal to the government”. Linking 
such distrust to Yemen’s civil war, he went on saying, “You have to be sure, 100 per 
cent, that the people who are representing you outside, will really represent you, and 
not other people. This is something really sensitive”.292  
Loyalty that lacks deeper conviction is brittle in moments of conflict, offering grounds 
for suspicion and incentivising specific ordering devices, such as the appointment of 
presumed loyalists and close monitoring of diplomatic voice. For Yemeni diplomats, 
practicing diplomatic loyalty meant sticking closely to the script, i.e. supporting the 
legitimacy of the Hadi government and its alliance members, specifically Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE.  
Diplomatic loyalty, which highlights compliance and struggles to accommodate cases 
of public voice, differs from Hirschman’s (1970) conception of loyalty, mentioned in 
chapter five. To reiterate, Hirschman (1970) understood loyalty as a “special 
attachment to an organization” that tends to “activate voice”. While less prominent in 
this study, this conception did find some empirical evidence. In some instances, 
permissible forms of criticism were framed by diplomats as an implicit expression of 
loyalty. One diplomat laughingly declared, “I was a rebel ambassador […]. I wrote 
[newspaper] articles […] during my time as ambassador.” He remembered one 
specific instance involving an article “that was very critical of Hadi”293 and a later 
conversation he had with the foreign minister, 
“The foreign minister asked me, ‘why do you make Hadi angry?’ I said, ‘I don't 
understand’. He said, ‘yeah, by your writing,’ and I said, ‘but I am not opposing 
him. I am not an opposition. I am a critic. I want him to be better. That's all”.294  
Shedding further light on the personal nature and micro-politics of diplomatic dissent, 
the diplomat claimed to have known the foreign minister well, saying “we are good 
friends, although we don’t get along politically, but he is still my friend”.295 The “rebel 
 
292 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
293 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 February 2017. 
294 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
295 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
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ambassador” was not fired but allegedly offered a post abroad in 2016. This suggests 
that certain forms of voice “passed” within the Yemeni foreign ministry, while also 
pointing to the involvement of personal connections impacting the lines of 
inconsequential dissent. Notions of loyalty, both to a friend and a government, inform 
the expression of voice, and are used as an ex-post justification. Criticism is not 
equated with opposition but presented as a sign of support and well-intended advice. 
In this instance, loyalty and voice are both integrated in diplomatic practice.  
IV Conclusion: diplomatic practice and global politics of “stateness”  
The analysis above examined how the context of Yemen’s civil war impacted 
diplomatic practice and subjectivities. In 2016-17, a key challenge to ordering the “big 
picture” of legitimate state governance and capacity stemmed from the fact that two 
self-acclaimed governments competed for political power and (inter)national 
recognition. Under these conditions, diplomatic loyalty was brittle and diplomatic 
practices, especially reflective practices of voice, became “disordered”: diplomats 
expressed different opinions, deviated from discursive instructions, and argued with 
colleagues over their speech acts.  
In response, a number of practices were introduced by higher-ups that may be read 
as “ordering devices”. They included the strict monitoring of diplomatic speech acts 
and the increased appointment of supposed loyalists. The monitoring of voice revolved 
around dichotomist official scripts, which left little room for “middle grounds”. The rising 
number of non-career loyalists, in turn, led some interviewees to question the purpose 
of the Yemeni diplomatic service. Indicating a shift in institutional function, they called 
the foreign service an inflated “welfare organization” that offered diplomatic privileges 
to Hadi loyalists but had little to do with the enactment of international diplomacy. 
Except for practices of protocol, which included the issuing of visas for example, it 
appears that diplomatic practices primarily aimed at maintaining a minimum of 
diplomatic presence and capacity. This suggests that the nature and degree of 
diplomatic activity is fluid and adaptive to changing socio-material contexts. 
The above analysis of (dis)ordered diplomatic practices foregrounded heightened 
suspicion and the concept of diplomatic loyalty. Adding nuance to the definition offered 
 174 
in chapter five, the above analysis explored diplomatic loyalty as a set of potentially 
insincere ritual practices. It also indicated that the meaning of diplomatic loyalty is 
unsettled by the “blurry edges” of social media and the voice of “loyalists” that is 
alleged to be well-intended. Overall, this chapter corroborates the argument that 
“diplomatic practice is […] crucial to creating the illusion of state presence and the 
existing status quo of international relations” (Jones & Clark, 2015, p.10).  
In conclusion, this chapter sheds further light on the links between micro-level insights 
and macro-level politics of stateness. Its discussion informs this study’s broader 
interest in the relationship between the Yemeni diplomatic service and the 
international reproduction of Yemeni statehood.  
Where competing authorities claim to be the government of the same state, the 
question becomes one of representation, legitimacy, and sovereignty: who acts as the 
“representative organ” of the state and, as such, “the depository of its sovereignty”? 
(Talmon, 1999, p.500). Typically, questions of sovereignty are answered through 
international speech acts of recognition, which are described by Novogrodsky (2018) 
“as a complex socio-economic and diplomatic process” (p.49).296  More specifically, 
acts of international recognition have been linked to ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard power’. Only 
“legitimate governments” are regarded as “competent to bind their State, dispose of 
its assets abroad, protect its nationals, represent their State in judicial proceedings 
and international fora and, most importantly, consent to armed (pro-democratic or 
humanitarian) intervention in their State” (Talmon, 1999, p.500). The latter point is of 
particular relevance in the Yemeni case, where the “rightfulness” of the Saudi-led 
military intervention hinged on the international acknowledgment of the Hadi 
government’s legitimacy. 
Rather than trying to gain recognition, Yemeni diplomats worked to maintain the broad 
international support of the Hadi government: soon after Hadi withdrew his resignation 
and fled Yemen, the international community recognized his government as 
“legitimate”. On 20 March 2015, the European Commission stated:  
 
296 As Talmon (1999) put it “recognition in the sense of a manifestation of an opinion on legal status 
seems to suggest itself in cases in which the legal status of an authority is uncertain or controversial” 
(p.531). 
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“The EU condemns the destabilising unilateral actions taken by the 
Houthis and military units loyal to ex-President Saleh, urges these forces 
to end the use of violence immediately and unconditionally and withdraw 
from areas they have seized, including Sana'a and Aden, and reaffirms its 
support to Yemen's legitimate authorities” (European Council, 2015). 
Two days later, on 22 March 2015, the UN Security Council Presidential 
Statement read: 
“The Security Council supports the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, 
Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and calls upon all parties and Member States 
to refrain from taking any actions that undermine the unity, sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and the legitimacy of the 
President of Yemen. 
The Security Council condemns the ongoing unilateral actions taken by 
the Houthis, which undermine the political transition process in Yemen, 
and jeopardize the security, stability, sovereignty and unity of Yemen" 
(United Nations Security Council, 2015). 
The international recognition of a government is widely presumed to indicate “the 
readiness to enter into [or in this case maintain] ‘normal’, i.e. diplomatic, relations” 
(Talmon, 1999, p.524). Turned on its head, this means that the establishment and 
maintenance of diplomatic relations with a government equals “recognizing” it. 
Operable diplomatic institutions, no matter their output or effectiveness, are thus 
essential to a government’s successful claim to state legitimacy and sovereignty. 
While the symbolic power and overall importance of operable material infrastructure 
will be further explored in the following chapter, focus is here placed on the role of 
diplomatic practice.  
This chapter argues that ongoing diplomatic practice played an essential role in the 
government’s efforts to maintain the recognition of its legitimacy and sovereignty 
claims. In doing so, it follows Jackson (1990), who argued that the “expression of 
sovereignty internationally – mutual recognition, diplomacy, international law, and the 
like – are works of political agents” (p.4). As suggested in this thesis, claims to 
external, as opposed to internal sovereignty became more important with the outbreak 
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of Yemen’s civil war, when domestic political authority was severely and violently 
contested within state borders. 297  It thereby builds on recent research on state 
sovereignty, suggesting that in today’s globalized world, external sovereignty 
constitutes a particularly crucial component in governmental claims of running and 
representing the state. In the words of Eckes (2015), “effective action at the 
international level […] necessarily enhances internal sovereignty. Some go as far as 
to claim that 'identity as a sovereign [entity] with legitimate and respected internal 
authority depends upon ... participation in ... international society'” (p.44). Somalia and 
its government, for instance, has been said to owe its ongoing existence as a singular 
legal-political entity “more to the perceptions of the international community than to 
internal political realities” (Novogrodsky, 2018, p. 42).  
The brutal conflict that plagued Yemen, its economic crisis, the ongoing destruction of 
infrastructure, and widespread human suffering posed a challenge to the 
demonstration of governmental authority inside state borders. Thus, institutional 
spaces outside the country emerged as important platforms to claiming the rightful 
exercise of political authority. Ever since Hadi revoked his resignation, both his and 
the Houthi government have played “the game of sovereignty” (Jackson, 1990, p.35), 
demonstrating their ability to practice and embody statehood. One diplomat suggested 
that Hadi postponed the appointment of diplomats until 2016, because he only then 
deemed it necessary to showcase the legitimacy of his government abroad: 
“The guy was losing power […] in front of his people, in front of Yemenis, and 
in front of the whole world. So, he wanted to prove that ‘I am still the president, 
 
297 In the usual understanding of the term, sovereignty denotes “a superior and exclusive form” of 
state authority (Krehoff, 2008, p.288). As such, it is frequently thought to include an internal and an 
external component. While internal sovereignty refers to the superior authority of a state government 
over its territory and citizens, external sovereignty describes, broadly speaking, the independence of a 
state in relation to other states or the community of states (Krehoff, 2008). Historically, sovereignty 
was considered to come from within and did not require the recognition of other sovereigns (Crawford, 
2007). Rulers could demarcate and declare a certain territory as their “kingdom”, “empire”, or “state”. 
In other words, their “demonstrated capacity for self-government created credibility and respect which 
warranted recognition: sovereigns preceded sovereignty” (Jackson, 1990, p.34). While for a long time, 
the state’s internal sovereignty vis-a-vis its territory and its internal affairs lay at the heart of legal-
political debates regarding statehood, Besson (2011) finds that “the question of external sovereignty 
of the State in its international relations gradually moved centre stage during the 19th century” (para 
26). By now, both notions of sovereignty are considered to be closely intertwined (Eckes, 2015). 
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the legitimate president of the republic of Yemen’. What he did, 'okay I am going 
to appoint the ambassadors'”.298   
Likewise, his colleague deemed the exiled foreign ministry as “the most important 
ministry – because this is the one that is dealing with the international community”. He 
added, “if there is no one dealing with the international community some countries 
may withdraw their recognition for the legitimate government [i.e. the Hadi 
government]”.299  
According to Jones and Clark (2015), it is especially in crisis situations that diplomats 
play a crucial role in the “geopolitical knowledge production and circulation” (Jones & 
Clark, 2015, p.2). Among other things, it is “their capacity to retain legitimacy among 
publics” that are critical (Jones & Clark, 2015, p.2). Echoing these arguments, this 
chapter suggests that the practice of diplomatic loyalty was crucial to the maintenance 
of state sovereignty and concomitant notions of state legitimacy and capacity.  
Running a diplomatic service allowed the Hadi government to demonstrate 
internationally its ongoing ability to “play the game of sovereignty,” whereby “playing” 
involved the surface-level imitation of mainstream international state demeanour, or, 
as Jackson (1990) put it, “doing what a sovereign does in relation to other sovereigns” 
(p.36). The literature on diplomacy has long acknowledged that “one of the major 
functions of diplomats remains to safeguard sovereignty” (Kurbalija, 1999, p.173). Yet, 
little research has focused on the micro-processes underlying the diplomatic 
safeguarding and promotion of state sovereignty. 300  To address this gap in the 
literature, this chapter explored the relationship between the (dis)ordering of 
diplomatic practice and state sovereignty in crisis. 
In the words of Crawford (2007), “the point about ‘government’ is that it has two 
aspects: the actual exercise of authority, and the right or title to exercise that authority” 
(p.57). As argued in this chapter, the Yemeni diplomatic service played an important 
role in both cases. It emerged as a global stage for showcasing the Hadi government’s 
 
298 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
299 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 October 2017. 
300One exception is an article on Icelandic diplomatic practice by Jones and Clark (2015). 
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ongoing exercise of authority, while thereby also contributing to its international 
recognition.  
These observations add empirical insights to new research on civil war diplomacy 
(Huang, 2016; Salehyan, 2009). While existing studies show that internal conflicts 
often have significant international dimensions, for instance in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, 
most focus on the decision calculus of external states, especially those who choose 
to intervene in civil wars (Balch-Lindsay et al, 2008; Cunningham, 2010). Huang 
(2016) challenges this status-quo by studying “rebel diplomacy” across history and 
continents. Likewise, Salehyan et al (2011) explore the linkages between rebels and 
foreign countries in explaining external support for insurgent groups. Building on their 
work, this chapter focused on the diplomatic activity by civil war actors. It differs from 
and complements the existing literature by studying the diplomacy of government 


















7 The Hustle of State Diplomacy: A Tale of Passports, Material 
Constraint, and Austerity  
 
 
This chapter assesses the interplay of diplomatic agency and institutional forms and 
functions, by examining in more detail the role of “the material”. In doing so, it follows 
a relational ontology (Jeffrey, 2017) that highlights the close interconnection between 
material resources, social relations, and professional practice. To uncover the scarcity 
of material resources and the uneven topology of diplomatic capacity within the 
Yemeni diplomatic service, Bourdieu’s concept of capital is applied. It helps analyse 
how economic resources interact with the value assigned to other, non-material 
attributes.  
Given its focus on the materiality of the Yemeni diplomatic service, this chapter 
emphasizes “economic capital”, which is defined as material properties that include, 
or are directly convertible to, money (Bourdieu, 1986). It is argued that the outbreak of 
civil war in Yemen in 2015 placed a limit on the economic capital provided by the 
government, including diplomatic salaries. This forced diplomats to rely increasingly 
on “side-hustles”, private savings, corruption, and the financial support of family 
members and friends. As a consequence, their network-based resources, or “social 
capital” (Bourdieu 1986), gained in importance.301 Being a relational and dynamic 
asset, diplomats’ social capital is closely tied to notions of family, friendship, trust, 
emotion, and patronage. To account for such complexity, this chapter draws on 
Ziersch (2005) in utilizing the following two sub-components: social capital 
infrastructure and social capital resources. Diplomats’ social capital infrastructure 
contains relational and affective elements, notably trust, as well as structural aspects, 
such as (overlapping) formal and informal professional and personal networks. Their 
social capital resources describe the social support that may result from these 
 
301 Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition” (p.247). 
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infrastructures, including for example material assets (i.e. economic capital) or 
diplomatic appointments to “valued” diplomatic missions.302  
Far from being equally popular, Yemeni embassies in various countries are commonly 
assigned different values by diplomats. The study of these “valuation processes” offers 
unique insight into the interaction between economic properties and other resources, 
such as cultural capital. Cultural capital denotes diplomats’ educational background, 
specifically their language skills, which is shown to play a mediating role in diplomats’ 
embassy preferences. The study of individual embassy valuations also highlights the 
significance of geographic location and spatial distance. The different values assigned 
to embassy posts do not equate a GDP map of the world but emerge from and through 
the interaction of multiple capitals and their relation to geographic space. A post in 
Paris, for instance, may offer the prestige and lifestyle of a “global city” (Sassen, 2005) 
to Yemeni diplomats with French language skills and the private funds to afford living 
there. 
A final asset that emerges in close reference to diplomats’ economic capital and plays 
a crucial role in the analysis of Yemen’s civil war, is “symbolic capital”. Encompassing 
abstract notions such as prestige, recognition, reputation, and authority, symbolic 
capital is frequently tied to the contested notion of statehood. Indeed, Bourdieu 
suggests that the construction of “the state” involves the gradual accumulation and 
centralization of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2014). By this logic, symbolic capital holds 
special relevance for diplomats and other high officials who claim to speak on behalf 
of the state. Since symbolic capital can only be enjoyed by virtue of already existing 
properties – provided these are deemed legitimate – it is often seen as a mechanism 
through which the value of other capitals is increased or undermined. In Yemen, 
symbolic capital emerged as a particularly contested asset in the aftermath of 2011, 
possibly due to its close relation with “the state” and legitimacy.  
To set the scene, the first part of this chapter outlines the general limitation of 
economic capital within the Yemeni diplomatic service, painting a picture that 
challenges widespread stereotypes of diplomatic luxury. It suggests that the limited 
provision of material benefits by the Yemeni government boosted the relative 
 
302 Ziersch (2005) names additional examples for social capital resource, such as social cohesion.  
 181 
importance of social capital resources. It also indicates that the fluid constellation(s) 
of unevenly distributed and scarce resources within the Yemeni diplomatic service 
impacted diplomatic practice. This insight provokes a set of reflections that is termed 
“poor state diplomacy” in this study. At its core, the concept of “poor state diplomacy” 
addresses the difficult reconciliation of resource scarcity with materially embedded 
diplomatic functions. Using empirical data from the “geopolitical margin”, it serves as 
a critical intervention in the Euro-centric field of diplomacy studies and its imaginations 
of global diplomatic uniformity. It challenges the idea of homogeneity that frequently 
underlies conceptions of diplomatic practice between and within national diplomatic 
services.  
To further elaborate on the fluid heterogeneity of diplomatic practice, the second and 
third parts of this chapter discuss two examples that illustrate the various ways in 
which economic capital, in interaction with other resources, shape diplomatic 
behaviours. The first example refers to the above-mentioned valuation of embassy 
posts, while the second example discusses diplomats’ engagement in financial 
corruption. Next, this chapter shifts focus onto Yemen’s crisis, examining how the 
outbreak of civil war has impacted the existing interplay of different capitals within the 
Yemeni diplomatic service. Again, given its interest in “the material”, particular 
attention is paid to economic capital, specifically the implementation of various 
austerity measures in 2015.  
The final part of this chapter examines the material and symbolic co-constitution of the 
Yemeni diplomatic apparatus by focusing on the changing functions of the passport. 
Building on a multidisciplinary body of literature that emphasizes the importance of 
“things” in the making of policies (Weisser, 2014; Dittmer, 2016; Barry, 2001, 2013; 
Neumann, 2007; Nicolini, 2009; Salter, 2003), it studies contestation of passports in 
the context of civil war. Traditionally the object of routine bureaucratic processes within 
the consular branch of Yemen’s diplomatic apparatus, the passport took on an 
important role in competing state claims and the militarized conflict for territorial control 
in 2015. Close analysis of the Yemeni passport suggests that certain ways of handling 
things may be inscribed into an artefact (Bueger, 2014), which can ‘‘authorize, allow, 
afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so 
on” (Latour, 2005, p.72).  
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I Countering stereotypes: the diplomacy of poor states 
“You think that diplomatic life is luxurious... – No, it is not!”303 
“You know that people here say that diplomats live the life of the Rocher 
advertisement?” asked one interviewee and laughed, pointing at a box of Rocher 
standing on the table between him and the researcher. He seemed amused by the 
discrepancy between his own life and the images broadcasted in a 1990s Rocher 
advertisement. Touting its world-famous pralines, the TV-ad showcased a glamorous 
diplomatic event inside a luxurious villa (Crowther, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 20: The Rocher Advert 
An ambassador summons a waiter to serve a pyramid of gold-wrapped chocolates.304 
 
 
303 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 February 2017. 





As the remainder of this chapter illustrates, the lavish lifestyle portrayed by Rocher 
was not self-evident in the case of Yemeni diplomats. Its realization depended on the 
multi-layered combination of their social and economic capital. “We have this 
reputation among people in Yemen: that we spend a lot of money, that we are rich, 
that we don’t work”, said one Yemeni diplomat, adding “well, in part that is true. But 
not always”.305 Whether or not Yemen’s state representatives could afford a life of 
luxury depended, among other things, on their rank, the embassy they worked in, their 
connections, and their families’ economic background.  
Highlighting the importance of diplomats’ individual economic and social capital, 
several interviewees distinguished between “rich” colleagues from well-off families and 
colleagues with a more modest family background. For those with limited personal 
funds it could be “a challenge […] to meet the diplomatic requirements,” as one 
diplomat put it, who went on to explain that the monthly salary of 150 US dollars in 
Yemen was “really, really modest”.306 His colleague agreed, saying, “those people that 
come from, let’s say, modest families, they struggle a lot”.307 Others, with access to 
considerable private funds, could meet the material standards and practices involved 
in diplomacy more readily.308  
Elaborating on these economic differences, one respondent used the example of 
clothing, saying that some diplomats struggled to pay for a simple suit, while others 
walked the ministry’s corridors wearing three to five thousand-dollar outfits.309 His 
colleague, presumably stemming from a better-off family, mocked the low income he 
received in Sanaa, saying “I used to take my salary, and on my way home I stopped 
by the shop and bought perfume for my wife”.310 Another diplomat openly admitted 
coming “from a wealthy family,” adding that he therefore “did not need [emphasized] 
to work”.311 Diplomats with considerable private funds were alleged to have joined the 
foreign service for non-material reasons, ranging from patriotism to their love of 
 
305 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
306 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
307 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
308 One diplomat confessed to ask his father for financial support whenever he found his income “was 
too low” (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017).  
309 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
310 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
311 Interview with a Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
 184 
adventure or wish to live abroad.312 These allegations were at least in part confirmed 
by a diplomat who described one posting as “a tourist attraction”313 and another as an 
invitation to “go and have fun”. After all, he explained, “there is no Yemeni company 
or community [in country xx], and vice versa. There is nothing to do”.314  
Apart from discussing material differences inside the Yemeni diplomatic service, 
diplomats compared their financial situation and lifestyle with that of other state 
representative. “Yemeni diplomats are the poorest in the world”,315 proclaimed one 
interviewee with fervour, while another postulated that his salary was lower than an 
Egyptian diplomat’s housing allowance. 316  Contrary to the glamorous images 
portrayed by Rocher and the popular media, Yemeni diplomats frequently live in small 
apartments in peripheral neighbourhoods, far away from the embassy and city centre. 
Those working in New York, for instance, were reported to live in New Jersey, having 
to drive an hour to work every morning. 317  Next to their modest housing, some 
diplomats struggled to pay for basic living expenses, which importantly included school 
fees for their children.318 International private schools were unaffordable for many 
diplomats, charging several thousand euros a year.319 Thus, children were sent to 
attend public state schools, where they were taught in the native language of their 
respective host country, which posed an obvious long-term challenge in their 
education.320 Given these difficulties, some diplomats decided to leave their families 
behind in Yemen.321 “You have to compromise”, explained a respondent, pointing to 
colleagues whose salary abroad was too low to cover the living expenses of their 
spouses and children.322  
Besides the drastic step of separating from one’s family, diplomats engaged in more 
banal acts of saving money. Trying to come up with an example, one respondent 
 
312 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
313 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
314 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 February 2017. 
315 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
316 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
317 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
318 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 July 2017. “The education of our children is our biggest 
problem,” explained one Yemeni diplomat (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017). 
319 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
320 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
321 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
322 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
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explained, “they ask themselves, do we need to go to this Café, for example, to spend 
money, while I can also have it at home”.323  
I.1. Reconciling limited economic capital and diplomatic practice? 
Limited economic capital, notably reflected in low salaries and embassy budgets, did 
not only impact diplomats’ lifestyle, but also impeded their professional activity. As one 
diplomat put it, “diplomacy is relations, is activities, is moving around and making 
invitations. When you cannot do that because of the financial situation, of course it will 
freeze you, you cannot work”. 324  His colleague agreed, “I am a diplomat, I am 
appointed […] not to stay at home but to meet people, to invite them, to discuss with 
them...”.325 The inability to pay for restaurants and the reluctance to invite guests into 
small apartments,326 reduced the (net)working strategies available to diplomats. This 
insight supports an argument made by former career diplomat Carne Ross (2007), 
who found that “contemporary diplomacy is deeply unbalanced and unfair […]. Big, 
rich and established countries have large cadres of experienced, well-trained and well-
resourced diplomats who are able to dominate negotiations” (p.24).  
The global heterogeneity of inter-state diplomatic practice can be traced to past 
colonialism, when diplomacy “stood in the service of empire building, rather than a 
means to communicate with, understand and mediate ‘the Other’” (Constantinou & 
DerDerian, 2010, p.11). As illustrated in chapter four, colonized “non-sovereign” states 
were subjugated to European rulers and excluded from the global diplomatic system. 
As Constantinou and DerDerian (2010) put it, they “were often found lacking in 
Western civility and denied the diplomatic identity” (p.10). 
Importantly, material limitations did not equally apply to all Yemeni embassies and 
diplomats, pointing to the important role of both social capital and geographic location 
in diplomatic practice: 
 
323 Since diplomats’ salary abroad, no matter how low, still exceeded Yemeni standards, motivation 
was high to save money whilst outside the country, which could then be spent on a house, a car, or 
school fees once back in Yemen (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017.).  
324 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
325 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
326 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
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“There are rich embassies around the world, in Riyadh or London. If you want 
to make an invitation to your home, you will do everything and then you give 
the bill to the embassy and they will give you the money. But if you want to do 
that in Warsaw, or in Budapest, or Vienna, they don’t have this budget, they 
cannot do that. It depends on the embassy”.327 
Notwithstanding such rare material wealth, official diplomatic events have reportedly 
declined across all Yemeni embassies since the outbreak of war. Cultural happenings, 
such as photo exhibitions, were described as “rare”: “because it costs money and the 
ambassadors fear… – they don’t want to spend money on these things because [they 
think that] maybe they have to pay the locals, the rent, the bills”.328 Accordingly, 
Yemeni embassies were said to have engaged in “minimum work” in 2016/17, 
involving little more than administrative necessities, such as consular procedures.329 
This observation resonates with an argument made in the previous chapter, indicating 
that the degree of diplomatic activity is fluid, always dependent on shifting and uneven 
socio-material contexts. It also corresponds with the notion of “minimum diplomacy” 
expressed elsewhere. Wojciech (2020), for instance, reports that European diplomats 
in North Korea describe their practices there as “diplomacy at its minimum”: 
“purposefully short-staffed, faced with no real demand for consular services or 
performing traditional diplomatic duties” (n.p.). 
Low salaries also undermined diplomats’ representative practices, including 
diplomats’ own appearance. In the words of one respondent, “you cannot meet the 
requirements to be the image of the good diplomat”.330 He went on to elaborate, 
“I think a good diplomat has, not a fancy, but a good-looking suit. Or formal suit. 
Even this – I know [it] is something very small – but even this is difficult for our 
friends. It is not easy for them. With 150 dollars a month you have to pay the 
rent, the monthly expenses”.331  
 
327 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
328 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
329 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
330 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
331 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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His colleague agreed that diplomats “have to have” a lifestyle that was unaffordable to 
many Yemeni representatives – especially those working on “domestic incomes” in 
Sanaa. “You have to have nice suits, nice tie, you have to have a nice car, you have 
to have a nice house. So, with the salary we get when we are inside you cannot do 
any of that”.332 Diplomats, he claimed, have to look representative, “in every way […] 
even when you go to the gym. I cannot just have any clothes”. His colleague agreed, 
saying, “diplomacy is all about images”, which cost money. “We cannot portray nice 
images” he concluded. “Our diplomats live in poor neighbourhoods […], they live a life 
like the Roma and Sinti”, he said and laughed.333 
As these examples suggest, diplomatic practice differs not only between diplomatic 
services of rich and poor states, but also between rich and poor embassies and 
diplomats of a single country. The degree to which Yemeni diplomats could comply 
with perceived diplomatic requirements, both in terms of specific practices and 
images, reflected an uneven topology of diplomatic capacity. Some of the interviewed 
ambassadors owned houses in expensive European capitals and could afford wearing 
costly brands, while other diplomats admitted their financial struggle. In particular, 
limited material resources impeded the conduct of material diplomatic practices, such 
as the hosting of dinner parties.334  
To highlight the heterogeneity of diplomatic practice and its fluid interaction with scarce 
and unevenly distributed resources, this chapter develops and foregrounds the 
concept of “poor state diplomacy”. As the Yemeni case study suggests, the global 
diplomatic playing field is marked by unequal capitals, material and otherwise, which 
in turn leads to differences in diplomats’ subjectivity and practice, both between and 
within national foreign services. Notwithstanding such disparity, as of yet, little has 
been written about the impact of limited government funds on diplomatic lifestyles and 
the form and effectiveness of diplomatic practice. By describing diplomatic practices 
 
332 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
333 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017. 
334 While scarce economic capital limited some diplomatic activities, they nurtured others, for example 
fund-raising (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 February 2017). Several Yemeni diplomats reported 
to have fallen into the graces of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh by securing aid and investment 
abroad. “Our diplomats are like beggars when they meet diplomats from Gulf countries,” remarked 
one respondent, who accused some of his colleagues of sharing tragic, heart-warming stories to 
obtain donations at diplomatic events. “They always have a paper or something with them that they 
want others to sign, asking for money” (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017). 
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and institutional forms marked by material scarcity, the notion of “poor state diplomacy” 
addresses this scholarly gap. It challenges predominant ideal- and stereotypes in both 
public discourse and diplomatic theory, specifically notions of uniformity and luxury.  
To further illustrate the various ways in which economic (and other) capital shapes 
diplomats’ subjectivity and practice, two specific examples are discussed in the 
following: the valuation of embassies and unofficial payments within the Yemeni 
diplomatic service.  
II The geographical valuation of embassies  
The distinction between working “at home” and working “abroad” had direct material 
implications, with diplomats in Yemen earning a fraction of what their colleagues 
abroad would receive. While this rendered foreign posts attractive, specific embassy 
preferences depended on the location-specific interplay of diplomats’ cultural, social, 
and economic resources. The combination and relative weight of these factors differed 
on an individual basis, and there was no uniform popularity ranking. Yemen’s foreign 
ministry never formally graded its embassy locations, which set it apart from Arab 
counterparts like Egypt, where embassy-hosting countries were grouped into A, B, C, 
and D clusters. “A”-countries were typically powerful and rich, offering a pleasant 
lifestyle and more impactful professional tasks, while “D”-countries were more 
challenging to live in and arguably of lesser political and economic relevance.  
In Yemen, diplomats’ valuation of foreign posts was comparatively more fluid, 
including aspects such as language skills, local salaries, as well as living expenses. 
Cities like Paris were considered prestigious, offering a historical and picturesque 
place to live in, but were also known to be costly.335 When asked, one Yemeni diplomat 
smiled and responded, “the reputation of France is that it is really expensive. So, they 
run away from France”.336 His colleague agreed, adding that Paris was unattractive to 
most diplomats due to its high prices and French language requirements.337 Two 
further disadvantages included the small number of Yemeni diplomats in Paris, which 
 
335 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
336 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
337 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
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led to a comparatively heavy workload for each, and the fact that legal regulations for 
foreign diplomats were claimed to be “less favourable” in France than elsewhere, 
denying tax exemptions, for example. “For the high [Yemeni] bourgeoisie it is nice to 
go to Paris”, one diplomat summed it up, “but not for others”.338 As the example of 
Paris illustrates, different forms of capital, often in interaction with geo-political 
specificities, inform embassies’ perceived popularity.   
The outbreak of civil war in 2015 changed the relative value and constellation of 
sought-after resources. Refuge and access to economic capital emerged as 
particularly crucial factors. When asked about popular embassies in 2017, diplomats 
pointed to Riyadh, Cairo, Amman, London, Ottawa, and Berlin. While this list is not 
exhaustive, it offers insight into the value ascribed to different embassy locations at 
the time. “In the United Kingdom, London, in Cairo, in Saudi Arabia […], these are the 
countries that people are willing to go to, and to get posted to […] maybe for financial 
benefits or to ask for asylum,” claimed one diplomat.339 In his view, the embassies in 
Germany and the UK had emerged as particularly attractive choices since the 
outbreak of war, a development he linked to the prospect of gaining asylum. “[My 
colleagues want] to stay a few years [in the embassy in Germany] and then ask for 
asylum. Even in the UK. And the government knows, everybody knows”.340  
A similar line of reasoning was offered by reference to Canada,341 with one interviewee 
suggesting that it was comparatively easy for Yemeni diplomats there to stay in the 
country after completion of their official term, either requesting asylum 342  or 
citizenship. 343  These statements suggest a shift in diplomats’ narratives that 
foregrounds notions of refuge. Next to Germany, the UK, and Canada, Egypt and 
Jordan were named as potential safe shelters for diplomats and their families, arguably 
offering favourable immigration laws and a “facilitating” Arabic-speaking environment.  
 
338 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 January 2017. 
339 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
340 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
341 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 
2017. 
342 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
343 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
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In addition to notions of safety, access to economic capital constituted an important 
motivating factor in individual embassy preferences. At a time in which the exiled 
government was unable to reliably provide a budget to diplomatic missions abroad, 
embassy funds depended primarily on the selling of documentation, such as visas and 
trade licenses. As discussed in more detail below, these funds were frequently used 
to raise staff salaries. Being among the few countries that received incoming flights 
from Yemen, Egypt and Jordan emerged as particularly important points of transit, 
witnessing a quickly growing Yemeni diaspora. This, again, turned Yemeni embassies 
there into central bureaucratic hubs that issued an increasing number of relevant 
papers and documentation and produced considerable revenue. As one interviewee 
put it, “thousands and thousands of Yemenis [are in Cairo], who all need stamps to 
get their stuff done”.344 
Next to Egypt and Jordan, Saudi Arabia was named as a particularly lucrative post, 
not least because of its proximity to Yemen. “There are over a million Yemenis living 
in Saudi Arabia, they are issuing them new passports,” explained one diplomat.345 His 
colleague agreed that “in Riyadh or in Jeddah, we have a million Yemenis […]. So, 
this money [gained through the issuance of travel documentation] is around millions 
in the Gulf countries”.346 Moreover, living in a neighbouring state allegedly allowed 
diplomats to pursue commercial interests in Yemen. “You can be an attaché, for 
example, and run your own business on the side”, one diplomat claimed.347 “It is like 
home” said another respondent, pointing to cultural similarities, shared language, and 
the large Yemeni diaspora in Saudi Arabia, especially in Jeddah. While not everyone 
agreed on the supposed advantage of living in Saudi Arabia, 348  discussion 
surrounding the differences in embassy-specific meanings illuminates the interplay of 
different capitals at work. To further examine the role of economic resources in the 
reproduction of diplomatic practice, the following section analyses ways in which 
Yemeni diplomats resorted to, and made sense of, corruption. 
 
344 Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016. 
345 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017; 
Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
346 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
347 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 11 January 2017. 
348 One diplomat complained that it was difficult for Yemenis who lived in Saudi Arabia to bring their 
families with them (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017). 
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III Corruption: “to survive as a diplomat you have to be rich or corrupt” 
 “The root cause of corruption [is] the passion for luxurious living within the ruling 
group”  
(Rahman Ibn Kaldun cited in Klitgaard, 1988, p.7). 
As indicated above, official budgets and salaries have traditionally been limited within 
the Yemeni foreign service, causing adaptations in lifestyle and practice that challenge 
mainstream images of diplomatic luxury. In response, Yemen’s foreign policy 
professionals unlocked alternative sources of income. One diplomat reported to have 
had a side job while being posted abroad,349 while many others relied on their families’ 
financial support. Informal revenues and payments inside embassies constituted a 
further important means of circumventing existing material constraints. Diplomats 
variously referred to these benefits as “additional income” and corruption. 350  By 
analysing the creation and distribution of informal economical capital, this section 
shows how closely the performance of state power is connected to individual material 
benefits and how blurred the lines between official and unofficial diplomatic practice 
can be. These findings corroborate existing research on bureaucracies that operate 
under conditions of limited accountability, contested administrative norms, and scarce 
material resources (Jeffrey, 2002; Khan, 1996, 2000; Tidey, 2016; Bersch et al, 2017). 
Following diplomatic accounts, corruption is understood in this chapter as the 
allocation of material rewards that is neither merit-based nor legally regulated. This 
conceptualization of corruption is not limited to the transgression of Weberian 
distinctions between public office and private gain. Instead, it suggests that the “forms 
of desire that fuel corruption are […] profoundly social, shaped by larger sociocultural 
notions of power, privilege, and responsibility” (Hasty, 2005, p.271). As such, so-called 
corruption is deeply embedded in institutional history, as has been shown in chapter 
three and four. In Yemen, the distribution of benefits among diplomats has long 
foregrounded notions of neo-patrimonialism, nepotism, and clientelism, which linked 
rewards to notions of loyalty, trust, and kinship, to name just a few examples. 
 
349 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017. 
350 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
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Diplomatic accounts of corruption were often clouded in humour and insinuation. Yet, 
corruption persistently emerged as a topic closely tied to diplomats’ emotions, ethical 
selfhood, and professional ideals. In a few instances, respondents openly criticized 
corruption and expressed their wish for change, probably motivated by the context of 
Yemen’s crisis (Grindle, 2012). 
As indicated above, a popular way of generating unaccounted economic capital, or 
“additional income”, was consular work, specifically the certification and issuing of 
legal documents.351 According to Yemeni diplomats, it was common to charge prices 
that exceeded official fees. Embassy employees thereby generated cash that was not 
sent back to the ministry but stayed inside the embassy, or rather “in the hands of the 
ambassador”.352 Alternative practises of enrichment were said to include payments for 
made-up employees, including drivers and gardeners,353 and rents that exceeded real 
costs.354 “Some Yemeni embassies,” one diplomat claimed, “can make ambassadors 
really rich”.355  
Confirming broad scholarly consensus (Gupta, 1995; Klitgaard, 1988; Karklins, 2002), 
diplomats linked corruption within the Yemeni foreign service to the lack of 
accountability. “Let's say I took some money, and it is being discovered. Nothing will 
happen when discovered, especially if I am well connected,” claimed one 
interviewee. 356  This highlights a close connection between economic and social 
capital. While foreign ministry employees would, in theory, check ambassadors’ 
expense claims, they were accused of condoning ambassadors’ corruption, in return 
for receiving a share of the profit thereby produced.357 In fact, it appears that a network 
of influential figures, including a number of ambassadors, financial attachés, and high-
 
351 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 
2017. 
352 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017; 
Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
353 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. These practices resemble the corrupt practice of 
claiming salaries for “ghost employees” elsewhere in the Yemeni public service. “Ghost employees” 
are workers who receive government salaries but either do not exist or who do not report to work. 
“There are few reliable statistics as to their prevalence, but anecdotal evidence suggests they number 
in the tens of thousands” (Rageh et al, 2016). 
354 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
355 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
356 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
357 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
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ranking ministry employees, benefitted from existing corruption practices.358 “They 
play with it,” one diplomat said in a bitter tone.359  
It is not uncommon for actors knowledgeable of corruption to also profit by its 
continuance. As Klitgaard (1988) put it, “corruption has self-serving aspects to those 
in power, not only as a means for lining one’s pockets but as a mechanism for political 
dealing, forging linkages, and even inducing political participation” (p.3). In the context 
of this study, corruption emerged as an important alternative funding scheme for 
embassies.  
While Yemeni ambassadors and high-ranking ministry officials benefitted most from 
corrupt practices, the fruits of corruption were sometimes distributed downwards. As 
one Yemeni diplomat described the corruption habits in Yemen’s foreign service, “the 
ambassador takes the biggest share of it [the “additional income”], then the financial 
attaché, then the counsellor. The other diplomats, if [emphasized] it's a huge amount 
of money, they give them a monthly support”.360 Allegedly, some diplomats relied on 
their “additional salary” in covering basic expenses, such as insurance costs, rent, or 
school fees. 361  In fact, one respondent described existing corruption practices, 
specifically the distribution of “additional income” in embassies, as a customary law. 
Once in place, he claimed, unwritten distribution practices were verbally passed on to 
new embassy employees, including new ambassadors. Although the latter were not 
formally obliged to follow the distribution habits of their predecessors, most of them 
did. 362  The allocation of “additional income” inside Yemen’s foreign service 
corresponds with existing research on corrupt government systems. Karklins (2002), 
for instance, finds that “quite often the salaries of state officials and civil servants are 
supplemented with hidden second salaries and bonuses […] paid at the discretion of 
supervisors, which gives them extensive leverage” (pp.25&27).  
Further illustrating the “institutionalization” of corrupt practices, one respondent shared 
a narrative describing a phone call received by a Yemeni ambassador from within the 
ministry’s department for administrative and financial affairs. Allegedly, the 
 
358 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
359 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 2017. 
360 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
361 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
362 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
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ambassador was instructed to complement official salaries of diplomats in his 
embassy by allocating a specific monthly stipend to each. Said request was 
supposedly given by reference to local living expenses, which were deemed too high 
to be covered by official means.363 With the customization of “corrupt” practices, public 
institutions, such as embassies, start resembling “private fiefdoms serving the whims 
of entrenched lords” (Karklins, 2002, p.25). In these instances, ambassadors, consuls, 
or financial attachés emerge as patrons, or brokers, who routinely disburse state 
resources.364 Such brokerage is not regulated by formal legal codes but by custom 
and social relations. It increases the resources that may potentially be extracted 
through diplomats’ social capital infrastructures.  
The outbreak of war in 2015 impacted the amount and geographic availability of 
“additional income”. Diplomatic missions that had previously benefitted from trade-
based corruption, for instance, experienced a sudden decline in their income.365 Given 
Yemen’s plummeting trade relations and a subsequent drop of funds, some 
ambassadors decided to stop, or at least lessen, the “additional income” paid to lower-
ranked diplomats. “Because there is less money now. It is not enough to split and to 
give to the other diplomats,” remarked one interviewee.366 While this example points 
to the financial suffering of embassies, not all Yemeni missions were negatively 
affected by the outbreak of war. As already mentioned, some benefitted from 
increased consular work, especially the issuance of travel documentation, such as 
visa or passports. 367  One diplomat described such inter-institutional discrepancy, 
saying: 
“In London they have a consular income, from consular fees, so they keep 
managing. But there are embassies, like the one in Prague, they don't have 
 
363 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017. 
364 In his research on low-ranking officials in India, Jeffrey (2002) establishes “malfeasance” that 
involves “low-ranking officials who act as patrons or brokers in the disbursement of state resources” 
(p.21). 
365 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 September 
2017. 
366 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
367 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. Next to London, other “lucrative” embassy 
locations included Riyadh and Jeddah. Yemeni embassies in these countries were said to “have a lot 
of income, locally generated, which has always been stolen and distributed within the embassy” 
(Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016). 
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students, they don't have expats, they don't have anything, so they don't have 
an income, so these ones really suffer. Spain is the same”.368  
Reflecting upon his own explanation, the diplomat paused for a moment, to then sum 
up the situation, saying: “So that's how it works. Some embassies can survive, others 
suffer”.369 Notwithstanding singular cases of material wealth, the Yemeni diplomatic 
service as a whole was negatively affected by the outbreak of war. As a consequence, 
a series of austerity measures was developed at the institutional and individual level, 
which will be discussed in the following section.  
IV Austerity in the diplomatic service: “our team around the world is being 
paid by Qatar”  
Besides triggering a decline in official embassy budgets, the outbreak of war led to the 
cut, suspension, and delay of diplomatic salaries. As a rule, Yemeni diplomats are 
paid quarterly, in US dollars, through the Central Bank in Sanaa, specifically its foreign 
reserves.370 Each quarter, foreign ministry officials would send their payroll – a list of 
employees and salaries – to the Central Bank, which would then transfer payments to 
Yemeni diplomats across the world. Allegedly, this routine was challenged following 
the Houthi takeover. Members of the Houthi movement were said to have tried “to stop 
the payment of [diplomatic] salaries,” arguably being “upset about how the conflict was 
being represented abroad”. 371  Notwithstanding such contestation, diplomats 
continued receiving their wages through the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) until 2016. 
The continuous provision of economic capital was linked to the work of diplomats 
within the foreign ministry in Sanaa, who were said to have “defended” their colleagues 
abroad. 372  More importantly, Central Bank representatives emphasized the 
technocratic and apolitical nature of their work.373 Throughout the 2011 uprising, the 
political transition, and the outbreak of war, Central Bank officials insisted on following 
ministerial payment instructions, no matter who was listed on payrolls or in charge of 
 
368 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
369 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
370 Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016. 
371 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
372 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
373 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2017. 
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ministries (Browning, 2016).374 In fact, Rageh et al (2016) reported a “tacit agreement” 
between representatives of the Hadi and the Houthi government in 2015, assenting 
“to respect the neutrality of the CBY and not to interfere in Central Bank operations”.  
In spite of the CBY’s ongoing operations, diplomats’ salaries were reportedly cut in 
half in the last two quarters of 2015.375 In trying to elucidate such cuts, respondents 
put forth different reasons. It was unclear whether the plurality and divergence of 
presented “explanations” reflected a politically-inspired blame game or resulted from 
honest confusion. Studies and a number of diplomatic reports376 suggest that cuts 
were induced by the Central Bank’s limited foreign reserves. “With the general 
decrease in government revenues due to the war, the CBY’s cash distributions were 
reduced in 2015 to cover only basic operating expenses” (Rageh et al, 2016).  
Diplomats’ cut in salary points to the material challenge of maintaining Yemen’s 
diplomatic service at a time of division and conflict. To address the difficulty of 
procuring sufficient economic capital, the exiled Hadi government began launching a 
number of austerity measures, including the outsourcing and delay of diplomats’ 
payments.  
In December 2015, Yemen’s exiled government was promised 40 million US dollar by 
Qatari authorities in support of its diplomatic service (Khatib, 2015; Mosnad, 2015).377 
Throughout the subsequent year, full diplomatic salaries were paid by Qatari funds, 
provided in four quarterly instalments of 10 million each.378 As a Yemeni diplomat 
observed in late 2016, “now the foreign service relies on Qatari donations”.379 Qatar’s 
role in the financial sustenance of Yemeni diplomats constitutes an example of 
“outsourced” services that is rarely discussed in the context of diplomacy.380 In fact, 
 
374 In June 2016 the IMF Mission Chief for Yemen, Albert Jaeger, publicly stated: “The central bank is 
certainly serious about being neutral in a very difficult political and security setting” (cited in Rageh et 
al, 2016). 
375 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
376 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017; Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 
November 2016. 
377 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
378 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; Interview with a Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 
2017. 
379 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
380 To date, only Rijks and Whitman (2007) speculate whether certain diplomatic services of the 
European External Action Service, such as consular-type work, might be more effectively conducted 
by outsourcing it to other organisations. 
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diplomatic and security institutions are among the few government branches that have 
remained relatively closed to non-nationals, supposedly due to the risk of foreign 
meddling and sabotage. Against this backdrop, the payment of a country’s diplomatic 
service by a foreign power constitutes a novelty that falls within this chapter’s concept 
of “poor state diplomacy”.  
The involvement of Qatar came at a time in which members of the Hadi cabinet broke 
official ties with the CBY. In the second half of 2016, Hadi officials publicly labelled 
ministerial payrolls as “partisan” and announced they would no longer cooperate with 
the Central Bank (Rageh et al, 2016). In September 2016, they accused the acting 
CBY governor of being a Houthi supporter, replaced him, and proclaimed the CBY’s 
relocation to Aden, which lied outside the Houthi sphere of influence. This decision 
was implemented in spite of its known negative impact on Yemeni citizens, including 
civil servants whose payment was put on hold for months on end (Rageh et al, 2016). 
A Western diplomat commented at the time: "The concern is that the Yemeni 
government, and implicitly the Saudi-led coalition behind them, are trying to 
weaponize the economy” (cited in Rageh et al 2016).  
Besides paying diplomats with money provided by Qatar, members of the exiled Hadi 
cabinet engaged in a range of austerity measures, allegedly cutting payments toward 
diplomats’ international health insurance and the tuition fees of their children.381 In 
addition, diplomatic salaries were delayed throughout 2016 and 2017. Having to wait 
for up to six months for his payment,382 one diplomat complained, “no salary, no 
insurance, no money for the education of your children, no tickets to visit family 
members… all of this is missing”.383 Lacking state support and unable to get a loan, 
diplomats increasingly relied on the financial support of family networks and friends.384 
One diplomat explained, “I have some savings” and “I have my relatives”.385 His 
colleague admitted with laughter that he as well had asked his family for help: 
 
381 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 
2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
382 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
383 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 January 2017 
384 Interview with Yemeni diplomatic staff member, 7 December 2016; Interview with Yemeni 
diplomat, 13 January 2017 
385 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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“The embassies support [you] sometimes, because a lot of them […] they have 
cash from, ehm, certain things, so they can support the diplomats for one, two, 
three months. Then the diplomats have to see if they can find any support from 
their families, from friends...something like that”.386  
The unpredictability of payments made it difficult for diplomats to plan ahead, which 
caused stress. “If they told us, ‘see we will gonna give you your salary in January’, 
then you are gonna prepare yourself […]. But they said, 'we have no idea when we 
are going to send the salary’”.387 His colleague added that diplomats “suffered”: “each 
ambassador I talk to is angry, not angry, but like stuck”.388 Diplomats showed mixed 
emotions in discussing their delayed payments. While some seemed 
understanding,389 others were upset: 
“I am a diplomat I am not supposed to ask my family to spend on me […]. Even 
if my family wants to help. How much would it be? You know with countries like 
Switzerland, the UK, and then I am not the only son they have”.390  
Austerity within the Yemeni diplomatic service also manifested itself in the materiality 
of diplomatic institutions. In some cases, expensive rented real estate was given up 
for cheaper options, causing the move of embassies and ambassadors.391 In Berlin, 
for instance, the Yemeni embassy moved from a rented property into the 
ambassador’s villa, which was owned by the Yemeni government. The ambassador, 
in turn, had to move to a smaller apartment.392 In London, limited funding was visibly 
reflected in the appearance of the Yemeni embassy, whose white walls had turned 
grey in late 2016, marked by large areas of crumbling paint. Likewise, the boiler inside 
the Yemeni embassy building broke down in winter 2016-17, leaving the entire 
Victorian townhouse without heating. With apparently no money available for repairs, 
employees had to work for months in cold offices, wearing winter jackets and relying 
 
386 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
387 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 August 2017. 
388 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
389 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
390 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 31 March 2017. 
391 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 13 February 2017. 
392 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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on provisional electric heaters.393 The image was anything but glorious, providing yet 
another counter-example to mainstream narratives of diplomatic luxury. 
Clearly, the appearance of diplomatic buildings impacts the production of “big picture” 
representations. Historically speaking, their pomp and lavishness were thought to 
represent the respective wealth and power of aristocratic heads of state (Nicolson, 
1936; Harr, 1969). Till this day, the architecture of embassy buildings is marked by 
considerable symbolism (Gournay & Loeffler, 2002). In a rare study of diplomatic 
architecture, Loeffler (1998) argues that “embassies are symbolically charged 
buildings uniquely defined by domestic politics, foreign affairs, and a complex set of 
representational requirements” (p.3). While run-down facades and interiors might taint 
the image of state grandness and capacity, this chapter suggests that the material 
endurance of diplomatic institutions is essential to the illusion of state permanence 
and legitimacy. Unlike other state buildings, whose material manifestation and 
effectiveness were impacted by institutional moves or duplications, Yemeni 
embassies’ existence and operations have remained fairly untouched by domestic 
turmoil. Displaying an image of stability, their main structures persisted, and highly 
symbolic objects, such as stamps and flags, continued to facilitate day-to-day 
diplomatic practices. 
So far, this chapter’s analysis examined the changing availability and distribution of 
economic capital within the Yemeni diplomatic service, paying particular attention to 
its interaction with a variety of other resources. It highlighted the material struggle 
faced by many Yemeni diplomats and outlined the coping strategies they developed. 
In the process of analysing how material constraints impacted diplomatic practice, this 
chapter has developed the notion of “poor state diplomacy”. Simply put, it describes 
diplomatic practice and institutional form marked by material scarcity. While foreign 
policy institutions might share the same symbolic markers, such as flags, portraits of 
state leaders, and formal dress codes, a look beyond the surface uncovers 
considerable differences, revealing the uneven distribution of resources and capacity 
between and within them. 
 
393 Interview with Yemeni diplomatic staff member, 7 December 2016. 
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The following and last part of this chapter focuses on a specific object which holds 
great symbolic capital and has long played a central role in the day-to-day work of 
diplomats: the passport. Changes in its usage and perceived value are linked to 
broader theorisations of the Yemeni state. Being crucial to competing state-claims in 
Yemen, the passport is treated as a material “surface into which the state’s symbolic 
capital can be inscribed” (Dittmer, 2017, p.8). In fact, this chapter follows previous 
research in suggesting that “the passport – that little paper booklet with the power to 
open international doors – seemed the perfect vehicle through which to explore some 
of the most important features of modern nation-states” (Torpey, 2018, p.xi). In 
Yemen, passports were closely tied to state sovereignty, playing a central role in its 
contested (re)-production during war.  
V The materiality of state sovereignty: a struggle for data and passports 
As suggested above, the international projection of state sovereignty hinges on the 
continuance of Yemen’s existing diplomatic infrastructure. In the following analysis, 
the micro-level contestation underlying such material continuity is exemplified by 
zooming-in on the technical modalities of passport production systems. Passports are 
viewed as objects of “sovereign power and as a documentary attempt to project the 
power of the sovereign state toward other states” (Salter, 2003, p.12). In Yemen, 
passports emerged as an important tool in competing state-claims, not only at an 
international but also at a national level. In fact, the study of Yemeni passports 
collapses the alleged separation between external and internal sovereignty. It shows 
that the provision of internationally recognized passports constituted an important 
means in national claims to territorial control and state power.        
Conditioning global movement and refuge, passports, especially diplomatic passports, 
became increasingly valuable to Yemenis with the outbreak of war. 394  Ordinary 
passports have traditionally been provided by the interior ministry’s “department of 
immigration, passports, and nationality” (maslaha al-hijrah wa al-jawazaat wa al-
jinsiyyah) in Sanaa, as well as its branches in various Yemeni governorates and 
 
394 Issued in 1990, the Yemeni passport law distinguishes between diplomatic, special, service, and 
ordinary passports (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014). 
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Yemeni embassies abroad (Yemeni Passport Law No.63, 1991).395 Being sold at a 
profit, passports were widely referred to as “documents with value”,396 according to 
one Yemeni diplomat.  
While the passport can be considered a “national object”, it is subject to a world of 
international visa restrictions. The regular Yemeni passport is listed at the bottom of 
global “passport power” rankings, only followed by passports issued in Somalia, Syria, 
Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, in that order. This means that Yemeni passport 
holders can only enter a few countries without an initial access visa, including 
Dominica, Ecuador, Haiti, Malaysia, Micronesia, Palestinian territories, St. Vincent and 
the Grandines, Sudan, and Syria (Passport Index, 2019).  
Contrary to ordinary Yemeni passports, diplomatic passports offer the advantage of 
circumventing at least some, if not all, of the visa requirements abroad and are issued 
by the foreign ministry’s protocol department (Yemeni Passport Law No.63, 1991). 
Given the global mobility ‘inscribed’ in them, “everyone wants a diplomatic passport,” 
according to a senior Yemeni diplomat, who used to work in the ministry’s protocol 
department. Allegedly, the demand for diplomatic passports used to be so high that 
Ali Abdullah Saleh himself had a hand-written note framed and placed over the desk 
of the department’s director: “No one gets a diplomatic passport unless he deserves 
it”.397  
While the international diplomatic passport system is heavily regulated by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations specialized 
agency,398 national governments remain responsible for central tasks involved in the 
production, distribution, and management of their national passports. For example, 
Yemeni government authorities must secure the validity of passports and avoid 
identity fraud. To do so, they typically run background checks, using basic information 
 
395 In conversation with Yemeni diplomats, the interior ministry’s department of immigration, 
passports, and nationality was more loosely referred to as the “passport agency” (Maslaha al-
Jawazat) (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017). Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 1 
December 2016 
396 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
397 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 12 July 2017. 
398 The contemporary system of passports bears witness to considerable inter-state cooperation 
marked by “an overarching set of norms and prescriptions to which individual states must respond” 
(Torpey, 2018, p.4).  
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stored locally on large data servers in Sanaa.399  Given the importance of these 
servers, passport-related processes were described as “centralized” by Yemeni 
diplomats, with passports or information requests being sent from embassies and 
consulates around the world to Yemen’s capital (Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, 2014).400 As will be shown in the remaining part of this chapter, the geo-
material centralization of the Yemeni passport system became problematic following 
the Hadi government’s re-location to Riyadh in 2015.  
The production and management of passports emerged as an important source of 
revenue with the outbreak of war, not only in embassies, as discussed above, but also 
inside the ministry in Sanaa. Once Houthis took control of government buildings in 
Yemen’s capital in late 2014, they gained access to empty passport booklets that were 
stored in the interior and foreign ministries. The process of printing and distributing 
(diplomatic) passports subsequently fell into their hands. Rumours circulated among 
Yemeni diplomats abroad, suggesting that diplomatic passports were sold by Houthis 
for at least 5000 US dollars each – in complete defiance of official eligibility criteria.401 
“A lot of people wanted diplomatic passports so if you paid high enough then you would 
get it,” claimed several interviewees.402 One diplomat specified, “because when you 
have a diplomatic passport you can go to Cairo or Jordan without a previous visa”.403 
While the number of stockpiled booklets in Sanaa could not be established with any 
certainty, it became clear that the Houthis would not be able to import any new 
booklets, which were produced abroad. “They can't! A militia asking for passports?! It 
won't go,” said one Yemeni diplomat and laughed loudly.404 Another explained that the 
 
399 Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016. 
400 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
401 Yemen’s passport law contains a list of candidates eligible to request and carry diplomatic 
passports. It includes members of parliament who travel in an official capacity, members of the 
diplomatic and consular corps, including their wives and underaged children, and high-ranking cabinet 
members, such as the prime minister, or the advisor to the prime minister (Yemeni Passport Law 
No.63, 1991). 
402 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 10 July 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; 
Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016. 
403 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
404 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
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company producing passport booklets “does not deal with anyone, if there is any 
question of legitimacy or whatever, then they would not produce new passports”.405  
These findings support an argument made by Torpey (2018), who found that passports 
“may indicate acceptance by one state of the existence of another state, a matter of 
paramount importance to those wishing to be so recognized” (p.204). In Yemen, the 
Houthis’ lacking international recognition was translated into lacking access to globally 
circulating symbolic capital (inscribed in passport booklets). This, in turn, undermined 
their ability to provide basic state services and related claims to internal sovereignty. 
According to Eckes (2015), the link between external recognition and internal 
sovereignty is not uncommon,  
“effective action at the international level […] also necessarily enhances internal 
sovereignty. Some go as far as stating that the 'identity as a sovereign [entity] 
with legitimate and respected internal authority depends upon ... participation 
in ... international society'” (p.44). 
Notably, Houthis were excluded from the international production of passport booklets, 
which in the Yemeni case were reportedly obtained from Germany.406 The most known 
provider of passport booklets in Germany is “Veridos”, a public-private venture that 
was founded in 2015. It claims to provide “sophisticated identity solutions for 
governments and their citizens” (Veridos, 2018). In addition to its headquarters in 
Berlin and operating facility in Munich, the company is represented in Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico, Singapore, the USA, and the UAE (Wallstreet Online, 2018). In fact, Veridos 
started a joint venture with the UAE's interior ministry’s “Privatization Group for 
Resource Development L.L.C”. Based in Abu Dhabi, the “Emirates German Security 
Printing” claims to “serve markets in the United Arab Emirates and the Middle East 
region with state-of-the-art identity solutions in accordance with German quality and 
security standards” (Emirates German Security Printing L.L.C., 2019). Close 
examination of the Veridos website offers insight into the policies of a booklet-
 
405 Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016. One diplomat suggested, Houthis ran 
short in booklets and began to reserve the issuance of passports for emergencies, or for particularly 
well-known individuals (Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017). 
406 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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producing company, exemplifying the material and normative embeddedness of 
Yemen’s passport production.  
 
Figure 21: Veridos Company Website 
The website of Veridos company emphasizes its contribution to Iraqi sovereignty.407 
 
Using political vocabulary, Veridos highlights the influence it has on state sovereignty. 
In December 2018, for instance, the company’s website described its own contribution 
to the “secure ID production in Iraq” as “crucial for [Iraqi] society and sovereignty” 
(Veridos, 2019). The company’s “code of conduct” is compared to a “constitution”, 
emphasizing that “trust is the basis of our commercial success” (Code of Conduct of 
Veridos GmbH, 2015). 
As this indicates, the global passport production infrastructure is closely interwoven 
with aspects of soft power, such as credibility and legitimacy, codified in formal 
international recognition. Companies like Veridos seem to only deliver passport 
booklets to internationally recognized state actors, such as the Hadi government in 
Riyadh.408 Non-recognized contenders like the Houthi government in Sanaa are side-
lined and excluded. While international recognition thus facilitates obtaining globally 
 
407 [untitled screenshot of Veridos website taken by the author in December 2018]. Retrieved 
December 2018 from https://www.veridos.com/ 
408 Members of Veridos did not respond to, or declined, the researcher’s multiple interview requests. 
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produced objects conducive to state sovereignty, it does not help retrieve domestically 
rooted material, such as data stored in servers in Sanaa. In 2016-17, Yemeni consuls 
responsible for issuing travel documentation could no longer obtain the required 
“approval from headquarters in Sanaa” (Mahdi, 2018).409  
Houthis, after taking control of Yemen’s capital in late 2014, stopped issuing passports 
in governorates controlled by the Hadi government. Temporarily, they also disabled 
the issuance of passports in Yemeni embassies abroad (Mahdi, 2018). Attempts by 
Hadi officials to present the provision of passports as a politically neutral act remained 
unsuccessful (Mahdi, 2018). Hence, the issuance of passports was provisionally put 
on hold in Yemeni embassies and in “passport authority”-branches located in territory 
controlled by coalition forces.410 “Even diplomats, Yemeni diplomats, who wanted to 
have new passports, they couldn’t. I remember my passport expired, I could not get a 
new one, there was a problem with that”.411  
Subsequent efforts on part of the Hadi government to take over Yemen’s passport 
production hinged on access to data stored in Sanaa. As mentioned above, it is difficult 
to run background checks and ensure the validity of travel documentation without 
sufficient data. Hence, the issuance of passports by exiled government authorities in 
2015 and related questions of data access emerged as a sensitive political issue that 
was shrouded in secrecy and proved difficult to investigate.412  
“For the same reasons that the counterfeiting of currency is not publicised, so 
the falsification of passports is hushed up. One must do everything to retain 
public faith. If it becomes widely known that your country’s passport is easily 
forged and has been used to unentitled persons then the genuine holders of 
such passports will possibly find themselves subject to undue scrutiny at border 
crossings and the prestige of the country will suffer” (Lloyd, 2008, p.176).  
In Yemen, the circulation of fraudulent travel documents would not only impact the 
prestige of the Hadi government but undermine its sovereignty claims. Since the 
 
409 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
410 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
411 Interview with a Yemeni diplomat, 24 October 2017. 
412 The question regarding passports and access to data was described as “a big issue” that was, 
however, “not much publicized” (Interview with former Yemeni politician, 23 November 2016). 
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issuance of passports constitutes a core governmental function that is essential to the 
performance of stateness and the international recognition of state actors, failure to 
ensure a smooth-functioning passport production threatens to undermine perceptions 
of state competency. While the latter remains contested and is easily shaped by 
powerful Western politicians (Jeffrey, 2007), it is crucial to the creation of trust that 
underlies the global passports system. Foreign identifying documents are commonly 
accepted on the premise that capable “state others” can ensure their validity. Here 
again, the passport sits at the nexus of both internal and external sovereignty, 
collapsing the scalar geographical distinction of national and international. 
Internationally bestowed authority to govern one’s own territory is linked to the 
portrayed ability to do so (Eckes, 2015, p.43). Given the close ties of passports to 
notions of state competence as well as state sovereignty, government officials have 
an interest in shielding passport-related crimes and security issues from the public eye 
(Torpey, 2018). Thus, “passport forgery is not a subject easily researched” (Lloyd, 
2008, p.176). 
In Yemen, it was not until early 2016 that the passport issue was reported to have 
received attention by Hadi officials. 413  Several diplomats claimed that a special 
committee was established at the time, tasked with initiating the passport production 
outside of Yemen.414 Allegedly, the committee, which was headed by the deputy 
foreign minister for financial and administrative affairs, brought in the head of the 
“passport authority” and other experts from Sanaa to help set up a new passport 
issuance centre in the Yemeni consulate in Jeddah (Mahdi, 2018).415 According to one 
diplomat, they were contacted over the phone and asked, “to come in a secret way”.416  
These experts allegedly brought relevant data from Sanaa to Saudi Arabia. Diplomats 
put forth different narratives regarding the supposed smuggling of data. One 
interviewee suggested that “following the Houthi revolt, the director of the passport 
agency left to Riyadh. From what I heard he was able to get a disc with necessary 
 
413 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
414 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 15 February 
2017. 
415 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
416 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
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data with him”.417 His colleague confirmed that when the experts from the passport 
authority in Sanaa were summoned to secretly leave for Saudi Arabia, “they came with 
the system and the data, with everything”.418 “It is just software. Very soft soft-thing. 
You can put a whole department in your pocket”, remarked a third diplomat and 
laughed.419 Ever since the establishment of the new passport authority in Jeddah, 
consuls in passport-issuing embassies would turn to experts in Saudi Arabia with 
passport related questions.420  
In addition to setting up a new passport issuance centre in Jeddah in 2016, the Hadi 
government also established issuing branches in Yemeni governorates under its 
control, most notably Marib, Hadramawt, and Aden (Mahdi, 2018).421 It simultaneously 
sent a circular to Yemeni embassies asking them to decline Yemeni passports issued 
since the beginning of 2015 in areas under Houthi control (Mahdi, 2018).422 Likewise, 
airport authorities in Aden were instructed not to accept passports issued in Houthi-
controlled territory (see Figure 22). 
At the time this research was completed (2019), the international acceptance of 
Houthi-issued passports remained difficult to determine. While it appeared that 
Yemenis could still travel via land into neighbouring Oman (Mahdi, 2018), Egyptian 
authorities had been asked by Hadi officials to refuse Houthi-issued travel documents 
(Mahdi 2018). 423  On 1 December 2018, the Egyptian news website “Al-Khobar” 
reported that the Yemeni embassy issued an alert informing the bearers of Yemeni 
diplomatic and special passports that as long as certain provisions were met, “the 
passport issued prior to 2015 is allowed to enter Egypt, as well as passports issued 
by the legitimate government” (Al-Khobar, 2018). 
 
417 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 14 February 2017. 
418 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017. 
419 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
420 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 1 December 2016; Interview with Yemeni diplomatic staff 
member, 7 December 2016; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
421 interview with Yemeni diplomat, 17 August 2017; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 
2017. 
422 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2019; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 8 January 2019. 
423 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 4 January 2019; Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 8 January 
2019.Besides Egypt, one diplomat suggested that other countries receiving direct flights from Yemen 
were asked to decline Houthi-issued passports, including Jordan and Sudan (Interview with Yemeni 




Figure 22: Changing Passport Regulations II 
Left: This document was sent by the Yemeni Airways sales manager in the Aden region (mintaqah) to 
managers of travel agencies. Following the subject line “not accepting passports issued in occupied 
areas”, it reads: “it is forbidden to deal with the referred to documents and to accept them for travel, 
reservations, or issuance. Only passports issued in freed areas should be accepted”424  
Right: The letter was sent by the Ministry of Interior’s “Immigration and Passport Control Department” 
and is addressed to the “Chairman of the board of directors of Yemen Airways”. It asks the chairman 
to “kindly inform your offices and the airline companies dealing with you not to deal with passports 
issued by the coup militias…”425  
 
Apparently, the Yemeni embassy in Cairo sent a memo to Egyptian authorities, 
including a list of passport serial numbers that should be considered illegitimate. 
Ironically, this step led to confusion when Hadi’s own minister of agriculture, Othman 
Mujali, was denied entry to Egypt. “They wrote wrong serial numbers”, explained one 
diplomat.426 Whether or not Houthi-issued passports were accepted by foreign state 
 
424 Twitter, 2018. 
425 Twitter, 2018. 
426 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 9 January 2019. 
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actors amounted to a political decision, closely related but not equal to the formal 
recognition of the Houthi government.  
The ability to provide internationally recognized passports emerged as an essential 
tool in legitimizing broader claims to territorial control and state power. “Any citizen 
can get a new passport”, said one diplomat, adding with emphasis, “outside the control 
of the Houthis, you will have a new passport. A recognized new passport!”.427 Pointing 
to the political power and leverage that is tied to the management of monopolised 
passport production processes, he went on saying, “we told them [the Houthis] if you 
want we can send you new passports [booklets], but you are a branch you are not the 
headquarters”. The provision of passport booklets was thereby made dependent on 
Houthis’ acceptance of the Hadi government as Yemen’s superior political authority. 
Unsurprisingly, Houthis opposed such “offers”, instead continuing their independent 
issuance of passports in Sanaa (Mahdi, 2018). The ongoing distribution of Houthi-
passports, boycotted by Hadi officials, led to a patchy landscape of contested 
legitimacy. Notably, Yemenis living in Houthi-controlled territory had to travel to areas 
ruled by Hadi-authorities to obtain internationally recognized travel documents - a 
journey that was never convenient and often unsafe. Alternatively, they could send a 
“passport broker”, a newly emergent profession in Yemen, who would travel the 
country to obtain requested travel documentation (Mahdi, 2018). In May 2019, a social 
media campaign was launched by Yemeni activists, journalists, and writers under the 
hashtag “where are the passports” (#wean al-jawazaat), criticizing the lack of passport 
availability and the suffering it caused Yemeni citizens, including patients who needed 
to travel abroad for medical treatment or students wishing to study outside of Yemen 
(Tahrir, 2019). “It is not a problem to get sick and die […]; the important thing is to 
support the legitimacy [i.e. the Hadi government],” complained one activist ironically 
(Tahrir, 2019). 
As the example of passports illustrates, “a multiplicity of state projects may be 
simultaneously performed by various actors in the same territory, each trying to deploy 
various state institutions, heritages, and infrastructures to their own advantage” 
(Dittmer, 2017, p.7). Political power struggles surrounding the issuance of passports 
 
427 Interview with Yemeni diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
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have treated the body of Yemeni citizens as a canvas on which sovereignty-claims 
were painted with broad, brutal brush. Where the suffering of people follows territorial 
parameters, human mobility becomes a matter of life and death. In that sense, 
Yemen’s passport must be viewed as a weapon in the fight for territorial control, 
(inter)national recognition, and legitimacy.  
VI Conclusion: economic capital and the study of diplomatic heterogeneity  
The above analysis adds to the previous two chapters by focusing more explicitly on 
the material components involved in diplomats’ professional practice, their agency, 
and their perception of the Yemeni crisis. A number of diplomatic actors experienced 
Yemen’s socio-political upheaval as a time of economic hardship, notably marked by 
a cut in material benefits and the delay of salaries. Rather than escaping Yemen’s 
economic turmoil, diplomats abroad suffered from various austerity measures at work. 
To make ends meet, they relied increasingly on social capital resources, i.e. money 
provided by family members and friends.  
Changes in material context also impacted materially embedded diplomatic practice 
at work, leading to the decrease of cultural events and dinner parties, for instance, and 
the reconfiguration of diplomats’ “additional income”. In the process, “being a diplomat” 
became associated with humble benefits of safety and employment (as opposed to 
unemployment). Existing research on European diplomats mentions low 
entertainment allowances and discusses their complication of pricy dinner invitations 
(e.g. “two dozen oysters”) (Jones & Clark, 2015). This study’s focus on Yemeni 
diplomats, who lacked entertainment allowances altogether, points to the material 
differences that lie between diplomatic services.  
As illustrated in this chapter, diplomats’ material struggle did not suddenly emerge in 
the aftermath of 2011 but has a long history. Presumably, this sets the Yemeni 
diplomatic corps apart from other, richer foreign services. The apparent heterogeneity 
in resources and diplomatic capacity applies to both the international and national 
level. A single diplomatic service, such as the Yemeni one, may contain considerable 
material differences, none of which are formally institutionalized. In Yemen, diplomats 
of the same rank and age might possess very different sets of capital and resources, 
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which in turn may impact their subjectivity and professional practice. For example, 
diplomats with access to considerable private funds may choose to work abroad for 
fun, anecdotally spending their low state salary on perfume.  
To emphasize resource scarcity and the uneven topology of diplomatic capacity both 
within and between diplomatic services, this chapter developed the concept of “poor 
state diplomacy”. Based on data gathered from the “geopolitical margin”, the concept 
challenges Euro-centric imaginations of global diplomatic uniformity, which assume 
universally shared professional codes, norms, structures and experiences.428 It calls 
for greater scholarly focus onto the not-so-luxurious specificities of diplomacy and the 
different material resources and practices outside (as well as within) the Euro-
American orbit. 
This chapter’s focus on “the material” also sheds insight on crisis-induced changes in 
institutional form and function. With the outbreak of war, access to refuge, for example, 
emerged as an important asset that reconfigured the relative value of embassy posts. 
Likewise, geographical shifts in consular revenues impacted embassies’ provision of 
economic capital. The “selling” of consular documents depended on a large Yemeni 
diaspora, whose presence, in turn, was influenced by multiple factors, ranging from 
visa and airline policies to shared Arabic language. In conceptualizing the multitude of 
elements underlying shifting diplomatic forms and function, Bourdieu’s concept of 
“capital” was applied. It highlighted the interplay of diplomats’ economic, cultural, 
social, and symbolic capital with geographic space.  
The micro-level analysis of passports further contributed to the understanding of 
changing institutional forms and functions. It treated the passport as an artefact that 
can make possible, authorize, allow, influence, and hinder a range of state-making 
practices. While its key function has long been the regulation of individual travel, 
frequently managed within the consular section of Yemen’s diplomatic service, it 
became a “weapon” in the context of civil war. In particular, it was used to further 
competing claims to state sovereignty. By treating passports as an essential tool in 
 
428 Melissen (2016) for instance, speaks of a “global diplomatic system” (p.xxi), marked by “shared 
values and diplomatic norms” (p.xiv). Likewise, Cohen (2016) suggests that “diplomatic relationships” 
are “grounded in a commonly accepted system of procedure, protocol and law; a lingua franca; and 
permanent diplomatic missions” (p.13). 
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building, maintaining, and organising stateness, this chapter contributes to a small and 
multidisciplinary body of literature (Torpey, 2018; Lloyd, 2008; Salter, 2003; Mongia, 
1999). It shows that governments’ sovereignty claims are materially embedded in the 
global and corporate production of passports, or, as Torpey (2018) put it, “in an 








An unprecedented wave of protests swept through the Middle East in 2011, posing a 
serious threat to the reign of established autocrats. As mentioned in previous chapters, 
the regionwide movement began with the “Jasmin Revolution” in Tunisia, where 
protesters refused to continue trading dubious economic “growth” and “stability” for an 
absence of political and civil rights (Murphy, 2011). Disillusioned with what they saw 
as the government’s self-serving neoliberalism, they called for the removal of 
president Ben Ali, who had ruled the country for 23 consecutive years. On 14 January 
2011, Tunisia’s long-term president gave in to rising political pressure by resigning 
and fleeing to Saudi Arabia. The power vacuum he left behind was initially filled by the 
Islamist Ennahda movement, which won a landslide victory in subsequent elections 
(Wolf, 2013). However, their governmental power was short-lived. Following a 
consensus model of shifting coalitions, Tunisian politicians formed eight different 
governments over the following eight years (Yerkes & Yahmad, 2019). While 
compromise helped protect the fragile political transition that followed the uprising, it 
arguably failed “to move the country forward at the legislative level” (Yerkes & 
Yahmad, 2019, n.p.). 
A few days after Ben Ali’s resignation, large-scale protests erupted in Egypt, on 25 
January 2011. Inspired by the perceived success of the Tunisian uprising, Egyptians 
launched a nationwide protest movement and occupied Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Diverse 
calls for change were epitomized in opposition against Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled 
as president for nearly 30 years (Sallam, 2013). Following Mubarak’s resignation on 
11 February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took control. It 
was chaired by the minister of defence and composed of the country’s most senior 
military leaders (Sallam, 2013). The leadership of the SCAF ended in summer 2012, 
when the Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohammed Morsi was elected president in a 
nationwide democratic vote. Ever since he took office, Morsi’s political leadership and 
presidency had been contested. Following mass protests against his rule on 30 June 
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2013, the military removed Morsi from power and took back control, quickly declaring 
army general Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi as Egypt’s new president (al-Anani, 2015). 
The unforeseen developments in Egypt and Tunisia led political scientists back to the 
drawing board, revisiting their understandings of regime change and stability (Sallam, 
2013).429 While ensuing discussion on state institutions in political transitions looked 
toward the military (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011; Kandil, 2012; Grewal, 2016), less work 
has focused on foreign policy bodies. To address this gap in the literature, this chapter 
explores developments inside the Egyptian and Tunisian diplomatic service at a time 
of sudden socio-political change. Its findings reveal similarities and differences that 
help assess the uniqueness of the Yemeni experience. While this chapter is not 
comparative per se, its outline of Egyptian and Tunisian developments provides 
empirical snapshots which can be productively juxtaposed with the Yemeni case 
study.  
To better draw out comparative insights, this chapter maintains the conceptual 
categories applied in its previous analysis of the Yemeni diplomatic service. Using 
Hirschman’s (1970) trio of exit, voice, and loyalty, it focuses on diplomats’ viewpoints 
and various behavioural strategies after 2011. The analysis of Tunisian and Egyptian 
diplomatic practice helps foreground and further illuminate the concept of diplomatic 
agency. Similar to developments in Yemen, a number of diplomatic actors in Egypt 
and Tunisia saw the uprising as an “opening” and engaged in unprecedented political 
activism. A look at Tunisia and Egypt also lends support to the argument that 
diplomatic institutions are fragmented, shaped by unique institutional histories, and 
responsive to environmental change. While a range of new viewpoints and practices 
were shared by diplomats of all three countries, change and continuity were expressed 
differently among the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Yemeni foreign services.  
The remaining part of this chapter is divided into five main parts. First, it discusses the 
uprisings’ politicizing effect on both Tunisian and Egyptian diplomats and outlines 
emerging practices of internal voice, which ranged from individual complaints to the 
formation of a diplomatic syndicate. In a second step, it discusses various forms of 
 
429 Examples include Albrecht and Bishara (2011), Bellin (2012), Blaydes and Lo (2012), Brownlee 
and Stacher (2011), Goldstone (2011), and Stacher (2012). 
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public voice, which turned out to be more pronounced in the Egyptian than the 
Tunisian case. Similar to Yemen, diplomatic practices of voice triggered considerable 
internal debate, which foregrounded notions of professionalism and loyalty, and is 
outlined in the third section of this chapter. The fourth section examines the occurrence 
of exit, both in form of ambassadorial resignations and the involuntary removal of 
diplomats. The chapter ends by discussing ongoing shifts in staffing policies that 
followed the 2011 uprisings and subsequent regime changes. Although neither Egypt 
nor Tunisia experienced a civil war after 2011, the political power struggles that 
followed the uprisings did impact internal staffing policies and led to the increased 
governmental monitoring of diplomatic practice, especially in the Egyptian case.  
By shedding light on the diverse institutional responses to similar moments of rupture, 
this chapter further underlines the heterogeneity that marks global state diplomacy. It 
also helps avoid assigning “false uniqueness” (Rose, 1991) to the Yemeni case study. 
Area studies have been described as particularly prone to such claims, with 
researchers emphasizing the distinctiveness of their country of analysis without 
considering developments and research done elsewhere (Halperin & Health, 2017). 
By zooming out of Yemen and into the diplomatic services of Egypt and Tunisia, this 
chapter produces comparative insights that help assess and better understand the 
Yemeni experience. 
I “Politicians on steroids” and the practice of internal voice 
The events of 2011 had a considerable impact on both the Tunisian and the Egyptian 
diplomatic service. One Egyptian diplomat described the uprising as “a hurricane that 
took the ministry” 430  and as a hugely “politicizing moment”. 431  In both countries, 
diplomats seemed eager, empowered, and free to express their (political) views. 
“Egyptians, after so many years of not being politicized, became politicians on 
steroids. Everybody had an opinion,” declared one senior Egyptian diplomat.432 His 
colleague agreed that following the collapse of “old controls” in 2011, “everybody felt 
 
430 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 29 September 2017. 
431 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 24 September 2017. 
432 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 24 September 2017. 
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free, literally everybody, felt free to express her or himself the way they wanted to”.433 
According to one respondent, being both a diplomat and an Egyptian citizen was 
“challenging” at a time of historical political change. He and other diplomats struggled 
to neutrally represent the government, while also “being Egyptian citizens and having 
our own preferences regarding the transition”.434 Tunisian diplomats also confessed 
that they felt at greater liberty to voice their opinions during the regime-change. “During 
the Ben Ali era we were not allowed to express our views”, remembered one 
interviewee, who went on linking his professional quietism to diplomats’ general 
“obligation de réserve”. 435  In 2011, he said and laughed, there was “aucune 
obligation”. “We did not feel that there was a real administration at the time”.  
It appears that the removal of autocratic regimes and the accompanying push toward 
a more democratic system had a liberating effect on Egyptian and Tunisian diplomats, 
who increasingly engaged in expressions of internal voice. This corresponds with 
findings in the field of social psychology, which suggests the occurrence of “excess 
testimony” in post-authoritarian moments. In examining the transition from dictatorship 
toward democratic rule in Argentina, Suarez-Orozco (1990) detected the rise of “a new 
consciousness of events and images previously denied, forbidden and only half-
known” (p.366). In fact, she observed “a flood of the unspeakable into public 
discourse” (p.369) – a phenomenon she interpreted as the healing from past injustice. 
In Egypt and Tunisia, feelings of frustration had seemingly accumulated among 
diplomats over the years. Tunisian career-diplomats were said in interviews to feel 
“neglected and marginalized by the political men [non-career appointees] who were 
affiliated to the regime”.436 In this context, the political opening in early 2011 was seen 
as a chance to change unpopular bureaucratic procedures and practices.437 Similarly, 
in Egypt, events of 2011 acted as a catalyst by uncovering cases of long repressed 
resentment within the foreign ministry.438 “It became a mess and a little bitter as well, 
there was a lot of bitterness”, commented a former Egyptian diplomat.439  
 
433 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 29 September 2017. 
434 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 7 February 2017. 
435 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 5 September 2017. 
436 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 7 November 2017. 
437 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 5 September 2017. 
438 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 3 February 2017. 
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The sentiments of street protests in Cairo and Tunis eventually spilled into foreign 
ministries, with an increasing number of employees engaging in practices of internal 
voice. Diplomats began exchanging predictions, best-case scenarios, and political 
preferences,440 while also calling for changes inside the ministry. In Egypt, claims for 
reforms were mostly filed internally, although minor cases of open confrontation were 
reported as well, such as entering the minister’s office and refusing to leave.441 In 
Tunisia, diplomats’ internal voice was notably expressed through the formation of a 
diplomatic syndicate, as discussed in greater detail below. “There was this push for 
reform of the ministry,” remembered one Egyptian diplomat.442 “Because the idea was 
that there are demands for change all over Egypt, so why not also the foreign 
ministry”.443 The amplification of voice and its spread through various discourses and 
spaces during and after the uprising further evidences the “liberating” or “disordering” 
effect that regime change can have on diplomatic practice. Following the removal of 
authoritarian rulers, diplomats’ proactive voice travelled across the streets of Cairo 
and Tunis, presumably their homes, and the professional realm of foreign policy 
institutions. As further discussed below, motivations to engage in practices of internal 
voice were rooted in diplomats’ wishes to improve their own work conditions and/or 
defend the professional ethos of the diplomatic service.  
At its broadest, it appears that the sudden spread of voice created room for diplomats’ 
reflection on a range of professional practices, with diplomatic actors in both countries 
calling for greater meritocracy within the Egyptian and Tunisian diplomatic service.444 
Protest against political circumstances was thereby translated into articulate criticism 
of diplomats’ professional status-quo. In Egypt, explicit complaints concerned, among 
other things, the education of diplomats’ children, health insurance, opportunities for 
young diplomats, 445  and the return of files to the ministry, specifically those on 
Egyptian relations with the US and Israel, which had been taken by security institutions 
during the turmoil of 2011. 446  In Tunisia, a specific point of complaint regarded 
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promotions, which did not occur automatically after a certain amount of time, as they 
did in Egypt. “There is no guarantee that after five years you are going to be promoted,” 
one diplomat explained.447 “Sometimes you can wait for up to 15 years […]. When you 
have to wait too long, the minister could decide to give you the promotion, [but] it is 
like a favour for people he knows”.448 
A major request made by both Egyptian and Tunisian diplomats regarded the reform 
of diplomatic appointment procedures.449 “A lot of people began to challenge existing 
practices […]. Why do you get posted to the US and I get posted to Denmark? Based 
on what?” recalled one Egyptian diplomat.450 In the past, diplomats just “sucked it up,” 
he went on saying; yet in 2011, they “began to organize protests”.451 In Tunisia as well, 
diplomats began criticizing non-merit appointment practices inside the ministry, 
especially the appointment of non-career diplomats from outside the foreign ministry. 
Tunisian diplomats reported that the foreign minister did not typically follow 
standardized appointment procedures, but considered individual profiles, expertise, 
and personal relations in allocating posts abroad.452 “Sometimes it is a bit like a 
lottery,” remarked one Tunisian ambassador and laughed.453 The push for internal 
reform in both the Egyptian and the Tunisian diplomatic service confirms the historic 
argument by Grindle (2012), who found that “new ideas about how the public sector 
was to be staffed found political traction at particular moments—a political or economic 
crisis, a regime change, an electoral draw among parties, a scandal. These moments 
provided reformers with opportunities to advance their projects” (p.2).  
I.1. The establishment of Tunisian syndicates 
Besides singular requests for change, Tunisian diplomats established the “Syndicat 
de Fonctionnaires du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères” in the aftermath of public 
protests. Representing the interests of all ministry employees, the syndicate formed 
part of Tunisia’s general trade union, the “Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail” 
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(UGTT). A few years later, in February 2015, diplomats established a second 
syndicate, the “syndicat du corps diplomatique,” arguably to circumvent political 
partisanship with the UGGT and to further specialize their union representation.454 “As 
diplomats, we have different tasks and characteristics than people who do 
administrative and technical things”, explained one interviewee. “So, we thought it was 
not a very good idea to have one body for all. Now we have two unions”.455 The first 
syndicate (i.e. “Syndicat de Fonctionnaires du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères”)  
represents employees who work within the ministry’s administrative and financial 
sectors, while the other one (i.e. the “syndicat du corps diplomatique”) deals with the 
specific problems of diplomats, including their appointment, payment, and issues 
related to their living conditions abroad, such as health insurance.456 “It is like our 
spokesperson,” one Tunisian diplomat remarked, adding in a regretful tone that the 
“syndicat du corps diplomatique” was not as efficient as it could be.457 In his opinion, 
diplomats’ geographical distance and global movement posed a challenge to the 
syndicate’s organisation and impact.458 Emphasizing the importance of face-to-face 
interaction and geographical proximity, this argument points to the limitation of social 
media, which is discussed as a means of organisation and the expression of voice in 
the next section.  
II Public voice: “a collective action moment” 
Besides the internal expression of voice, diplomats engaged in various forms of public 
protest during and after 2011. Both Tunisian and Egyptian diplomats were reported to 
have participated in street demonstrations, for instance, openly expressing their 
opposition to the incumbent government.459 “There is no statistic available, but a lot of 
diplomats were in the square” recalled one Egyptian diplomat. “I was there every day, 
and I met a lot of colleagues,” he said and laughed.460  
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While in Egypt, diplomats’ complaints, opposition, and calls for reform never 
institutionalized into a labour union, Egyptian diplomats engaged in forms of public 
voice that went beyond their participation in the 2011-protests. For instance, they 
created a Facebook group called “Lotus”. The Lotus flower has a long symbolic history 
in Egypt, going all the way back to pharaonic times, when it was considered a symbol 
of rebirth and life (Hawass, 2009, p.110). According to one Egyptian diplomat, the 
name also referred to the foreign ministry, 461 which operated from within a tall white 
tower whose architectural design was “based on various configurations of a stylised 
bouquet of Pharaonic lotuses” (Hassan, 1999, n.p.). In fact, the Lotus design of the 
ministry, constitutes a rare attempt of actively linking the professional self-image of 




Figure 23: Egyptian Foreign Ministry Building 
The architectural design of the Egyptian foreign ministry building was based on the pharaonic image 
of the Lotus.462 
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While the exact number of Lotus group members could not be determined, one 
Egyptian diplomat, who was part of the group, said that hundreds of his colleagues 
had joined.463 Another Egyptian diplomat remarked that “being a [Lotus] member 
doesn't mean that you are actively engaged or that you approve what they [other 
members] said. They did some stupid stuff on this group”. 464  When asked for 
examples, he responded, “like some people putting copies of coded cables [online]. 
You can't do this!”.465 He also deemed it inappropriate to carry out personal fights on 
Facebook, “slandering each other”. “It wasn't all heroic, it was just a Facebook group”, 
he concluded.466  
In Tunisia as well, diplomats created a Facebook group in 2011, which was supposed 
“to link all diplomats all over the world”, as one diplomat explained.467 Contrary to their 
American colleagues, he said, Tunisian diplomats never had an intranet that would 
have allowed them to communicate globally. The creation and use of an online 
platform therefore constituted a novelty within the Tunisian diplomatic community. 
While it was intended to facilitate the exchange of news and opinions regarding 
political developments and diplomats’ professional day-to-day life, some (mis-)used 
the platform for their personal vendettas and acts of public shaming.468 As was the 
case in Egypt and Yemen, shifting power constellations were thus played out online 
on a personal micro-level. For instance, some diplomats who were known to have 
benefitted from their relationship with Ben Ali were singled out and attacked by 
colleagues online. “People used the opportunity to express themselves frankly”, 
admitted one Tunisian diplomat, adding that online discussions had become less and 
slightly more moderate over time.469  
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In Egypt, diplomats’ online activity was occasionally transformed into real-life action. 
Toward the end of the uprising, for instance, diplomats collected signatures online, 
calling for Mubarak to step down. While this step did not receive much attention by the 
media at the time, it constituted an early example of public voice and active diplomatic 
opposition in Egypt.470 A year later, diplomats engaged in a more drastic and widely 
covered move against the Morsi government, when publicly boycotting the 
constitutional referendum in 2012.  
Prior to Mohamed Morsi’s election as president in June 2012, the legislature had 
appointed a constitutional assembly tasked with re-writing the Egyptian Constitution. 
After having been dissolved by an administrative court in April 2012, a new assembly 
was quickly established. Weakened by severe internal disagreement, the second 
constitutional assembly eventually lost most of its secular members and 
representatives of the Coptic Church, “costing it up to a quarter of its 100 members 
and much of its legitimacy” (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012, para 8). In addition to these 
internal challenges, the assembly faced a number of external threats, most notably 
the possibility of another shutdown by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which “Mr. 
Mubarak had tried to stack with loyalists” (Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012, para 9). In 
the midst, and possibly because, of this polarized political context, Morsi issued a 
decree in November 2012 that stripped the judiciary of any power to challenge his 
decisions. He also rushed through a draft Constitution, which he hastily opened up to 
a public referendum (BBC, 2012). The draft Constitution and Morsi’s decree prompted 
widespread protest in Egypt. While Morsi advisors portrayed the decree as “an attempt 
to cut through the deadlock that has stalled Egypt’s convoluted political transition”, 
many Egyptians viewed it as a first step toward “an absolute presidential tyranny” 
(Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012, para 3).  
At the time, a number of diplomats seemed to share such fears and scepticism, openly 
boycotting the referendum’s implementation. “More than 200 diplomats signed a 
statement […] that was made public, refusing to participate in organizing the 
referendum abroad”, remembered one respondent.471 “I signed it – and I never sign 
 
470 Interview with Egyptian diplomat, 7 February 2017. 
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petitions! It's the only time in my life that I did it. A lot of us felt that even if we were 
putting our career in danger – because no one at the time knew what's going to happen 
with the Muslim Brothers – this was the right thing to do”. The referendum went ahead, 
but those diplomats who had signed the petition allegedly “refused to organize it in 
embassies and so on. This was our biggest collective action moment I would say”.472 
Another Egyptian diplomat described the event, which received considerable media 
attention, as a symbolically strong step that challenged the wide-spread assumption 
that diplomats would not express their political opinion.473  While some diplomats 
viewed such activism positively, others were more sceptical. In fact, 2011 events 
sparked considerable debate concerning diplomats’ professionalism, especially their 
neutrality and (lacking) freedom of expression.  
While Tunisian diplomats exchanged information among each other and engaged in 
internal voice, no cases of outright public opposition against Ben Ali could be detected. 
In explaining this difference, Tunisian diplomats did not emphasize their loyalty and 
professionalism, but pointed to the uprising’s short time frame and their pragmatic 
caution. One diplomat explained that at the time of the revolution his colleagues “were 
waiting and seeing. Because it started on 17 December and it stopped on 14 January. 
More of less 27 days”.474 Another interviewee agreed that the “revolution’s” short time 
span lessened the severity of diplomatic opposition: “The revolution was very sudden. 
It took a few days. […Diplomats] did not even have the opportunity to resign […]”, he 
explained. Plus, “the assumption was that it's an uprising and that it's manageable. 
That the regime could manage it and control the situation”.475 One of the respondents, 
who was working abroad during the uprising, confirmed that he followed a “wait-and-
see strategy” during 2011. Confessing to have had “mixed feelings” at the time, he 
said, “we never knew how things would turn out. There was some hope because 
people were fed up with the autocratic regime. There was hope that change would 
occur, but at the same time we were scared that events would go the wrong way and 
that there would be violence and confrontation”.476  
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The occurrence of “wait-and-see” strategies, which may be associated with 
opportunism or diplomats’ lingering but silent dissatisfaction, complicates Hirschman’s 
(1970) conceptual trio, which focuses on the active expression of unfavourable views. 
As the insight provided in this study suggests, diplomats’ silent compliance and 
ongoing practice of “diplomatic loyalty” 477  is better attributed to a sense of self-
preservation than attachment and care for one’s organization. The extent to which 
regime change acted as a catalyst, motivating the sudden public expression of 
discontent, varied from diplomat to diplomat and, as the Tunisian case study suggests, 
might be linked to notions of temporality. Even in a moment of rupture, advantages of 
pubic voice may not immediately outweigh perceived risks. Diplomats might require 
time to assess change and decide whether the expression of public voice was “safe” 
and “productive”. As indicated above, some Tunisian diplomats let events play out, 
without engaging in any articulate expressions of support or discontent. Others, 
especially political appointees, were allegedly more “invested”, fearing to lose their job 
over regime change in Tunisia. For instance, one interviewee pointed to the Tunisian 
ambassador in Brussels at the time, claiming that as a political appointee, he “knew 
that his position was at stake”. A few days prior to Tunisia’s actual regime change, he 
thus appeared on television and wholly defended Ben Ali. In doing so, he allegedly 
disregarded the advice of others who had told him “to wait and see how things would 
evolve”.478 These examples re-confirm that diplomatic practice in a moment of rupture 
is highly reflective and that conscious behavioural choices are informed by an array of 
social and material factors that go beyond the professional realm of the diplomatic 
service. 
III The contestation of voice: a question of loyalty and professionalism 
The practice of diplomats' voice, especially public forms thereof, triggered 
considerable debate inside the Tunisian and Egyptian foreign ministry. A number of 
respondents deemed public voice incompatible with diplomats’ professionalism, a 
concept that was not clearly defined but seemed to require the “silent” representation 
 
477 “Diplomatic loyalty” was defined as a ritual performance in chapter six. 
478 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 16 November 2017. 
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of government. By examining norms and contradicting ideal types expressed in 
arguments about diplomats’ voice, this chapter has shed further light on the ambiguity 
of diplomatic professionalism.   
In Tunisia, some long-established ambassadors were said to have opposed diplomats’ 
Facebook group, which they claimed was only “causing trouble”.479 Other diplomats 
supported the online exchange but felt that serious problems should not be discussed 
so publicly. 480  One high-ranking interviewee promoted internal over public voice, 
insisting “if you have any reservations, you have to express it to the minister, or 
through diplomatic channels in the ministry”.481 In Egypt as well, diplomats’ public 
voice was deemed to be “unprofessional” by several interviewees. This highlights the 
normative element contained in internal power struggles and points to the importance 
of competing narratives of justification (Boltanski and Thev́enot, 1999). One Egyptian 
diplomat complained that developments “got to a point” at which diplomats, who were 
going to defend a certain policy at a foreign embassy in Cairo, would express their 
opposition to it on Facebook a day prior.482 A more specific criticism regarded the 
content of diplomats’ opinions, which was considered disrespectful and offensive at 
times. One Egyptian diplomat complained that some of his colleagues were “not just 
opposing the government”, but were “even, I would say, disrespectful of the 
government”.483 He added, “my view is that even if it is the Muslim Brotherhood 
government, even if it's Morsi's government, you shouldn’t go on Facebook and […] 
disrespect it, and say bad words, cursing, and what not. Even from a manners point 
of view, I wouldn't do this to a person that I don't like”. 484  He linked diplomats’ 
“misconception” to flaws in their training. Those who engaged in public voice simply 
“assumed” their practice was adequate, he alleged, “but there should have been 
coaching on this”.485 
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“No one told them from the beginning that ‘you are a civil servant. You are not 
a private citizen anymore’. Once you decided to enter the service you are no 
longer free to express yourself... we don't send you abroad to express yourself, 
but to express a government, to take a position according to what the 
government says, not according to what you believe”.486  
Others confirmed that as a diplomat “you literally agreed that you would defend the 
government's position for the next 35 years, and you don't know what the government 
is going to be”.487 Thus, “if you join the foreign ministry, you've given up part of your 
freedom of expression”.488  
As these examples indicate, the criticism of diplomats’ voice was closely tied to the 
idea of neutral representation of the government. In some instances, diplomats 
claimed to represent a country, or a people instead of the regime – an argument that 
was used to support both diplomatic loyalty and opposition to the government. For 
instance, a senior Egyptian ambassador, who strongly supported the idea of 
diplomatic neutrality and condemned the activism of some of his (younger) colleagues, 
declared that “as a diplomat, if you want to play politics? Go out. Professional 
diplomats may not defend the regime, but they defend the country. If somebody asked 
me to defend Mubarak, I never did […] and I never did […] defend Sisi or Morsi”.489 
He later added, “I represent a country, not the President. My loyalty is with whatever 
the people of Egypt will decide”. In another instance, diplomats’ alleged duty to 
represent the Egyptian people was used to justify their opposition to the Egyptian 
government. The former Egyptian foreign minister, Mohamed al-Orabi, defended 
diplomats’ anti-Morsi activism, saying that “the Egyptian foreign ministry is a national 
ministry and works for the benefit of the Egyptian people and is in an advanced trench 
to defend the Egyptian interests" (Hamed Allah, 2013). These insights indicate that, 
similar to the Yemeni case, diplomats in Egypt and Tunisia seemed to variously 
perceive themselves and colleagues as “obedient servants” or “political agents”.490 As 
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in Yemen, the concept of representation was used to justify both political quietism and 
activism.   
IV On voluntary and involuntary exits  
In Egypt, palpable chasms and differences within the diplomatic service were not 
immediately translated into notable changes of staff. Importantly, no Egyptian 
ambassador resigned or was removed during or after 2011, and no significant political 
appointments were made. Likewise, in Tunisia, diplomats’ cautious approach and 
lacking public antagonism was reflected in a low number of ambassadorial 
resignations. It appears that only Mezri Haddad, who worked as Tunisian ambassador 
to UNESCO, stepped down in opposition to the regime. On 14 January 2011, a few 
hours prior to Ben Ali’s departure, he submitted his resignation letter, which he had 
allegedly drafted the night before. In his letter, Haddad cited his past complaints to 
Ben Ali regarding the police crackdown on demonstrators as a reason for his 
resignation: “I told you that the protestors are not against you but against the oligarchy 
to which you have fallen hostage and which has plundered the country's riches without 
cease” (cited in Agence France-Presse, 2011).  
While the number of Tunisian resignations is not comparable to Yemen, ambassadors 
who had once been appointed from outside the ministry and who were known to be 
close to Ben Ali, were forced out in 2011. “The majority of them was marginalized”, or 
“frozen”, claimed one interviewee.491 His colleague specified, “most ambassadors, 
especially those who were not career diplomats, those who had political exposure, 
such as foreign ministers, or those who had worked with Ben Ali or the party, left […]. 
We had a revolution, so of course they had to leave”.492 Since new appointments were 
commonly made in the summer, it was only a couple of months after the regime-
change in January, that some Tunisian ambassadors were called back pre-term, due 
to their assumed association with Ben Ali.493 Others retired at the end of their official 
term. “They were ambassadors who were politicians, from outside the Foreign 
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Ministry,” one diplomat explained.494 “Lawyers, doctors, ministers, they were often 60 
or 65 and they just retired”.495 Since diplomats who came from outside the ministry 
were usually contracted, their let-go, or ‘retirement’, was easily achieved through the 
non-renewal of their contracts.496  
In explaining the limited number of resignations and political appointments in 2011, 
Tunisian and Egyptian diplomats pointed to the strength of their institutions and 
diplomats’ professionalism. One interviewee maintained that Egyptian diplomats did 
not even contemplate resignation “because their perception of Egypt was that even if 
Mubarak has been there for 30 years […], they do represent a country, a service, 
contrary to political appointees who were protegees of the regime”.497 He contrasted 
the Egyptian foreign service with that of Iran and Libya, where he said diplomats were 
often appointed due to their close alignment to the ruling regime. “When the Iranian 
revolution happened, everybody [in the diplomatic service] changed because there 
were [close ties] between […] the ambassadors and the Shah himself […]. The same 
thing, I think, […] happened in Libya”.498 Indeed, it appears that numerous high-
ranking diplomats at multiple Libyan embassies resigned in 2011, criticizing Ghaddafi 
in public statements (al-Jazeera, 2011). Another respondent agreed that the Egyptian 
foreign service was less prone to resignations than some of its regional counterparts: 
“My impression is [that] all of us have a deep sense of belonging to the service and 
respect for it and for its tradition. So, even when we have misgivings, either we voice 
those differently, informally, or even in writing, but in a less aggressive way than 
resigning”.499   
Tunisian respondents put forth similar reasons, pointing to the strength of their state 
institutions when explaining diplomats’ lacking public opposition and limited structural 
changes inside the foreign ministry. One interviewee offered a historical explanation, 
saying “Bourguiba had created great institutions. Which means that the public 
administration and institutions and the ministry continued to work [during 2011]”.500 
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Contrary to Yemen and Libya, which were described as “tribal”,501 interviewees also 
ascribed a stronger professional identity to Tunisian diplomats. In Tunisia, one 
interviewee declared, “the civil servants, they belong to the system”.502 His colleague 
agreed, “we don’t have tribes [or] ethnic groups”, adding that the regional origin of a 
Tunisian diplomat therefore did not matter. “It just matters whether you pass the exam 
or not, but the exam itself is anonymous. It does not matter where you are from”.503 
While these statements offer interesting insight into the self-perception of Egyptian 
and Tunisian diplomats, they have to be treated with caution, given the opposition 
and/or political appointments that did occur in both foreign ministries.  
V Following 2011: political turmoil and contested staffing policies 
Neither Egypt nor Tunisia experienced a civil war in the aftermath of 2011. Yet, the 
political transition and power struggles that followed the uprising did (dis)ordered 
internal practices, which was reflected in staffing policies and the increased 
governmental monitoring of diplomatic behaviour, especially in the Egyptian case.  
In Tunisia, one interviewee found that career diplomats found their prospects within 
the foreign ministry improved in the immediate aftermath of 2011.504 “Some of those 
who were left behind had an opportunity now. One of them is the brother of Marzouki 
[Moncef Marzouki, interim Tunisian president, 2011-2014]. He was like frozen before, 
because his brother was a political opponent”, explained one Tunisian diplomat.505 To 
ensure merit-based appointments in the long-run, a committee was allegedly 
established inside the Tunisian foreign ministry, tasked to develop a list with objective 
criteria, on the basis of which a more transparent appointment procedure could be 
developed. These criteria were said to include diplomats’ “academic qualification, 
language, career, or field of experience”.506 One interviewee claimed that for the first 
time in the history of the Tunisian diplomatic service, all ambassadors appointed in 
summer 2011 were in fact career diplomats. He contrasted this development with past 
 
501 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 23 October 2017. 
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503 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 16 November 2017. 
504 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 7 November 2017. 
505 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 5 September 2017. 
506 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 7 November 2017. 
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appointment practices, remembering that “under Ben Ali it [being appointed 
ambassador] was more like a reward for people who served him in the party”.507 While 
power in the foreign ministry was centralized under Ben Ali, subsequent Tunisian 
presidents were said to have largely delegated diplomatic (including ambassadorial) 
appointments to the foreign minister, limiting their own involvement to confirming the 
minister’s selection.508  
The committee’s newly developed appointment criteria remained of a suggestive 
nature, leaving it up to the minister whether or not to consider and follow them. In 
discussing the 2014 and subsequent appointments, two Tunisian diplomats admitted 
that the overall number of political appointments had gone down but has not fully 
ceased.509 Another diplomat claimed that the clearing of Ben Ali’s alleged political 
appointments lasted for about three years, and that counter-revolutionary figures had 
started re-emerging since, pushing for their re-integration into the foreign ministry.510 
By 2017, it appeared that the committee and its work had lost respect and influence 
within the ministry, which, according to one interviewee, has witnessed a resurgence 
of political appointments.511 In explaining this relapse, he pointed out that political 
parties in Tunisia have always had a great interest in having their members appointed 
ambassador. “They are very keen to have a voice to represent their political party,” he 
said, adding, “but when you have the state, you have to take the raison d'état into 
consideration. At the end of the day, the logic of the state is not the logic of the political 
parties, or of civil society”.512  
In Egypt, the quick succession of presidents and changing power dynamics inside the 
foreign ministry led to considerable internal division and was reflected in staffing 
policies, especially under President al-Sisi. The foreign ministry witnessed a first 
institutional shake-up with the election of Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohammed Morsi 
in 2012, while a second one followed with the take-over of army general al-Sisi in 
2013. Morsi’s rise to power was described as a challenge to the Egyptian foreign 
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ministry, which had traditionally harboured upper-middle or middle-class Egyptians. 
According to one diplomat, they “were mostly Westernized […], would drink alcohol, 
etc.”.513 Notwithstanding the notable influence of Islamization trends in Egypt, the 
ministry was said to have maintained a secular reputation in the late 20th and early 
21st century. In 2017, Nael Shama, an Egyptian researcher, described the 
predominant political orientation within the foreign ministry as “liberal centrist” 
(Soliman, 2017).  
Given the allegedly secular outlook of the Egyptian diplomatic corps, one diplomat 
claimed that “the Muslim Brothers viewed the foreign service as a kind of hostile 
entity”.514 Morsi’s election caused political division within the ministry and “disordered” 
diplomatic practices by motivating some employees to openly express their sympathy 
for the Muslim Brotherhood and to emphasize their religiosity at work. Respondents 
accused some of their colleagues to have gone “beyond their call of duty” in order to 
help Morsi’s entourage. Allegedly, Morsi supporters comprised diplomats who have 
long been “conservative religious practicing” as well as opportunists “who wanted to 
climb the ladder no matter how”.515 Notably, they came into conflict with diplomats who 
considered Islamism to be “backward”,516 refused to implement orders by the Muslim 
Brotherhood leadership, 517  and engaged in collective acts of opposition, as 
exemplified by the aforementioned petition. 
These divisions mattered, as they informed a radical change in staffing policies under 
army general Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, who was named president in July 2013 (Roll, 
2016). Following his rise to power, the foreign ministry experienced a “kind of purge”, 
as one diplomat phrased it.518 “Some of the old regime supporters came back with the 
military - with vengeance. And those who were upset by the [post-2011] chaos [inside 
the ministry] also joined because they wanted some sense of hierarchy and 
organization and stability in the service itself”.519 Under al-Sisi, the Egyptian foreign 
service experienced the forceful “ordering” of diplomatic practice, presumably to 
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ensure loyalty and secure the concordant presentation of favourable and carefully 
devised messages. The military and Egypt’s security services began to increasingly 
control the ministry, all the way down to individual hiring and firing decisions (Soliman, 
2017). 520  As one diplomat put it, “the military brought a heavy-handed security 
approach to the service, which means they unleashed the security agencies on the 
service itself to vet it”.521  
The presidency of al-Sisi gave a real boost to the country’s military and security 
apparatus, whose members had already began occupying influential political and 
economic positions since the uprising (Roll, 2016). Having experienced “the disruptive 
power” of protests and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s new rulers practiced 
increased governmental control, which in many cases amounted to the brutal 
repression of societal elements deemed to be unruly (Roll, 2016). Inside the foreign 
ministry as well, Egypt’s military and security apparatus “have been eliminating 
people” from their positions – a phenomenon that “has not happened since Nasser's 
time in the '50s”, according one respondent.522 Primary targets have been diplomats 
who were alleged to be pro-Brotherhood, or pro-Morsi, and diplomats who were 
politically active and outspoken during and after 2011 (Soliman, 2017). “Those who 
volunteered to help the Islamists were crushed”, 523  said one Egyptian diplomat. 
Likewise, the founders of the Lotus Facebook group, which has long been an 
anathema to the military, 524  were “blacklisted”. 525  One diplomat summarized the 
various stages of the purge, saying: “first it was those who were close to the Islamists, 
then it included people who were active politically on the liberal side, and then people 
who were just annoying in one way or another”.526  
A key criterium in the assessment and treatment of diplomats was their “loyalty to the 
regime”, although that assessment was described as inherently unfair by one of the 
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respondents, who had experienced the government’s cleansing processes first-hand. 
He argued that the evaluation of diplomats was not based on objective investigations, 
but on vague impressions that were assembled on the basis of a diplomat’s social 
media presence and social network.527 If diplomats were active on the Facebook Lotus 
group, for instance, or could be associated with critical public figures or the opposition, 
they were likely to be blacklisted (Soliman, 2017).528 “One of them came from a family 
that was close to the Brotherhood, but he had been a diplomat for 25 years. It doesn't 
mean just because his family was [a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood], that he is 
one”, maintained one former Egyptian diplomat.529 Similar to the Yemeni context of 
civil war, it appears that narrow dichotomist frameworks confined diplomatic practice 
in Egypt under al-Sisi. This suggests that diplomatic discretion is narrowed down when 
the incumbent regime deems its political legitimacy and stability to be fragile and 
contested. Tolerating no mistakes and leaving little room for any “middle ground”, new 
boundaries of diplomatic activity were based on zero-sum conceptions and processes 
of stereotyping and de-individualization (Spillman & Spillmann, 1997). 
Since it was difficult to legally fire diplomats, creative bureaucratic “alternatives” were 
developed. In some cases, “blacklisted” diplomats were posted to insignificant 
positions abroad, while in others they were either asked to stay at home (while still 
receiving a salary) or sent to work in local municipalities. According to the Egyptian 
diplomatic law, the president has the right to transfer diplomats to other jobs in the 
administrative state apparatus (Soliman, 2017). Yet, the “removal practices” under al-
Sisi were described as a legal “grey zone” by Egyptian diplomats. “They can't fire you, 
but they don't want you to be working, so they ask you to stay home [politely claiming 
that] there isn't something [i.e. a position] good enough for you”.530 When asked to 
describe the experience of colleagues who were “close to being fired”, one diplomat 
laughed and said “there isn't real rule of law, but there isn't a complete absence of it 
either. So, you get caught in the middle”.531 
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Over the course of 2015 and 2016, around 40 diplomats were reported to have been 
removed from their diplomatic positions (Soliman, 2017). In 2017, the process was still 
ongoing, with Egyptian diplomats having been transferred to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Administrative Development, the Ministry of Transport, and 
local state offices in various Egyptian provinces (Soliman, 2017). In all cases, 
diplomats were essentially removed from the foreign service, which motivated many 
to hand in their resignation. “The climate now is one of fear, repression, and 
frustration”, said one diplomat in commenting on the control of security institutions over 
the foreign ministry.532 “Almost everybody in the service is unhappy today”.533  
An anecdote used by several respondents to illustrate the changing power relations 
and practices within the Egyptian foreign ministry surrounded the figure of career 
diplomat Nabil Fahmy, who was appointed foreign minister following al-Sisi’s rise to 
power in 2013. Soon after he took office, Nabil Fahmy allegedly received a 
communiqué, either from state security or from the military intelligence, with a list of 
ambassadors abroad whom he was asked to call back.534 Since these ambassadors 
had taken up their positions shortly after Morsi’s election, they were assumed to be 
Morsi-followers, who had been appointed directly by him. These assumptions were 
described as false by several diplomats, who explained that the ambassadors in 
question had already been appointed in spring 2012, under the reign of the SCAF. 
When Mohamed Morsi was elected in June that year, he merely signed their formal 
“agrément”. It further appeared that concerned ambassadors were not Morsi-loyalists, 
appointed from outside the ministry, but career diplomats.535 Presumably aware of 
these circumstances, Nabil Fahmy declined to hold ambassadors accountable for 
political charges that could not be proven (Soliman, 2017). His continued refusal to 
follow orders and call back ambassadors ultimately cost him his position as foreign 
minister in June 2014. As one diplomat sarcastically summed it up, he had “a fall out 
with Sisi” and “was duly sacked”.536 Fahmy was replaced by Sameh Shoukry, under 
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whose rule Egyptian security services have increasingly interfered in the ministry’s 
internal affairs (Soliman, 2017). 
VI Conclusion 
The insights provided in this chapter point to a number of similarities and differences 
between the Yemeni case study and developments inside the Tunisian and Egyptian 
diplomatic service. In all three cases, the uprising was experienced as an emotional 
and politicizing moment that acted as a catalyst for long-held grievances and triggered 
diplomats’ expressions of voice. At the same time, the occurrence of exit, the form and 
institutional effect of voice, and shifts in internal staffing policies were marked by 
considerable difference. Such diversity supports this study’s argument for diplomatic 
heterogeneity, indicating that institutional responses to similar moments of rupture 
may differ. It also challenges the explanatory power of Hirschman’s conceptual trio. 
While exit, voice, and loyalty did occur and helped explain developments inside the 
Yemeni, Egyptian, and Tunisian diplomatic service, no regionwide blueprint of 
“revolutionary (re)action” could be formulated on the basis of Hirschman’s theory.  
While voice was amplified and seemed to travel across various discourses and spaces 
in all three cases, it did not seem to be public in the Tunisian example. Yet, the internal 
voice of Tunisian diplomats reveals striking similarities with the Yemeni experience. In 
both cases, diplomats established a ministerial syndicate in 2011 as a means to 
improve their labour conditions and career prospects. Later, both Yemeni and Tunisian 
diplomats founded a second syndicate to better reflect the differences between 
ministry employees who worked abroad and those working in the ministry’s financial, 
legal, and administrative sectors. While causal relations could not be empirically 
investigated in the context of this study, it seems plausible to assume that Arab 
diplomats discussed their experience and learned from each other in the aftermath of 
2011. As one Tunisian interviewee explained, a lot of exchange took place among 
diplomats from Arab countries at the time. He remembered speaking to a Libyan 
colleague, for instance, who asked him about the syndicate and wanted to know what 
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Tunisian diplomats did during and after “the revolution”. “There was an experience 
sharing between those [Arab Spring] countries”, he explained.537 
Notwithstanding such shared experience and knowledge transfer, no homogeneous 
positionality can be ascribed to Arab diplomats which behaved differently, both within 
and between countries. Contrary to Yemen and Tunisia, diplomatic voice never 
translated into the formation of a trade union in Egypt, for instance. Yet, some Egyptian 
diplomats began engaging in public and collective expressions of voice that stood out 
and were widely covered in the media. In all three cases, the role of social media, 
especially Facebook, emerged as a crucial aspect in the practice and discussion of 
voice. Diplomats variously criticized the secret content shared on Facebook, the rude 
language that was used, and the personal vendettas that were fought. In general, it 
emerged that in all cases, diplomats’ freedom of expression and appointment 
practices constituted particularly contentious issues, closely linked to questions of 
professionalism and related concepts of diplomatic loyalty and representation. In 
Egypt and Tunisia, ideas of silent, loyal, and neutral obedience to shifting governments 
seemed to constitute a normative baseline. Yet, diplomats put forth different ideas of 
“ideal diplomatic behaviour” and did not clearly define their professionalism. 
A notable difference between the Yemeni diplomatic service and its Egyptian and 
Tunisian counterpart regards the number of ambassadorial resignations. In trying to 
make sense of these differences, Egyptian and Tunisian diplomats both emphasized 
the strength of their institutions – an asset that seemingly included diplomatic loyalty. 
A number of respondents emphasized the fragmented, if not “tribal”, nature of Yemeni 
society and politics, claiming that divided loyalties and personalized ties between 
diplomats and political leaders weakened the Yemeni foreign service. Such claims 
paint a rough picture that cannot be taken at face value. However, it provides insight 
into the narrative construction of “institutional identities” in the Middle East and 
supposed sources of institutional stability.  
Notwithstanding diplomats’ claims of “resilience”, all three foreign ministries have 
shown to be malleable. The establishment of syndicates and committees in the 
Tunisian case suggest “material effects”, while in Egypt collective public voice and 
 
537 Interview with Tunisian diplomat, 5 September 2017. 
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shifting staffing policies stood out as a notable change. By regionally zooming out of 
Yemen, this chapter contextualized and qualified the Yemeni experience, producing 
findings that add to a picture of heterogeneity between and within diplomatic services. 
A look at Tunisia and Egypt lends support to the argument that diplomatic institutions 
are fragmented, ambiguous, highly responsive to environmental change and marked 
by unique institutional histories. Further research is required to explain the occurrence 
of singular commonalities, such as the formation of syndicates, which cannot be 
treated as self-evident but may variously be related to inter-system exchange, 
processes of emulation, human socio-psychological (re)actions, and similar 
institutional set-ups, among other things. 
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9 Conclusion: Navigating Uncertainty Inside Yemen’s 
Diplomatic Service  
 
 
This study focused on Yemeni diplomats and diplomatic practice to examining how 
political conflict in Yemen has played out within the country’s diplomatic corps since 
2011. Drawing on ethnographic data produced during nine months of multi-site 
fieldwork, it analysed the complex interplay of socio-political, personal, and material 
forces that informed the contested maintenance and partial reworking of Yemeni 
foreign policy institutions at a time of crisis. It argues that since 2011, Yemen’s 
diplomatic corps has experienced simultaneous continuity and change – a paradox 
that can only be grasped by conceptualizing the Yemeni foreign service as a dynamic, 
fragmented and internally uneven socio-material institution.  
Rather than approaching this investigation through a single theoretical and 
methodological framework, a wide range of methods, sources, and concepts were 
combined to effectively obtain and analyse data. The adoption of an opportunity-driven 
and flexible multi-method approach helped overcome barriers of access during 
fieldwork. Likewise, a postfoundational perspective suited this project’s inductive and 
question-driven content analysis. No a priori commitment was made to a particular 
theory or disciplinary tradition. Instead, concepts and theoretical tools were chosen 
and selectively applied for their relevance and explanatory value. 
This study adopted an actor- and practice-based approach that offered unique insight 
into the micro-level dynamics of change and continuity. In fact, practice theory has 
long been described as a uniquely suited tool in the analysis of social reproduction 
and transformation (Bueger, 2014). Crucially, the practice idiom moved this project’s 
analytic glance beyond the macro-level façade of a single continuously operable 
diplomatic service, facilitating the analysis of underlying conflict, unevenness, and 
change. Like Jones and Clark (2015), this project found that “big pictures” produced 
through diplomatic practice “had a particularly grubby microcontext: the practices of 
diplomacy are frequently not the epitome of etiquette or realms of detached high-
standing, but rather worlds of everyday activities, personal animosities and individual 
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frustrations.” (p.4). The study of micro-level diplomatic practices facilitated the in-depth 
analysis of (re)produced geopolitical representations at the macro-level, notably 
including statehood and concomitant notions of state legitimacy and sovereignty. 
The practice theorem also managed to conceptually span the social and material 
aspects that informed this project’s analysis of the Yemeni diplomatic service. In fact, 
the conceptualization of diplomatic practice as a meeting point of agency and structure 
offered a more dynamic perspective than “classical” approaches such as Gidden’s 
structuration theory (Bode, 2015). This made it particularly useful in studying social 
phenomena of fluidity, change, and reproduction.  
This project defined diplomatic practice as the “doings and sayings” of diplomats. As 
such, it comprised singular and short-lived as well as collective and temporally 
extended activities (Rouse, 2007). This broad theoretic approach facilitated the 
analysis of diplomatic behaviour in a moment of crisis, when routine practices were 
interrupted and new practices emerged, both long- and short-term.   
Numerous scholars have called for more empirical research of practices, which may 
put complex theoretical elaborations to the test (Bueger & Gadinger, 2018). This 
project contributes to ongoing debates on international and diplomatic practice by 
pointing to challenges in the conduct of empirical practice research, while 
simultaneously offering a theoretical approach that moves away from the focus on 
background, or implicit, knowledge. Rather than perceiving diplomats as thoughtless 
implementers and carriers of routinized patterns of practice, this project focuses on 
their creative agency. It finds that in “critical moments” (Boltanski and Thev́enot, 1999), 
diplomatic practice is reflective and informed by socio-material factors that transcend 
the boundaries of diplomats’ professional environment. Interested in diplomats’ 
behavioural choices and strategies, this study followed Bode (2018) in arguing that 
the portrayal of practices “as reflective rather than as only based on tacit knowledge 
highlights how actors may creatively adapt their practices to social situations” (Bode, 
2018, p. 293).  
 240 
I Comprehending change: a study of crisis, reform, and agency 
This thesis argued that the Yemeni diplomatic service is marked by considerable 
fluency and internal difference, reproduced over time through changes in materiality, 
power relations, and embodied diplomatic practices. It indicated that institutional 
boundaries are highly permeable, allowing broader socio-political change to impact 
internal institutional dynamics. Yemeni diplomats, as emotion-capable actors who 
inhabit both professional and non-professional roles, carried broader societal shifts in 
sentiment, aspiration, and opinion into the foreign ministry. Regime change and war 
thereby translated into a particular professional challenge, marked by shifting and 
diversifying diplomatic practices and attitudes.  
These insights challenge mainstream portrayals of bureaucratic state institutions as 
impersonal, stable, and “sealed-off” realms filled with “neutral” and emotionless civil 
servants. They also highlight the need to question existing depictions of the foreign 
service as a conservative, even counter-revolutionary force (Sharp, 2009; Ross, 2007; 
Frey & Frey, 2004). By conceptualizing the Yemeni diplomatic corps as a microcosm 
shaped by broader political and social trends, this study suggested that resistance and 
contestation are as common within as they are outside state institutions.  
In the context of the 2011 uprising, Yemeni diplomats developed a variety of new 
behavioural strategies, including both voice and exit, that sparked controversy within 
the diplomatic corps. The expression of public voice in particular triggered disputes 
about diplomats’ freedom of expression, moral integrity, and political activism. At the 
core of unfolding debates stood the concept of diplomatic loyalty and related questions 
of professionalism. Following the outbreak of war in 2015, these two notions continued 
to act as cornerstones around which shifts in diplomatic practice and institutional 
functions were negotiated. Questions of diplomatic loyalty and professionalism were 
closely tied to diplomats’ ongoing expression of voice as well as the increased 
appointment of untrained “loyalists”. Career-diplomats complained about what they 
viewed as blatant favouritism and began questioning the meaning of their positions 
and day-to-day work. Some perceived the foreign service as an emerging “welfare 
organisation” that provided safe shelter for Hadi loyalists, who were given diplomatic 
privileges without engaging in significant diplomatic work. 
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At a time of loosened control and instructions, diplomats’ behaviour became less 
routinized and predictable, leading to new expressions of diplomatic agency. In the 
face of destabilized systems of power and sudden political uncertainty, an increasing 
number of diplomats began to engage in individual and collective forms of opposition. 
Many experienced the 2011 uprising as a moment of opportunity, vocalizing long-held 
grievances regarding internal ministerial practices, specifically with regard to unofficial 
payments and appointments. In these instances, the uprising acted as a catalyst for 
an accumulated sense of frustration and bitterness. Some of the reform efforts that 
arose from these developments had “structural effects” (Mitchell,1991) that altered the 
form of Yemen’s diplomatic service. This is most notably reflected in the establishment 
of “diplomatic syndicates” (i.e. trade unions), which have been widely viewed as a 
result of the uprising.  
The study of diplomats’ shifting reproduction of socio-material institutions draws 
attention to the relationship between crisis, reform, and agency. By suggesting that 
both agency and reform were amplified in a moment of crisis, this project corroborates 
a rare historical cross-country analysis of civil service appointments (Grindle, 2012), 
which argues that, 
“new ideas about how the public sector was to be staffed found political traction 
at particular moments — a political or economic crisis, a regime change, an 
electoral draw among parties, a scandal. These moments provided reformers 
with opportunities to advance their projects” (p.2). 
As shown in this study, diplomatic agency was structured around multiple networked 
relations and positionalities, including family and regional affiliations. Diplomats’ 
agency was also materially mediated, closely interacting with financial resources, 
rewards, and risks. Concern about the safety of one’s family or the threat of 
unemployment could impact diplomats’ behavioural choices, challenging widely held 
conceptions of the diplomatic profession as stable and safe. Material anxieties 
arguably became more pressing following the outbreak of war, which placed further 
constraint on already scarce institutional resources, such as salaries and embassy 
budgets. 
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Studying the behaviour and motivation of Yemeni diplomats adds analytical depth to 
the concept of diplomatic agency. This thesis suggested that diplomats’ varying 
behavioural strategies reflect two alternative conceptual framings of the “ideal 
diplomat”: one that portrays the diplomat as an obedient civil servant, and the other 
that pictures the diplomat as an emotional political agent. Both approaches can be 
found in bureaucratic state theory as well as diplomatic theory. By arguing that Yemeni 
diplomats oscillated between these two professional ideal types in the context of 
uncertainty and socio-political turmoil, this research contributes to a more nuanced 
and “humanized” conceptualization of agents and agency in world politics. Its empirical 
findings show that “neither individuals nor groups are rational in the utility-maximizing, 
emotionless way supposed by most theories of world politics” (Crawford, 2000, p.156). 
Instead, diplomatic agency is shown to arise from a complex blend of thoughts, 
feelings, principles, loyalties, ethics, beliefs, and ambition, which are (re)formed in 
interrelation with diplomats’ broader material and social settings.  
II Continuity in the face of change 
While this study highlighted various processes of change and discussed the out-of-
the-ordinary, it also revealed numerous indications of continuity. In fact, it argued that 
the coexistence of institutional endurance and transformation constitutes a paradox 
that has historically shaped the development of Yemen’s foreign policy institutions. In 
some instances, continuity found obvious expression in the institutional status quo, 
including material structures and practices that seemed untouched by crisis. In other 
instances, continuity was the result of purposive human effort, rooted in notions of 
professionalism, pragmatism, norms of diplomatic loyalty, and ethical selfhoods. 
Rather than portraying agency as a romanticized revolutionary idea that implies 
change, this thesis conceptualised agency as an essential part of both revolutionary 
and counter-revolutionary processes.       
An obvious and important expression of continuity has been the ongoing institutional 
existence and operation of the Yemeni diplomatic service. Unlike other state 
institutions, whose material manifestation and effectiveness were impacted by 
institutional moves or duplications, Yemeni embassies’ existence and operations have 
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remained fairly untouched by domestic turmoil. While material constraints affected the 
outward appearance of some buildings and required others to be moved as a cost-
saving measure, by and large, Yemeni diplomatic structures and basic socio-material 
practices, were shielded from the conflict inside the country. Scattered at a safe 
distance around the globe, the Yemeni flag continued flying in front of embassies, 
official stamps and letterheads continued being used, and portraits, albeit replaced, 
continued decorating embassy walls.   
While these observations suggest a link between institutional continuity and material 
(infra)structures, they do not fully explain the operational endurance of the Yemeni 
diplomatic service, which was rooted in staffing policies, professional norms, and a 
range of personal thoughts and emotions. In the course and immediate aftermath of 
the uprising, Yemeni diplomats abroad were not replaced. Although resignations did 
occur in the context of the uprising, their number was low and limited to ambassadors. 
Similarly, the increasing appointment of non-career loyalists during Yemen’s civil war 
did not imply the replacement of experienced career-diplomats, who remained in 
existing posts and continued to constitute a significant faction of new appointees. The 
foreign ministry in Sanaa, albeit under Houthi control, continued to act as an important 
source of new embassy recruits. Members of the exiled foreign ministry treated 
diplomats in Sanaa as Hadi representatives, unless their loyalties were “proven” to lie 
elsewhere. 
Besides staffing policies, this study argued that the principle of diplomatic loyalty, and 
related understandings of professionalism, contributed to the ongoing operation of the 
diplomatic service. Diplomatic loyalty, as practiced and described by Yemeni 
diplomats, was theorized as a ritual performance. Closely associated with political 
neutrality and emotional detachment, it encouraged the silent observance of 
established routines. At a time of crisis, diplomatic loyalty seemed tied to the notion of 
professionalism, which emerged as an implicit baseline and threshold against which 
behavioural strategies were developed and judged.  
Notwithstanding considerable material challenges and personal inner conflict, a large 
number of Yemeni diplomats decided to stay in their profession. In the midst of turmoil, 
uncertainty, financial disadvantages, and widespread opposition against the 
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government, their diplomatic loyalty was anything but self-evident. In fact, the choice 
to continue working as a diplomat became politicized after 2011. In several instances, 
diplomats had to justify their professional behaviour to family members, friends, and 
colleagues. In doing so, they developed narratives that foregrounded their 
professionalism or their representation of the Yemeni people and country, rather than 
the regime. A large number of diplomats appeared to engage in acts of “loyal 
muddling”, trying to strike a balance between “muddling along” and quiet acts of 
subversion (Levinson, 2015). Most worked hard to combine their performance of 
diplomatic loyalty with a variety of other, sometimes opposing commitments. These 
findings indicate that agency was as much linked to continuity as it was to change. 
III Studying diplomacy from the “geopolitical margin” 
This study challenges the Western-centric bias in contemporary diplomacy research. 
Recent ethnographic studies on diplomats and diplomatic practice have mostly 
analysed diplomats in Brussels (Jones & Clark, 2015; Kuus, 2014), European foreign 
ministries (Neumann, 2005, 2007), or international organizations, such as NATO 
(Pouliot, 2010) and the UN (Jones & Clark, 2019). To date, no research has focused 
on Middle Eastern diplomats, although much has been said about diplomacy in the 
Middle East, and some scholars have ascribed a distinctive diplomatic culture to the 
region (Brown, 2003).  
The analysis of the Yemeni diplomatic service sheds light onto a range of practices 
and dynamics rarely discussed in diplomacy research. For instance, this thesis 
revealed a degree of economic constraint and unevenness that challenges 
widespread assumptions of diplomatic luxury. To emphasize the resource scarcity 
found within the Yemeni diplomatic corps and to highlight the uneven topology of 
diplomatic capacity – both within and between foreign services – this study put forth 
the concept of “poor state diplomacy”. At its core, “poor state diplomacy” addresses 
the difficult reconciliation of scarce resources with materially embedded diplomatic 
functions. In the Yemeni case, material constraint led to the development of specific 
practices and institutional dynamics. Diplomats could not afford certain diplomatic 
activities, such as dinner parties, instead taking on side jobs or relying on “additional 
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income” to ramp up their salaries. Besides such “diplomatic hustle”, some diplomats 
reported to live in less than privileged urban peripheries and several Yemeni 
embassies were in bad shape. These examples portray the Yemeni diplomatic service 
as a counter-stereotype that challenges standardized pictures of diplomatic lifestyles 
and materiality.  
More generally, this study problematizes Euro-centric imaginations of global 
diplomatic uniformity, which assume universally shared professional codes, norms, 
structures and experiences. Its insights underline the diversity of diplomatic practice 
around the world as much as within specific diplomatic services. Relatedly, its 
historical analysis complicates narratives of diplomacy’s linear and “progressive” 
global diffusion from the imagined European centre. This thesis argued that the 
Yemeni foreign service constitutes a socio-material hybrid that has been learned and 
relearned since the early 20th century, flexibly interacting with changing environments 
and individual demands. It is marked by a unique combination of “institutional 
registers”, including personalized power structures, fragmented loyalties, merit-based 
appointments, a conceptual private-official divide, and the importance of social 
relations, to name just a few examples. Some of these ideas and practices were taught 
at Yemen’s diplomatic training institute and have been codified in Yemen’s diplomatic 
law. The complexity of Yemen’s diplomatic institutional dynamics combines and goes 
beyond singular concepts such as clientelism, nepotism or merit-based bureaucracy.  
This thesis calls for greater scholarly attention to the not-so-luxurious dimensions of 
diplomacy and the uneven socio-material resources and practices outside (as well as 
within) the Euro-American orbit. Recently, a few scholars have begun examining the 
diplomacy of small states in the Caribbean and elsewhere (e.g. Wight, 2002; Cooper 
& Shaw, 2009). While the study of “small state diplomacy” points to the heterogeneity 
of global diplomatic practice, it mostly concerns itself with abstract strategies, including 
for example the formation of alliances, policies of regionalization, and tactical 
behaviour in international organizations. This approach treats macro-level factors, for 
instance the relative size of the state, as a main explanatory variable, while failing to 
capture institutional micro-dynamics, internal power struggles, and inter-personal 
differences in behaviour and attitudes. As this study argues, it is only through an actor- 
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and practice-centred approach that the divergent meanings and enactments of being 
a diplomat can be understood.  
In light of the partial and situated nature of current diplomacy research, this study calls 
for the “provincialization” (Chakrabarty, 2000) of diplomacy, which needs to be re-
thought from the “geopolitical margin”. This means acknowledging silent yet 
omnipresent references to “Europe” – defined by Chakrabarty (2000) as a hyperreal 
figure of imagination. In this study, the narratives of Yemeni diplomats were, at least 
in part, “entrapped” in European references. This was shown by self-identifying 
allusions to “third world thoughts” and the “self-evident” reflection of civil prudential 
theory in descriptions of diplomatic loyalty and professionalism. Moreover, this 
research project and its conceptual and theoretical toolkit have been conceived within 
“global academia” and are as such entangled in “the globality that the European 
modern has created” (p.46). It is debatable whether the positionality of the researcher 
– a white German PhD student at the University of Cambridge – allows for the 
development of a postcolonial perspective completely free from Eurocentrism and its 
self-serving perpetuation of power inequalities. Notwithstanding its contested 
feasibility, a postcolonial ambition guided the design and implementation of this thesis. 
Foregrounding the voice of Yemeni diplomats, it aimed to write their narrated 
ambivalences, power relations, and complexities into both the contemporary history of 
the Yemeni foreign service and into academic theory. This study thereby takes an 
important first step toward the “provincialization” of diplomacy research and 
contributes to a radically heterogeneous imagination of diplomats and diplomatic 
practice. 
Rather than developing general explanatory patterns, this thesis emphasized the 
contradictory, plural, and heterogeneous struggles that have shaped the continuous 
re-learning and re-production of the Yemeni diplomatic service. The outcomes of such 
struggles are impossible to summarize in single “schemas that seek to naturalize and 
domesticate this heterogeneity” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p.42). Instead, a postcolonial and 
postfoundational perspective is of great scholarly value, helping to critically 
deconstruct and use concepts, such as “the state” or “diplomacy”, without dogmatically 
committing to a single theoretical definition. By adopting an inductive approach that 
starts with Yemeni diplomats and their practices, this research endeavour produced 
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new insights that shed light on the notion of neo-patrimony, for instance, and on the 
resource scarcity of non-Western diplomatic services. To scale up scholarly efforts to 
“provincialize” our understanding of diplomats and diplomatic practice, more 
ethnographically inspired research needs to be conducted, especially outside of 
Europe and North America.  
IV Diplomatic practice and the global politics of stateness 
The present analysis of the Yemeni diplomatic service offered important insights into 
the Yemeni state, which stood at the core of political debate and conflict in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Building on existing scholarship that highlights the role 
of diplomats in sustaining the permanence and solidity of states (Jones & Clark, 2015; 
Sending, Pouliot, & Neumann, 2015), this project illuminated the micro-processes 
involved in such maintenance work. In doing so, it shifted emphasis toward the 
concept of sovereignty, especially its external aspects. 
Importantly, this study viewed the expression and recognition of sovereignty as the 
work of individual political agents. As such, the notion of sovereignty is shaped by 
global inequalities: powerful actors can grant or deny the status of sovereign statehood 
to less powerful others. The institution of the diplomatic service has long been 
intertwined with such uneven international politics. In fact, the global diplomatic system 
has long “stood in the service of empire building” (Constantinou & Der Derian, 2010, 
p.11), denying access to colonized “non-sovereign” actors. As illustrated in this study, 
the foreign ministry in South Yemen was the last state institution to be allowed real 
political sway and full independence by British colonizers. Born in a context of political 
oppression, the eventual establishment of a South Yemeni diplomatic service signified 
the “success” (i.e. international recognition) of the government’s sovereignty claims. 
In fact, having embassies abroad amounted to a symbolic display of its newly gained 
“state status”.   
The historical entanglement of international recognition, sovereignty, and a 
government’s successful claim to “statehood” experienced a comeback in Yemeni 
politics following the outbreak of war. Seeing its political authority severely contested 
within state borders, the Hadi government placed great emphasis on maintaining its 
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international recognition outside of Yemen. This observation builds on recent research 
proposing that external sovereignty has become a crucial component in governmental 
claims of running and representing the state. Specifically, contemporary scholarship 
suggests that the internal sovereignty (i.e. supreme political authority within a defined 
territory) of a government increasingly depends on its participation in international 
society (Eckes, 2015). The diplomatic service constitutes an important medium 
through which such international engagement takes place. In fact, this study 
suggested that a primary function of the Yemeni diplomatic service has been the 
maintenance of external sovereignty through the display of diplomatic institutions and 
the (hollow) practice of diplomatic loyalty.  
The continued operation of Yemen’s diplomatic institutions has gone a long way 
toward showcasing government authority – and functionality. Irrespective of its actual 
effectiveness, running a diplomatic service arguably allowed the Hadi government to 
demonstrate its ongoing ability to “play the game of sovereignty”, whereby “playing” 
involved the surface-level imitation of mainstream international state demeanour. 
Embassy banners advocating Yemen as a tourist destination indicate the occasionally 
cynical, insincere, and odd nature of diplomatic state projections at a time of civil war. 
Dressed in suits, Yemeni diplomats continued celebrating “national days” in foreign 
embassies around the world, attended academic events, and mingled with other 
diplomats and politicians. In the process, they nurtured the perception, if not illusion, 
of the Yemeni state as a coherent and functional political entity, “governed” by the 
“legitimate” president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Besides constructing an image of 
stable state presence, the maintenance of diplomatic buildings and ongoing 
performance of diplomatic loyalty reinforced the general bias in international affairs to 
maintain already existing state entities.  
V Avenues for further research  
Future research should further explore the role and functioning of diplomatic services 
in the Middle East and other “non-Western regions”. A comparison, for instance, would 
help develop and expand this project’s insights, further examining the (dis)similarities 
of diplomatic institutions within and beyond the Middle East. This could be done 
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through an in-depth study of the intra-regional knowledge transfer that seems to have 
taken place in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. As was suggested in this thesis, it is 
plausible to assume that diplomats of different Arab states discussed their experiences 
and learned from each other at a time of political uncertainty. Yet, this exchange of 
ideas did not result in uniform practices and similar institutional developments. While 
these dynamics could not be systematically investigated in the context of this study, 
future examination of intra-regional similarities and differences should put the notion 
of a “Middle Eastern diplomatic culture” to a test (Brown, 2003). 
A people- and practice-based approach to diplomatic services in the Middle East 
would also add novel contributions to our current understanding of foreign policy-
making in (semi-)authoritarian states. While much has been said about 
authoritarianism in the Middle East, especially following the 2011 uprisings 
(Heydemann & Leenders, 2013; Bellin, 2012), most work has focused on the national 
level (Tansey, 2016). It is only recently that international components of authoritarian 
politics have received greater attention (Tansey, 2016; Tolstrup, 2019; Escriba-̀Folch 
& Wright, 2015). Yet, little is known about the inner life of foreign policy institutions and 
the role of diplomats.  
Further research on diplomatic services in the Middle East would also advance our 
insight into the role of diplomats in times of (civil) war. Existing studies on civil war 
diplomacy show that internal conflicts can have significant international dimensions, 
for instance in Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Nonetheless, most research on “conflict 
diplomacy” focuses on the decision calculus of external states, especially those who 
choose to intervene in civil wars (Balch-Lindsay et al, 2008; Cunningham, 2010). 
Shifting focus to rebel and (exiled) government actors’ uses of diplomatic practices 
and state institutions offers a promising addition to the existing literature. It would 
further illuminate the role of diplomatic actors and institutions in competing state claims 
and explore in greater depth the concept of “war time diplomacy”. As the Yemeni case 
study suggests, at a time of war, diplomats can serve the purpose of one-sided 
advocacy and engage in the “hollowed out” performance of loyalty – aimed mostly at 
perpetuating the perception of continuous stateness.  
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A final promising avenue for research regards the concepts of diplomatic agency and 
discretion. This includes diplomats’ freedom of expression, especially with respect to 
their use of social media. The study of Yemeni diplomats has shown that the 
professional definition and boundaries of their agency were fuzzy and contested. 
While some behavioural guidelines were enshrined in law, the wording of legal codes 
was often unclear, and its application lacked consistent enforcement.  
A look at traditional diplomatic theory suggests that diplomats have long been asked 
to show “professional intimacy” at work, make judgment calls, and rely on their own 
interpretation and situational instinct.538 Striking the right balance between emotional 
agency and neutral obedience, between the following of orders and spontaneous 
personal choices, requires diplomatic discretion, which has received little attention 
from diplomacy scholars. 539  Noteworthy exceptions are Kuus (2014) and Cornut 
(2018), who both explore diplomats’ navigation of professional norms, studying not 
only “the rules of the game but more specifically the ways in which departures from 
these rules are also a part of the game” (Kuus, 2014, p.166). While not mentioning 
“discretion” as such, both authors view the deviation from (in)formal direction as a 
common practice in diplomacy. They link the use of discretion to a diplomat’s level of 
experience and skill, arguing that deviation requires a “true insider” because 
“amateurs do not know how to improvise. They perform practices mechanically, like 
actors reciting a memorized monologue” (Cornut, 2018, p.725).  
While not denying that experience plays a role in the deployment of discretionary 
practices, this study suggests that diplomats’ broader socio-political context 
constitutes a further important factor that impacts the boundaries and enactment of 
diplomatic discretion. In Yemen, the heightened emotions, cognitive liberation, and 
politicization that marked the 2011 uprising arguably enabled and motivated diplomats 
to increasingly deploy practices that pushed and renegotiated the boundaries of their 
 
538 Being modest, kind, trustworthy, and approachable, for instance, may be essential to building and 
maintaining good relationships, which in turn might benefit a diplomat’s work, e.g. in the exchange of 
information or the conduct of negotiation. Nicolson (1963) thus argues that the ideal diplomat “is 
required to cultivate the intimacy of persons of eminence or influence in the country in which he 
resides” (p.198). 
539 “The structure of rules and regulations with which bureaucrats must comply is not as tight as it may 
appear to outsiders, and it leaves significant room for discretion. This discretion, in turn, allows 
bureaucrats to develop different styles of work and to give expression to them” (Zacka, 2017, p.5). 
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professional conduct. Similarly, the rise of social media as a tool and medium of 
diplomatic practice has blurred the boundaries of discretionary boundaries, triggering 
considerable debate among Yemeni diplomats. Contemporary diplomacy research 
would benefit from a better understanding of diplomats’ discretion, especially with 
regards to their private use of social media.  
VI The relevance of ethnographic diplomacy research  
Official state diplomacy is arguably in the midst of change (Stanzel, 2018). Rapid 
societal and technological developments, specifically digitization, affect how the work 
of diplomats is understood – by themselves and by others – and changes the 
diplomatic attributes that are deemed necessary or desirable. A recent German policy 
report, titled “New Realities in Foreign Affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” finds 
that:  
“Diplomats’ responses to modern challenges often fall under the radar of gov-
ernments and the public, precisely because they do not conform to what is 
traditionally considered to be typically diplomatic” (Stanzel, 2018, p.5). 
Little is known about diplomatic actors’ changing professional worlds and professional 
practice today. Frequently “diplomacy” is referred to as a uniform and essentially 
unchanging global system, that seems secretive, sealed off, and exclusive. Academic 
and media discourse mention “the state” and “diplomacy” without breaking open and 
explaining these categories, what they contain and mean, to both insiders and 
outsiders.   
As this study has shown, ethnographic research on the micro-level is crucial to 
understanding the construction, composition, and in some cases limitations, of such 
macro-level images. While a quick glance at the Yemeni diplomatic service might 
suggest stability and institutional resilience, a micro-level perspective complicates 
such impressions. Zooming-in on the minute developments that have unfolded within 
Yemeni foreign policy institutions since 2011 reveals considerable fragmentation of 
practices and subjectivities. This highlights “the limits of a state-centred approach that 
takes for granted the idea of a centralised diplomacy and a single national voice” 
(Bonnefoy, 2018, p.51).  
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The actor- and practice-centred study of diplomacy produces nuanced insights that 
are of broader social and political relevance. After all, diplomats and their behaviours 
influence the policies, actions and self-understandings of governments. They arguably 
also impact the public’s understanding of foreign policy and international politics 
(Stanzel, 2018). In fact, the emphasis of individual agents and agency in diplomacy, 
might impact dynamics of public accountability in foreign affairs. If the diplomatic 
service is no longer seen as a dubious uniform entity, speaking with a single voice of 
authority, media and academic attention might shift to the behaviour of diplomats, 
whose action thereby becomes more accountable to the broader public.  
This research has gone beyond superficial (re)presentations of international affairs, 
wherein diplomatic institutions feature as anthropomorphic entities severed from the 
very people whose day-to-day routines make possible foreign policy, diplomacy, and, 
to some extent, the state itself. Offering a rare glance “behind the scenes” of Yemeni 
diplomacy, it has achieved a level of nuance that is crucial for informed, sensible, and 
effective foreign policy-making pertaining to the Middle East. Developing an in-depth 
understanding of diplomats and diplomatic services around the world, their 
heterogeneous challenges, subjectivities, and practices, can significantly improve how 
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